THE
MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

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THE THIRTY-FIRST ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF MODERN CHURCHMEN

By The Editor

THE thirty-first Annual Conference of Modern Churchmen was held at Somerville and Regents Park Colleges, Oxford, July 26—31. It coincided with the jubilee of the Modern Churchmen's Union, founded in 1898, and the appropriate theme selected for the consideration of the Conference was the Necessity for a Christian Modernism. This theme was treated from various points of view in the papers and addresses published in this issue.

The Conference sessions and sermons were well attended: a spirit of optimism and enterprise prevailed: comments on the papers were positive and constructive.

The term Modernism had been applied to the Liberal or Broad Church school in the Church of England by its opponents after the Modernist Movement in the Roman Catholic Church had been condemned by a Papal encyclical. We need hardly add that the designation was not welcomed by Liberal Churchmen, as they were aware how widely they differed in some respects from the Roman Catholic Modernists with whose sufferings, under Papal persecution, they sympathized strongly. Nevertheless the designation of Modernist was accepted, for, as Dr. Sanday (Lady Margaret Professor, Christ Church, Oxford) wrote:

> 'I do not disclaim the term Modernist. The name describes justly what I aim at being. I aim at thinking the thoughts and speaking the language of my own day, and yet, at the same time, keeping all that is essential in the religion of the past.'

English Modernism is a spirit, not a set of conclusions, for in the phrase of Paul Sabatier it is '*une orientation.*' It is, as Dr. Macan, Master of University College, Oxford, defined it:

> 'A modern defence of Religion, and that Religion the Christian Religion.'

Perhaps the best definition we have of English Modernism is that coined by Mrs. Humphrey Ward:

> 'Modernism is the attempt of the modern spirit, acting religiously, to refashion Christianity, *not outside, but inside the warm limits of the ancient churches*; to secure not a reduced, but a transformed Christianity.'

It is in this sense that the terms Modernism and Modernist were used at the Oxford Conference.

At no time has the Church of England stood in greater need of the spirit of simplification, comprehensiveness, fellowship and rejuvenation than to-day. And it is only a Christian Modernism which can so shape our Church's doctrine, policy and practice as will enable it to secure Christian reunion at home and provide a convincing philosophy of religion for the modern world.

In the past the Methodist and Evangelical Movements initiated a profound and far-reaching conversion in the religious and moral life of England. They set a high standard of personal piety and brought religion into the homes of the people. They secured the liberation of slaves overseas and the amelioration of the lot of child workers in our English factories and mines.

The Oxford Movement, in some respects the successor of the Evangelical Movement, was closely related to the Romantic Movement in literature and art. This Movement, while awakening in the Church of England a sense of historic continuity with the Latin Church and the duty and privilege of Church membership, unfortunately did not a little to stimulate the spirit of ecclesiasticism, clericalism and sacramentalism among the clergy at the cost of alienating great numbers of the laity. This failure was due partly to the inability of the Tractarians to understand the character of English people in the sphere of religion.

The Christian Social Movement, initiated by F. D. Maurice and his disciples Charles Kingsley and Tom Hughes, did much in Church circles to direct the attention of the educated classes to the need of social and industrial reform as a Christian duty.

The Broad, Liberal and Modernist Church Movement, by welcoming and applying the many-sided contributions of scientific research, in the spheres of historic and literary criticism of the Bible, of anthropology, of comparative religion and psychology, has initiated a process which seeks to separate the true from the false, the higher from the lower, the essential from the non-essential, in our understanding and acceptance of the quality and character of the Christian Religion. Much, however, remains to be done particularly in the sphere of a co-ordination of the positive achievements of each of these Church-reforming movements. Such a higher synthesis, which is on its way to being accomplished, should give to the Christian Religion the power to convert mankind, perhaps not to membership in any of the present existing

Christian Churches, but to whole-hearted citizenship in the service of the Kingdom of God.

Divine Sonship in the Kingdom of God in loyal and loving relationship to the Divine Father of mankind constituted the good news of the Kingdom as proclaimed by Jesus Christ. The development of many additional doctrines ensued, particularly concerning the Christian Church, its institution, ministry and functions, which although easily accounted for under the circumstances of that age and locality (and excusable if not actually laudable), are now seen in the light of historic criticism to have been no part of the original Gospel of the Kingdom of God proclaimed by Jesus, and in loyalty to the claims of which He died. This change of emphasis and content in the teaching of the Primitive Church has only been realized as the result of modern literary and historical criticism of the New Testament. This knowledge has necessitated a return to Jesus Himself and His Gospel of the Kingdom as the essential element in the Christian Religion. The realization of this has, as a consequence, emphasized the need for a great simplification in the Christian Religion itself, both in its dogmatic formularies and its ecclesiastical organization and institutions.

The Modernist does not advocate the abolition, in any drastic fashion, of these doctrines and institutions but their absolute subordination to the Gospel of the Kingdom as preached by Jesus Christ. This means that the *prime essential* of the Christian Religion is Sonship in the Kingdom of God, not necessarily membership in the 'visible Church.' The 'visible Church' when loyal to the spirit and principles of the Kingdom of God has a great part to play as the servant of that Kingdom in bringing about its coming on earth as it is in heaven. But the Church must insist that it is loyalty to the Kingdom that is primary in Christ's Religion. It is the demand for this primary position of the Kingdom of God and the secondary and subordinate position of the Church which is emphasized by English Modernism. Neither the Church nor its ministry nor its institutions are of the *esse* of the Kingdom of God. When, however, these Apostolic and post-Apostolic creations are imbued with the spirit and principles of the Kingdom of God they become its *bene esse*; and to make them such, by reformation and reinterpretation when they need it, is another essential duty of the Modernist Movement.

In so far as these two great aims of the Modernist Movement are realized by and in the Christian Churches, not only will their reunion follow as a matter of course but their influence on mankind, especially in the creation of a truly world-wide Christian civilization, will become inevitable and effective.

THE NECESSITY FOR A CHRISTIAN MODERNISM

(A LAYMAN'S VIEW)

By Sir Henry Self, K.C.B., B.D., President of the Modern Churchmen's Union

I. Introduction

THE emphasis in the title of the address I have been invited to give is upon the words 'A layman's view.' 'The Necessity for a Christian Modernism' will be the theme of this Conference, and it is a very fitting one in view of the attainment this year of the Jubilee of the Modern Churchmen's Union. It is indeed appropriate to take stock of the position and see how best we can both carry forward the great achievements of the past and fulfil our stewardship of the future. But I shall be speaking from the layman's standpoint and shall concern myself with the practical issues of the present world situation and its future trends: others more competent will be addressing you on the ecclesiastical, doctrinal and theological aspects.

It is a further indication of the general approach we should attempt to-day when we are told that the basic theme of the eighth Lambeth Conference now assembled will be upon the Christian doctrine of man. This is refreshing, and it is fervently to be hoped that the three hundred bishops so gathered together will have some far-reaching conclusions to offer on man, his nature, his destiny and the way to its attainment. This is the critical need to-day when the future of civilization is so obviously in the balance. The Lambeth Conference could not be more appropriately timed for such a purpose, but it will be fatal to the Church in its aspiration to play an effective part in human destiny if this present assembly of her leaders turns to relative trivialities of a domestic and doctrinal character. Men are looking for profound thought by the Fathers of the Church, not for controversial arguments on ritual and ecclesiastical organization — still less on abstruse and outmoded doctrinal formulae. Let the Church give a clear lead on the fundamental issues of life and men will listen — because their need is great and obvious.

It is against this background that I propose to attempt to assess the situation as it appears to the lay mind. First and foremost must come the attempt to understand where man stands to-day and whither he is heading, before we can hope to see how the

Christian religion can shape his destiny. The investigation will itself reveal whether there is a necessity for a Christian Modernism and the part it should play. In the sequel, it is to be anticipated that Modernism must in the nature of the case be essential for the forward movement of the religious life: without it, there would be lost the urge to re-expression of essential truth in the heightened form made possible by experience. Man must understand and assimilate his experience if it is to help him forward to his goal—and Modernism is that leaven of rational thought steeped in mystic insight which alone can save organized religion from lapsing into pious stagnation. Modernism is no exclusive school—all men are Modernists because and in so far as they seek to make explicit in their understanding the revelations which are implicit in their experience. With this reflection, we pass to the task of seeking in the present situation some indication of the manner in which man will need to develop his thought and practice if he is to face the future with a valid sense of purpose, a reasonable idea of his destiny, and a considered policy for its attainment.

II. The World Situation circa A.D. 1950

If we are to come to grips with the future we must first understand the past. I therefore propose, with your leave, to look back over the experience of the first half of this century and try to discern some broad principles which should have value as a guide in framing the policy to be pursued in the second half.

The early years of the twentieth century were steeped in ideas of liberal thought and administration; yet in 1911 we had the first ominous signs of the great European cataclysm. The storm was temporarily averted, but 1914 saw the outbreak of World War I which itself ended in what has now been clearly shown to have been but a truce leading to the terrible events of the last ten years.

We are thus approaching the end of five decades during which mankind has been unable to clarify its thought or to expel the stupidities which precipitated the original conflict and became particularly manifest in the psychopathic madness of Germany. Why should such a sequence of avoidable disasters have filled the working lives of the generation to which we belong?

Looking back to the years preceding 1911, could ordinary people then have imagined that the world could become involved in the first appalling war with its series of land-locked battles? Having emerged from that bitter agony, did the ordinary people over the next fifteen years contemplate the possibility of a return to a fresh bout, aggravated by a new conception of 'total war'

under which the home front became even more critical than the actual battle front? What is it in human character which can result in such failure to take hold of the real essence of experience and order international affairs in accordance with the spiritual values which have so definite a foundation in human nature and possibilities?

I think the first answer is that neither the governments nor the statesmen of the world during the past fifty years have had either the time or the will truly to understand human nature or properly to foresee its destiny. We have progressively slipped into the grave error of supposing that a materialistic civilization holds promise of leisure and comforts for the peoples which they would automatically use as the means to progress and development along the lines of inadequately conceived ideals.

This has been shown by the course of events to be a travesty of the facts. Let us pause to wonder how the German people could tolerate the appalling creed which inspired the Nazi tyranny and its lust for world power. It is not necessary for an appreciation of this to review the long line of German philosophers who lent themselves to the progressive treatment of self-assertive will as the basic key note to human nature and destiny. We have seen it so clearly manifested in action that we are the more ready to credit the fact that it is the product of a long line of perverted thought and practice.

By contrast we might consider the parallel concept of Western civilization that man is by nature good and happily placed with his feet upon a road, however long, which must inevitably lead to human culture of a high order. This amelioristic philosophy has been shown by experience to be wishful thinking of the poorest quality. There is in fact no inevitable trend towards progress: man is, in his original nature, neutral. He is neither radically evil as the Augustinians used to urge, nor is he naturally good as suggested by the Chinese philosophers such as Confucius and Mencius. He is a source of great possibilities—but possibilities both good and evil. His potentiality for good must, in the nature of the case, be matched by equal potentiality for evil.

But evil is quick in development because it is a process of destruction. All evil is, to my mind, an expression of wrongful application of human abilities inspired by the will to self aggrandizement or self-assertion. The paradox is that this effort at self-aggrandizement is contrary to the law of true progress. Such progress turns on surrender of the individual interest for the benefit of the many, so that the life of the many may in return enhance the life of the individual. But self-aggrandizement is the

reverse of this in that the individual seeks to take all he can from the world for his own use and give nothing in return. The only result is that the individual becomes purely self-centred and encased in a shell of egotism within which he is ultimately consumed by self-decay.

The eventual outcome of evil thought and practice must be the progressive suicide of the evil doer. This is as true of the nation as of ordinary men. We see war, therefore, not as the process of Spartan development but rather as the process of racial suicide. The obsession of power which leads to war is the expression of national egotism which cannot but result in the long run in self-destruction for the particular nation that persists upon such a course.

It may be, as with the individual life, that the process of self-destruction may be halted before it is complete. In that case the stopping short of the final abyss can only come from such a shock and radical change of heart as reveals the alternative possibilities of potential good which will be of a higher character than would be possible but for the evil experience. This is not to pretend that the change can be practicable without the bitterest consequences. What has been started must have its results; the nations that offend start a process which must involve terrible tribulation for themselves and for their neighbours before the world order can re-establish itself as a factor in human emergence towards a higher civilization.

The war of 1914-18 was just such a consequence. The tragedy was that men failed to realize that they were paying the cost of past sin. They were still at heart in love with their sin rather than seized with a new vision or a change of heart. The consequences were that after the house was cleansed, seven devils even more terrible took possession and plunged the world anew into the abyss from which it is now struggling to emerge.

But we are entitled at least to say this, that for all nations the experience of the last fifty years must mean heightened possibilities if only we understand its true character. We must recognize that the trials of those years have been the consequence of man's own lack of vision and understanding. Do we understand sufficiently what it has all meant so as to bring into realization the much greater possibilities which should emerge as a result of that experience? Is this not the task of Christian Modernism, as the focus of forward thinking, and the proof of its necessity?

The bitter experience of evil should open up visions of contrasted good, unknown and unknowable to our predecessors. Are we going to plumb our anguish and discern therein the heightened

ideals and principles which would otherwise have been unknowable? These must be found for the building up of the fabric of national and international collaboration from which alone a new world order can derive.

From such an analysis there is clearly for us first to see the principle that the past has been in all its misery and iniquity the expression of national self-aggrandizement. We have learned by many years of bitter agony that the law of national self-aggrandizement is contrary to the principles of an international order. The principles of an international order are compatible with those of true national development — provided always that the individual nation first gives to the world what it has so that its contribution may be returned enhanced in value for individual appreciation and development.

This must be the one basis upon which a new world order can come into being: nations must develop their individual and unique possibilities, but to do so they must conform to the international order and foster the higher life by contributing their special experience for the enjoyment of all. With the development of the world order by these contributions there will progressively emerge a unified life for humanity, enhanced by the higher conceptions which will have resulted from the common and synoptic enjoyment of the many individual experiences.

It is for nations, just as for individuals, to lose themselves and thereby re-find themselves on a higher level. In giving without seeking return we find the true basis of human progress. The return must come, but it is not the primary purpose of 'casting one's bread upon the waters.' The giving is the inspired purpose of seeking the destiny of humanity within an order where self-surrender has taken the place of self-aggrandizement. It is an act of faith that the process will first lead humanity along the road to its destiny and, secondly, ensure that the new national existence will become possible within and only within such an order.

'The essence of all this reduces to what I might recall as an application of the 'philosophy of value' on the plane of international life.' We must remedy the lack of vision among the nations as to what are the real values behind human existence. This is the supreme task of Christian philosophy. For the last fifty years we have surrendered ourselves to the fire-flies of materialism. Science has introduced into our lives so many glittering achievements and materialistic possibilities that we have come to regard them as the real values of life — so that with the attainment of radio sets, refrigerators, labour-saving devices, etc.,

we suppose we have made automatically possible a true and well-ordered human life.

These of course are not ends; they are but means. If we have no understanding of the values underlying life, then it is futile to offer to humanity leisure in which to develop the culture which those values should inspire. As with the individuals, so with the nations. The first and paramount requirement of to-day is vision as to what are the true values for which man is striving. Only with such vision can we discern the destiny of humanity.

III. Destiny of Humanity

Throughout my personal experience I have been puzzled by the absence of any clear focus of human destiny as a guide to the policies of governments. We have produced a present-day world which seems to take it for granted that the objective, whatever it may be, will be assured if only the world can be sufficiently dotted with vast congregations of human beings, each moulded on very much the same lines and enjoying the same material conditions. Provided that they could all be guaranteed social security, an adequate diet, full employment, abundant means of literary and social enjoyment, etc., it seems to be assumed that the destiny of mankind will have been achieved within the perfect environment for the expression of human culture and achievement at its best.

I beg to join issue with this conception. No one will question the need and justice of social security measures designed to guard against unemployment, disease and distress. These are the legitimate aspiration of all men for themselves and for their families in order that the great freedoms may be given full scope. But we must, I submit, be very active in coupling such a policy with safeguards against the dangers which it contains.

Reviewing history, one fact stands out with extraordinary prominence. The great ages of cultural expression and real achievement have been those in which man has been face to face with adversity and acute difficulty. Whenever conditions have been easy and living good, the thinking has become academic and the outlook complacent. Men have turned to enjoyment of the good things of the earth and thereby damped their ardour for adventure and their zest for self-expression. Their talents have been neglected and their enterprise blunted. With the passage of time the national character has taken on the colour of the individual lives and the nation has become a prey to enemies from without because of disease within.

Far be it from me to suggest that the basic measures of social

security now applied in democratic countries contain these dangers in any acute form. It is nevertheless necessary, I think, that they be drafted to avoid the individual becoming so enamoured of a routine existence in secure surroundings that he has no appetite for the more arduous and adventuresome forms of life. We are the custodians of the great traditions of the past, which must be the backbone of world thought and practice if the new order is to be worthy of its possibilities. That means that those peoples who have been entrusted with this inheritance must leaven the whole world and go forth in true missionary fashion so that the inheritance may be shared by all. How can the great expenses of the world be peopled and developed on right lines if white men prefer to remain in their own cities and lead a sheltered existence?

With this retention of the pioneering spirit we must also preserve the true incentive to human expression of ideals and values. Every man is an artist in the particular field of work for which he is suited, and he must retain the incentive to give self-expression to the conception that he develops in his own unique way of the task which life holds for him. This must and can only be by triumph against difficulty and opposition. If everything comes easily the urge to achievement rapidly fails. In short, it is essential that we so order our social legislation that man can express himself in his work and retain full incentive to do so.

It is thus, in my view, necessary to seek the objective towards which national and international government should aspire for humanity, not in the realms of materialistic benefits and conditions, but in the region of ideals and values. This last war as well as the earlier has only been possible because scientific materialism has so largely outrun the growth of true cultural insight and development. There has to be a recovery during which this disparity disappears. The wars have provided a forcing ground in which the issue has been clearly disclosed and joined. By its agony the human race has done much to overtake the lost ground and place itself in a position further to make up the leeway. It is for that reason that I stress so strongly the need for prescribing to-day a vision of the destiny of humanity which will provide a true focus for the development of international, national and individual policies.

First and foremost we must, I think, be quite clear what is the destiny of the human being. It is no part of my present purpose to enter into the realms of theological or philosophical thought other than to suggest that most men would be agreed upon the primary importance of character as the product of life. A man is only truly himself when his character has been established in

accordance with his ideals. These ideals are discerned in the light of experience and express themselves in terms of values which the man holds to be truly worthwhile.

Thus through experience we discern values and by the understanding and assimilation of our experience we build our values into the fabric of our character. I might sum up the general course of this thought in three short statements:

1. Adversity is the proving ground of experience.
2. Experience begets character.
3. Character is the fabric of humanity.

With these three principles I submit that we should conceive the real destiny of humanity as the realization, firstly, of the individual character within a free community; secondly, of national character as the basis of that free community; and thirdly, of supranational character within a world order making possible the life and self-expression of the free communities.

This vision of the destiny of mankind calls for a complete revaluation of our ideals and our values. I conceive this to be so supremely important that I do not venture to deal with specific problems and the remedies that might be called for in the present world situation. These are all-important and must be faced: but they will be better faced, and can only properly be faced, if we have concurrently a growing appreciation of the ideals and values implicit in the continued existence of mankind and its presumption to regard itself as the rightful heirs of the world.

I make this last point because it does seem that the presumption that we are the rightful heirs of creation involves very heavy responsibilities. We use the resources of the world at our complete discretion to such an extent that we may in the course of time make it impracticable for human life as we conceive it to continue. We are thus placing a time limit on our period of tenure and also assuming a definite responsibility for treating our conception of humanity as a regulative principle for our particular epoch.

This is to say that we are embarking upon a specific world order for a definite epoch. It is well that we take stock now at such a critical phase in human history, that we so order that epoch as to make it in itself a genuine expression of reality and a background of achievement worthy of incorporation in whatever may follow.

Dr. Inge has recently stressed the passing of one era and the advent of a new age. You will also recall the great emphasis placed by Whitehead on epochal world orders as a basic conception. He emphasizes that any one epoch must give way in due

time to its successor. In so doing it creates a 'stubborn fact' which becomes a critical factor in the emergence and growth of the next epoch — which may have an entirely different destiny before it. We are thus not merely qualifying our own destiny and possibilities but establishing such a stubborn universal fact as will enter into the later possibilities. In short, we shall immortalize our epoch objectively in the succeeding phase, whatever its character may be.

We cannot foresee what the character of that next epoch will be — indeed, I urge not merely that we have not yet discerned the character of our own, but that we shall not do so until we make the approach through re-examination of our ideals and our values. Then we shall bring into first expression an approach towards a new order for our own epoch. As and when that new order takes shape it will itself vary its conception of its objective and destiny. In short, novelty is intrinsic to the universe, and we must have faith in the future that we shall proceed from strength to strength rather than from disaster to disaster.

IV. Faith in the Future

This naturally leads to my next point, *viz.* faith in the future, on which I would urge the strongest possible emphasis.

Before the first world war apathy and indifference prevailed in regard to world issues: with the achievement of complete victory, apathy and indifference returned. During the course of the second world war we saw the desire to put right in a moment everything that had been allowed to go wrong over decades of apathy and indifference: with its passing, will we see the return of that apathy and indifference?

This seems an amazing position. First we sit back and let things drift for many years. Faced with an issue, we expect to solve it clean-cut more or less in a moment. 'Once and for all' is the expression. There is no such clean-cut and immediate solution to any basic problem. Even less is it possible when a malignant growth has been permitted to fester for a lengthy period. The drastic operation of the knife will have to be followed by remedial treatment over a long period before this troubled world can hope to re-establish itself on sound and healthy lines.

But even if a clean-cut, immediate solution were practicable, what would be the purpose of it? Should we then expect to have in being a world and a humanity both of them perfect and waiting on each other's mutual enjoyment? Of what value would a perfect world and a perfect humanity be in reality? The very existence of time presupposes that the world and its occupants have a purpose

calling for effort and enterprise. This means persisting imperfection which requires treatment.

The fact is that the world is imperfect and must be so for our epoch. Humanity is imperfect and must equally be so for our epoch. I need not justify these reflections on the status of the world other than to recall the fact that Nature is 'red in tooth and claw.' Nature is non-moral and operates as the background for something of a superior order clearly seeking some process of achievement.

We are sufficiently presumptuous (and rightly, to my mind) to believe that humanity is the object of this higher concern. Humanity is in process of creation and the world is the background for that process. But humanity, as the emergent evolute of this world, has many millions of years of animal ancestry and instincts. We must therefore expect imperfections in humanity and periodical throw-backs, both nationally and individually, to the earlier primitive instincts. Indeed in these last two world wars we have seen just such throw-backs on the most appalling and colossal scale.

All this brings us back to the point that we have to have faith in the future. We cannot expect by a short cut and swift expression of public indignation to eradicate all the consequences of the evil which has procured its own condemnation and execution at the hands of the tortured peoples. We must look forward to a period of whole-hearted and intense activity to bring about rightful conditions and true development.

Never again must we sink back into the apathy and indifference of the past intermingled with spurts of spasmodic indignation and activity. Herein we must confute with our practical efforts the quietest passivity of the old philosophy such as that of Lao-tse, who saw Nature as ensuring that everything would go forward for the best if only these fussy, interfering human busybodies would mind their own business and stop meddling. The trouble has been with us, not that we have meddled, but that we have not meddled enough and combined our meddling with true understanding of what we were seeking to do. We have seen what are the results of apathetic indifference: now our determination must not be to achieve everything 'once and for all,' but rather to maintain an inspired and all-pervading intensity in pursuing the development of international, national and individual existence upon principles which we regard as the true expression of our destiny.

This means that we have got to have faith in the future and take our steps one at a time, never letting go. We cannot expect to deal with the situation *in toto* but rather *per saltum*. The con-

trast is that between chewing the apple as a whole as opposed to the more refined way of dealing with one bite at a time.

We thus must face the future with confidence that we shall be able to treat it step by step as we go forward, provided we can maintain our vision clear and our energy unfaltering. Then we shall see that the ideals which we apply as the background for our activity will themselves progressively change in form as our vision becomes heightened and will guide us up the steps which we shall seek to take one by one.

If we do not recapture our faith in the future because of the failures of the past we shall deny our faith in any real destiny for humanity. After all, why did the failures occur in the past if not because of human stupidity and indifference to the ideals which we knew were already within our experience? Because we have failed to be true to ourselves in the past is no reason to suppose that the universe is not amenable to human progress or that we must always fail in realization of our ideals. This would be to sink into the philosophy of pessimism with a vengeance.

I urge, therefore, the predominant need for the leaders of the world to find breadth of view and length of vision as the first basis of their approach to the post-war world. With those characteristics we must plead fervently for the discernment of true values by means of that supreme quality of statesmanship, to wit, judgment.

The judgments of to-day are the determinants of what we become to-morrow. Each day is sufficient to itself but establishes an immortal fact which in part determines to-morrow. So we must see that our private, national and international judgments will be the determinants of the order and the destiny that we are seeking. That is the keynote of so-called 'Christian Modernism' and the evidence of its necessity to-day.

V. The Church and Post-war Development

It is here that we come closely to grips with the function of the Church in the post-war world. If judgment is to be sound and vision bright it will only be because the Church is the living expression of the driving spiritual forces immanent in mankind. There must be springing from the Church that continual urge towards expression of truth and discernment of real spiritual values which constitutes a perpetual challenge to world thought whilst providing the necessary guide to its practice. That urge is the expression of Modernism in working practice.

Right living and good conduct should necessarily flow as a consequence of true vision and understanding. The development of real character means that a man's conduct will be right because

it is the only possible expression of his character. First, therefore, he must build his character, and for that he must be guided to understanding of rightful ends and true values.

We have not had in the past fifty years a clear understanding as to what are the true spiritual values guiding the destiny of mankind. Here is the real crying need for the world, to wit, that the Church should without fear or hesitation come out into bold and effective utterance of the critical beliefs and values which underlie her philosophy. Never in history has there been a more clearly defined opportunity for the expression of such basic belief. For the Christian philosopher the destiny of mankind has been revealed once again by the course of the present crisis. The Christian Modernist urges that the revelation be proclaimed to the world.

We have seen a challenge, without counterpart in history, of the moral verities which man had previously claimed to underlie the structure of the universe. That challenge went forward with seemingly ineluctable success. For years we saw the tide roll onward, but in the last phases we witnessed the ebb of the flood and a counter movement towards the validation of those moral values which had been so rudely and outrageously challenged.

It is well on such occasions to go back and see what the old prophets conceived to be the course of events when these moral verities are challenged. Nowhere in human experience or literature is there to be found anything to equal the insight of the prophets of the Old Testament culminating in the vision and revelation of Jesus of Nazareth. Those prophets referred over and over again to the process of iniquity as developing what they term 'an indignation.' This process goes forward with snowball effect till a grand climax is reached which they term 'the accomplishment of the indignation.'

Here we must not confuse our human ideas of hot anger with the prophetic 'indignation.' It is only human feelings which read hate into the conception. It is in fact the cold and austere relentlessness of destiny which is piled up by the process of iniquity in its affront to the moral law. The 'dignity' of the moral law is challenged and the 'indignation' flows forward to its 'accomplishment' when the retribution is complete.

Surely the amazing manifestation of this moral process over the past years enables the Church to go forward with overwhelming emphasis on the fact that the universe is based on that moral order which is the basis of Christian philosophy?

With this background we then have the possibility of developing progressively the Christian view of the universe as founded in

spiritual values and sustaining a process for the creation of living human personalities — each expressing in his own unique way certain spiritual values discerned in experience as he goes forward.

But first what, in short, do we mean by this phrase 'spiritual values'? A review of the values implicit in life cannot be here attempted, nor can I hope to bring out the practical values which underlie every thought, word and deed of our working days. But at least I can recall the central belief in three standard strands of value, to wit, the True, the Good, and the Beautiful.

These essential strands are so expressive of the critical thought and practice of the Christian Church that I need not expand the theme beyond observing that the True, the Good, and the Beautiful are yet but three strands intertwined in one. We recall that 'Though I have the gift of prophecy and understand all mysteries, and all knowledge; and though I have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing.'

Charity is not a matter of gracious expenditure of trifles by the few to eke out the miseries of the many. It is the uniquely Christian virtue which we to-day hesitate to mention, *viz.* Love. It is not love as normally conceived. It is not desire, still less lust. It is that spiritual force which strives with man in man—that urges him towards his destiny — that inspires him to surrender his life to his fellows that thereby he may re-find his true self and theirs. It is not odd when we have seen the forces of evil staging their fierce challenge that we should pause and consider whether indeed the ultimate power of the universe is that which we call Love. And yet this is your belief — and mine.

We affirm that this universe is grounded in moral verities, in aspirations of beauty, and in ideas of the true. We assert that these are subsumed and preserved in all their fullness within the overriding principle that the ultimate law of the universe is the law of love, that is, of self-surrender.

This is as true for the nation as for the individual. If we wish to see a new world order within which national and individual lives may be really possible, it must be by this recognition that the law of self-surrender is the basic principle of that universe within which we seek our destiny. Man is organic to the universe and must express himself in accordance with its fundamental principle or perish.

VI. The Church and Humanity

If, then, the universe is founded in spiritual values we have to understand what is the significance of its process, firstly, for the individual, and secondly, for humanity.

For the individual we have discussed already the fact that values are assimilated through experience into the fabric of character, but I did not then intrude this further thought that character is itself the home of something which lives and has its being within the timeless spiritual realm. I mean here, if I may, to emphasize character as the home of living personality. This is the distinctive characteristic of the Christian philosophy and one that has to be driven home if we are to counter the after-effects of the noisome Nazi creed.

It is because character is conceived to be something lifeless and static that we lose so much of the force of the appeal which comes from living personality. I would therefore urge that we seek once again to bring out into clear relief the essence of Christian philosophy as coupling what is termed 'the philosophy of value' with 'the philosophy of personality.'

For the individual, therefore, we must proclaim a destiny of so living that he gathers to himself the values discerned and actualized through his experience so that they become the fabric of his character, which itself is the body of his new being, to wit, his 'personality.' But if this be so there is a sequel. Personality can only respond to personality. This is unfortunately manifest in particular fashion in the tragedy of Europe.

Why, after all, did the Nazi creed bite into and pervert the very lives and thought of the German youth? It was that perversion which provided the background for Naziism in all its terrible manifestations. The essence of their appeal was to place a mythical figure at the centre who represented the central thought of their pagan creed. But they proclaimed a living individual as this mythical focus and developed around him an order and a ceremonial which ensured popular belief in his super-destiny and status. By the appeal of a living focus they drew forth from the inner psychology of German youth a determination to achievement which has been all the more tragic in its pursuit because it was a perversion of the real possibilities in human life.

What, then, is the answer of the Church to this tragic lesson of the past? Surely it must be with the proclamation again and again of God as Living Personality? It is because we have lapsed so much into the realm of ethics and the cold, austere order of principles that we tend to miss the living pulsation of divine thought and being which is the real core of existence.

But again, where does man find the focus of God as Living Personality? This is the crux of the message the Church has to give to the world. The Personality of God is for mankind focused in the Eternal Christ, whom we believe to have been manifest in

the person of the man, Jesus of Nazareth. In His life we have the revelation of the Personality of God living under human conditions and portraying before us the central theme that for man life must be an adventure pursued in faith that the world is founded in spiritual values and sustained by God as Father. In this historic focus each and every man can find his own conception of his destiny and the channel of approach to the Eternal Christ, on Whom is focused that spiritual and timeless order wherein we shall ultimately find our own destiny once our potential spiritual values have been actualized and built into our character as the body of our spiritual personality.

So, as Modernism has always sought to emphasize, Christology is still the key to Christian theology. The Church must re-proclaim the Eternal Christ on Whom humanity is focused and in Whom each and all must find his destiny. This has to be reaffirmed with the parallel belief that the immanent urge of the universe is the Holy Spirit.

With the re-statement of the doctrine of the Trinity we have the culminating conception of the individual personality at its highest as the temple of divine indwelling wherein the immanence of the Holy Spirit and the transcendence of the Eternal Christ come to full intercommunion as the Living Presence of God. In the heights of such spiritual experience the individual is caught up from his separate existence in time and partakes in the boundless and timeless experience of the spiritual realm. This, then, is so supremely real for the mystic that existence in time finds its true status as the crucible wherein will be actualized the timeless jewel of personality, forged within that flux of tribulation and tragedy which serves to purge away the dross of egotism.

This is the approach of the individual, to wit, to discern in the focus of the Eternal Christ the spiritual values possible for his own individual life and, by living and actualizing them, finally to develop his own spiritual being as personality which will find its destiny within the realm of spiritual being.

In so doing he becomes a life-cell within the body of spiritual humanity, already existing here as a counterpart of that timeless society which we dimly discern beyond our ken. The old theological term of *Ecclesia* is pregnant with this thought that the Church should be the visible counterpart on earth of the eternal City of God, and as such the home of spiritual humanity. The idea is affirmed and re-expressed in the *Epistle to the Ephesians*, and should be for us the central theme in explaining the destiny of mankind and the means to its attainment.

Could we not vitalize human thought and action with this

belief in God as Living Personality and humanity as His living body, animated in all its parts by His presence and inspired with His vision and strength? This would reveal to each and all a destiny to be discerned within their inner lives by direct spiritual communion with the Eternal Christ and sustained by communion within the living body of the Church which offers itself as the Temple of God.

Such I conceive to be the fundamental message of Christian Modernism and the evidence of its necessity. That message I sum up in three thoughts:

(*a*) The Church is the proclaimer of the spiritual values by which the universe is sustained;

(*b*) It is the manifestation here and now of the timeless society which calls each and every human being to a spiritual destiny within its company; and

(*c*) The message must be crystallized in the appeal of the Personality of the Eternal Christ to the individual as a growing personality in his wanderings through the school of experience which this universe is planned to yield.

THE CAUSES OF CHRISTIAN MODERNISM

By Professor S. A. Cook

THE word Modernism first came into general use with the notorious Encyclical of Pius X in 1907. It is unnecessary for me to speak about the rise and fall of Roman Catholic Modernism, but it is worth noting that a recent Jesuit review wisely observed that

> 'the danger of Modernism will continue as long as the questions asked by the Modernists remain unanswered.'[1]

Yes! Our Modernism turns upon a number of questions. They are questions that are increasingly urgent; and they involve problems upon the solution of which we are not all agreed. Perhaps as individuals we are not wholly in agreement as to which questions are the most fundamental. Modernism has two sides, a negative and a positive: on the negative side it is critical, on the positive side it is a declaration of certain principles.

In this paper I shall endeavour to state what Modernism means for me. I shall divide it into three parts: (1) a brief summary of

[1] See D. A. Binchy, 'The Modernist Movement,' in *The Cambridge Journal*, I, 4 (January, 1948); pp. 220-232.

the four main factors that have brought Modernism to the front, (2) a more extended survey of the conclusions I draw from them, and (3) some remarks upon the task of Modernism.

Four Main Factors

The four main factors fall into two pairs : (*a*) Biblical Criticism *and* Comparative Religion, and (*b*) the progress of knowledge and thought *and* the current situation. Now, in a sense, we are all of us Modernists, even as every intelligent reader of the Bible is to some extent a critic. We cannot help applying ordinary principles of common sense and reason; and we are influenced, however unconsciously, by the intellectual atmosphere in which we live. But we do not always realize how greatly this atmosphere differs from that of a few generations ago, how old and new ideas and forms of thought are jostling each other to-day, and how often we are really trying to pour new wine into inherited bottles and put new patches on to old hand-me-downs.

Modernism in general and Biblical Criticism in particular reflect a certain attitude, a spirit; they involve specific ideas, conclusions and the like; and I am anxious at the outset to emphasize the fact that there is, or can be, a difference between our general attitude or approach and the view we hold as individuals. The Roman Church denounced the immanentism of its Modernists and accused them of agnosticism and atheism. But obviously I should not be justified in saying that every Modernist or Biblical critic, as such, holds the particular views which I, or anyone else, rightly or wrongly associate with Modernism or Biblical Criticism. Neither of these is a creed or a system, still less a philosophy; and I should like to add — parenthetically — that it is the absence of a systematic philosophy which, in my own opinion, weakens both.

Biblical Criticism has grown up from small beginnings; and it can safely be said that no modern book of any value on the Bible, whether Roman Catholic or other, fails to betray some traces of its influence. But there are pseudo-critical and pseudo-modernist books. They seem to be written from a modern standpoint, but they can scarcely be called useful contributions to the subject. If I say that I do not believe that Moses wrote the Pentateuch, or that the Fourth Gospel, as a historical source, is inferior to the Synoptic Gospels, I am merely holding certain critical views; I cannot be called a Biblical critic unless my views are part of a network of supporting arguments. In other words, Biblical Criticism is a discipline; and the same could be said of Modernism.

There are, of course, books that betray a crude rationalism;

they are negative and destructive. But the true critic has a constructive aim; it is to elucidate the Bible, and pursue the questions which he finds confronting him. There are many admirable critical books that are both lucid and immediately helpful for the ordinary intelligent reader. But I must also add that much work is being done along more specialist lines, work that is not of general interest — it seems academic, antiquarian, remote from life, work the value and relevance of which cannot at once be recognized. None the less, one can never tell when some apparently recondite enquiry will suddenly be found to have a bearing upon questions of immediate importance. Both Biblical Criticism and Modernism have short-term and long-term aims. They are confronted by urgent questions — and people demand simple answers to what they think to be simple questions. At the same time, the long-term aims are gradually building up a new background of knowledge and thought; and I would assert that these long-term aims are more 'cultural' — in the best sense of the word.

Next, as regards Comparative Religion. Like Biblical Criticism it has humble origins, but it has reached the stage where the questions it raises require more adequate answers than they usually receive. Comparative Religion has come to stay, and it behoves us to take it seriously. Some writers on the subject are merely destructive, some uncritically sympathetic, and some use their material merely to display the intrinsic superiority of Christianity. But Comparative Religion, like Biblical Criticism, is a serious discipline. It is concerned with what other people evidently believe to be most real and true; and sooner or later we find that we have to consider very carefully the relation between what was true for them and what is true for ourselves here and now. I myself am convinced, upon what seem to me to be objective grounds, that the future of civilization depends upon the revival of Christianity; but I am bound to admit that the more ready I am to recognize the hand of God in human history and in the world's religions, the more difficult and delicate I find the task of Modernism to be.

I have mentioned as the third factor in Modernism the progress of knowledge and thought. Biblical Criticism and Comparative Religion form a great landmark in human history; and I would add that Sir James Frazer's innumerable and attractive works on folk-lore, custom and myth have probably done more than anything else to influence *popular* ideas of religion. And while Darwin and his successors have told us of the lowliness of human origins and our relationship with the sub-human world, anthropology has thrown light upon the very rude beginnings of our civilization. Moreover, psycho-analysis has devastatingly ex-

posed the springs of our instincts and emotions, the secrets of our inmost selves. (And I must add, in passing, that if the literature of psycho-analysis is sometimes nauseating, the ruthless criticism of our most cherished convictions can be more than distressing.) At the same time, the exponents of psychical research are compelling our attention to the strange and often inexplicable material which they claim to be authentic.

The advances in science — in physics — have shown that we are infinitesimally insignificant beings in an incredibly vast universe whose age is such that man is, as it were, the creation of yesterday. None the less, how stupendous are the claims of religion, and with what overwhelming pride and Titanism some schools of thought proclaim that man now holds the keys of the future in his own hands! Science is accustoming us to the conception of an unceasing flux; and the effects of two disastrous wars and the desperate vehemence of certain social-political movements have made us vividly and disturbingly conscious of the possibilities of a world-wide collapse. In fact, through the disintegration of the atom we have come to learn of the immense possibilities of atomic energy for man's good or evil at the very time when the disintegration of our inheritance is feared by many thoughtful observers. We witness the decline and fall of an old world-outlook, and have not yet succeeded in framing another to take its place.

Such is the present situation, and it is unnecessary to dilate either upon the practical difficulties of our age, or upon the absence of harmony and cohesion in current lines of theological and philosophic thought. We should agree that our hope for the future lies in the education of the masses, but have we any coherent teaching to give them? Little wonder that there is bewilderment and confusion among them. Here an Anglican Bishop denies the physical Resurrection, and there an Anglican Dean identifies himself with Communism. Many earnest humanists would favour a secularist education; and if we say that any religion is better than no religion, we have only to mark the vogue of Oriental theosophy, occultism, spiritualism, and the cult of the numinous for its own sake.

Roman Catholicism has its age-long and highly elaborate philosophy. Communism, in its turn, has a philosophy that deserves more expert and public criticism than it usually receives. In between these two protagonists there is no philosophical or coherent system, and it is notorious that we as a people are equally averse from philosophical argumentation and from any penetrating theological discussion. No one factor by itself is the root-cause

of our present discontents; and, speaking for myself, I hold that the task of Modernism is to restate Christianity so that it shall meet the challenge of this age in a way that — as I consider it — it is failing to do. And this requires both great faith and much laborious thought.

Conclusions from these Factors

I turn now to the second part of this paper, and shall mention some of the conclusions at which, I think, we can safely arrive. I start with Biblical Criticism. Its foundations are two : the exercise of reason and one's personal faith. For example, on rational grounds I may say that I can or cannot accept a particular narrative as historical; or, here are conflicting records, which shall I accept? But as I proceed farther my personal beliefs are involved. Thus, the present stage of Old Testament criticism was in its origin powerfully swayed by the profound spiritual teaching of the great prophets. We cannot pass to them from the Pentateuch, and we gain an intelligible view of the outline of the history and religion of Israel only when we treat the Pentateuch *in its present form* as post-prophetic.

Similarly as regards the New Testament, the more we are impressed by its freshness and dynamism, the more is it impossible to deny the historical existence of Jesus, even though on rational grounds it is difficult to write His life as we should like. Nor can we give a reasonable account of the Bible and of Christendom unless we recognize that the rise of Christianity was a unique spiritual event unlike anything we find elsewhere. Yet it is obvious that these feelings and convictions are not shared by everybody; and equally obvious that everywhere my faith may be imperfect and my reasoning at fault.

In the case of the Old Testament itself the spiritual value of the great reforming prophets is, in my opinion, overvalued by some critics, and undervalued by others : questions of reason and of religious belief are involved. Again, I myself consider the Mosaic Age a religious landmark in the ancient history of the Middle or Near East; but there is wide divergence of opinion when we come to consider what were the religious conditions in Israel in the time of Moses, and what he actually achieved. Also, when I read the Second *Isaiah* I am convinced that behind it lies a profound spiritual development, but I am quite unable to determine conclusively the course of the history. Personal belief and reason interact, and it might be argued that I wrongly interpret *Isaiah* chapter liii, one of the most impressive of all chapters in the Old Testament.

There is diversity of critical treatment as regards the Old Testament and the New. This is due partly to the difference of content and the circumstances of their origin, but partly also to matters of religious faith. On the plainest of historical, archaeological and other grounds the two Testaments cannot be separated. But while some writers virtually ignore the Old Testament, others criticize it very freely, and accept principles of criticism which they would hardly apply to the New. And while some fail to do justice to the progressive development as we pass from the one to the other, there are others who concentrate so exclusively upon the Old Testament that they seem to forget that the New Testament is both the sequel to the religion of the Old, and is also the inauguration of a new epoch. In a word, we must not treat the history, religion and theology of the Old Testament in and by itself.

Religion and history interact: religion can influence history, and the history of the past can influence religion: our own personal religion is affected by our past and affects our ideas of the future. The Old Testament, on the critical view, reflects the teaching of the prophets; but its perspective of the past obscures, or rather, it ignores, the part played by the prophets and the sweeping vicissitudes in the religion of Israel. Consequently, although the Book became the foundation and backbone of Judaism, it stood in the way of the Jews when there arose the great prophetic movement from which sprang Christianity. We in our turn may be hampered by a false or imperfect perspective of our own history.

How does the critical view of Biblical History affect us? Old Testament criticism involves some sweeping literary-historical theories; on these there is broad agreement. It involves reconstructions of the course of history; and upon these there is considerable disagreement. Some reconstructions are considered too drastic, others too conservative. As it stands, the Old Testament does not give us a progressive development of religion, whereas the Bible as a whole places man and the world within a religious frame from the Creation of the World to the last chapters of the *Book of Revelation* — it begins and ends with a world-view. Now this, our criticism fails to do. If I say that 'in the beginning God created heaven and earth,' I am expressing my religious belief. But I also need a reasonable synthesis, and I may attempt to replace the early chapters of *Genesis* by what I can learn from science. But even then, unless I keep my faith and my intellect in separate compartments, I must aim at a closer interrelation between religion and our scientific knowledge of the universe than prevails

to-day; I must build up a new background of religious and positive knowledge.

When we take a wider view of the lands of the Bible we go outside Israel and Palestine to Babylonia and Egypt, to Persia and the Hellenistic world, and thence we pass to the influence of Greece and Rome, and to the spread of Christianity in the West. In this way we are gaining a new background upon which to place our critical study of the Bible. Now the rise of Christianity is, objectively, a tremendous historical fact. But we cannot view the rise of the New Israel, the Israel of God, apart from the fall of the Old Israel. At that fateful time what could seem to have been more admirable than Jewish ethical monotheism? Yet it was superseded. In and behind the Bible is the record of the election and subsequent rejection of Israel, a tragedy which we cannot take too seriously. A religion may prove to become inadequate for its age; and our own religion, too, might in its turn fail to meet the demands of our age. This is one of the most impressive warnings we can take from the past.

Biblical history tells us of growth and failure, of decay and rebirth. Zephaniah condemns the scepticism of his day: 'The Lord will not do good, neither will he do evil'—God doesn't count! How well we can understand that opinion! But the years pass, and in the Second *Isaiah* we reach the peak of the religion of Israel. Later, Kohéleth (*Ecclesiastes*) reflects current pessimism; again the years pass, and the triumphant faith of Christianity arises. Philo of Alexandria represents, in my opinion, the swan-song of the old pre-Rabbinic religion; but the Fourth Gospel gives Philo's conception of the Logos a new and pregnant meaning, to which I shall have to refer later. We have in the Bible high-pitched expectations, extravagant millennial dreams, the coming Day of the Lord—but history pursues its course. There are the simplest of truths, but they have theological and philosophical implications; there are individualistic reforms, but their teaching must be adapted to social and institutional needs. We have everything to learn from those relatively few centuries which culminated in the rise and early spread of Christianity.

The outstanding spiritual periods have been periods of the 'criticism' of religion. The prophets—and Jesus was a prophet—condemn the religious and social abuses of their day, the lack of belief, the hollowness or inadequacy of the religion. They were more than humanists or social reformers; and the stronger their faith the sharper their criticism. At the great pregnant periods of the past there is a reassertion and restatement of the basic ideas of the interrelation between God, man and the world as man con-

ceives it to be. In one form or another this pattern is fundamental in religion and it has to be formulated afresh to-day.

I turn now from Biblical Criticism to Comparative Religion. Christianity is one of other religions; it has its content and its history, and it is helpful to see how other religions have dealt with the great problems of life and experience. Much can be learnt from their vicissitudes, their varieties of emphasis, the things they do or do not consider essential. And the more sympathetically we approach them, the more necessary it is to pursue steadily the questions which they bring us.

God has not left Himself without a witness; in the words of St. Peter,

> 'He has no favourites; he who reverences Him and lives a good life in any nation is welcomed by Him.'[2]

The late Archbishop of Canterbury once spoke of the One God of Heaven and Earth as using the figure of Yahweh, the God of Sinai, as the medium for His revelation of Himself.[3] And when we look more widely afield, *e.g.* at the noble ethical Indian Varuna, or Zoroaster's Ahuramazda, not to mention many another, may we not extend Dr. Temple's remark? We who believe in God must surely consider very carefully both our ideas of revelation and inspiration, and our explanation of the points of similarity and difference between our conceptions of God and those that we find elsewhere, especially among the higher religions.

From the several religions and a comparison of their main features we may be inclined to frame a theory of the absolute development of religion and of its future. There are some who would agree with Frazer that an age of magic, followed by religion, will culminate in an age of science. Religion has had its day, and religion, in the words of a recent scientific Communist, is

> 'a system of fantastic beliefs founded not on knowledge but on lack of knowledge.'[4]

Or is religion too supernaturalistic and 'other-worldly'; is it to become purely immanentist, or merely a personal matter divorced from science and public life? We are only too well aware of the conflicts in the realm of thought as regards religion and its future, and my sole concern is to stress my conviction that it is not enough for us individually or collectively to affirm the faith that is in us; we have to demonstrate the objective validity of our religion, and that means that we must be able to meet our rivals or opponents on their own ground.

[2] *Acts* x, 35; Moffatt's translation.

[3] *Mens Creatrix* (1917), p. 304; cf. the writer's *The 'Truth' of the Bible*, p. 191.

[4] Maurice Cornforth, *Science versus Idealism* (1946), p. 257.

There are four preliminary points to which I should now like to draw your attention. In the first place, characteristic of religion is the recognition of the sacred, the holy or the transcendent, the experience of something vastly more real than this world of space and time. We have our own profound experiences when we are conscious of the break between them and our ordinary life. But we must not ignore the extreme and irrational tabus in religion, the vagaries and aberrations, the unethical, anti-social and abnormal exhibitions of human nature. Everything turns upon the matter or content of the experiences, upon their practical and social value. We must not confuse the psychic and the spiritual. St. Paul distinguishes between the more biological *psyche* and *bios* and the spiritual *pneuma* and *zōē*. What is psychic may be spiritual, but not necessarily; and in religion, there is much that is of spiritual worth but has no psychic features. The fact is that we have to reckon with such phenomena as false prophets, false Messiahs, and with what looks like religion but is contrary to its highest ideals. We have to distinguish between what is psychologically or subjectively religious but, objectively, often hardly deserves to be so styled. What claims to be 'religious' must be judged by its fruits.

The second point is concerned with the two main types of gods, spirits and other beings with whom religion peoples the world. There are the gods who stand in some sort of personal relationship with men, and there are those who are regarded as active causes — they are explanatory. This, of course, is to put it much too briefly, but my point is, that the former are more personal, the latter more impersonal. There is a difference between the personal relationship, 'I and Thou,' and the impersonal and more descriptive 'I and It.' Our description of the world, the universe, is on the intellectual plane; our place in it concerns our personal faith. Modern knowledge enables us to say a great deal about the world of nature and man, but we must not leave ourselves out of the picture; and what we are to think of ourselves, our destiny and the unseen involves our religion. The problems of ourselves and of our total environment are the concern of the sciences of man and nature; but sooner or later science and religion are found to be inextricably interwoven.

My third point is the care taken in religion to preserve social unity and the relations between men and the sphere of the sacred, the holy and the transcendent. Group-unity, on whatever scale and for whatever purpose, requires sufficient harmony of life and thought among the individuals that constitute the group. As society becomes more complex individual needs and aspirations become

more variable; men have their diverse religious, aesthetic, intellectual and other needs. There is always some tension between the individual and the group or groups to which he belongs; and how to reconcile, control or suppress the differences has been an age-long problem. The totalitarianism of to-day is repressive and materialist; whereas the religious ideal of the Body of Christ is that of diversity within unity; men have different gifts and endowments, each has something to contribute to the whole. The problem of social unity is thus approached along two lines, from two directions: from the social-economic structure and from the spiritual ideal of Christian unity. But the lines do not meet.

And the fourth point is this. If we consider the varieties of loyalty, consecration, devotion, love and infatuation, there is a certain range of subjective psychological similarity; but everything depends upon the character and worth of the object, whether it be an unseen being, a person or a cause. A man may be a devoted Nazi, Fascist, Communist or Socialist; he may devote himself to a perfectly worthless person; and in the world's religions a god has sometimes been a man's justification or precedent for evil.

The Tasks of Modernism

To-day more than ever we need to avoid confusing the psychic and the spiritual, the subjective and the objective value of any impressive manifestation of deep feeling. I must admit that the task of Modernism does not become simpler as one pursues this line of enquiry. For example, I recall the solemn words of *Matt.* xviii, 20, 'where two or three are gathered together in my name there am I in the midst of them.' There are parallels to this in Judaism and Islam, and in the old religion of India, and a writer in the *Nineteenth Century*[5] has illustrated a Russian belief in Stalin as a sort of omnipresent figure.

We have to understand and formulate as best we may the perplexing varieties of religious, pseudo-religious, and all other related types of experience. It is often said that there is in man a 'religious' instinct, he is fundamentally religious. My point is that there are fundamental urges and intuitions, but in themselves they are not necessarily religious or spiritual unless they are directed and guided in harmony with our highest spiritual ideals. Mystical experiences are psychologically akin, but in their fruits they differ widely. There are varieties of inspiration within religion and without, but they have different forms. There are similar patterns — the group-idea, the need for a God or a subject of

[5] January, 1944, p. 34.

devotion — but religion, like science and the arts, must have its criteria. It needs guiding-lines, doctrines; and although I have no desire whatever to belittle personal religion and its subjective value for an individual, only when a religion has demonstrated its objective and transcendent authority can it stand up to its competitors, rivals and foes.

God's revelation of Himself, we say, depends upon our readiness and response, upon our capacity to receive what He has to offer. We are not passive receptacles, we co-operate; and, in a sense, our religion is the result of a fusion of our human nature, our forms of experience and thought, and what we receive from our environment, from the world outside and from the promptings which come from within. Our religion, like our description of the universe, is a 'construct.' Now, God has evidently granted his creations some measure of spontaneity and freedom, else we could hardly account for the presence of so much that is evil, horrible or destructive in both nature and man.[6] We cannot sever man from the physical world; and, even as the God of Israel was the God of every Israelite and God of the Universe, so in Christianity Christ is the God of all who accept Him, and, as the Logos, He is in a sense cosmic, that is to say, Christ is in this world. More attention is, I think, now being paid to the meaning of the Logos doctrine. Christianity, said Dr. Temple, is 'the most avowedly materialist of all the great religions . . . (it) is committed to a belief . . . in the reality of matter and its place in the divine scheme.'[7] 'The Logos,' writes Professor Dodd, 'mediates God to the world both as the source of its being and as the source of knowledge in man.'[8] To quote Dr. Matthews, it is 'the immanent Divine Life in all things, which is the source of the upward trend of evolution.'[9] With Bishop Gore, Christ is the immanent principle of order in the universe; with J. B. Lightfoot (1876), He is the principle of cohesion; with Dr. Inge, the Logos is a cosmic principle.[10]

In no circumstances must we treat this conception of the Logos as pantheistic. If we look for an analogy from the human side,

[6] cf. the Lambeth Conference, 1930 ('The Christian Doctrine of God'), p. 67.

[7] Cited by Canon Baker in *William Temple and his Message*, p. 108 (from *Nature, Man and God*, p. 478); cf. p. 83 (*Nature, Man and God*, p. 267), on the interaction between God, man and the universe.

[8] Manson's *Companion to the Bible* (1939), p. 413.

[9] In *The New Learning* (ed. Raby, 1933), p. 323.

[10] For these see my *Introduction to the Bible*, p. 130; cf. also J. M. Creed, *The Divinity of Jesus Christ* (1938), pp. 138-141.

we may think of the head and ruling spirit of an organization who gives considerable freedom to his subordinates; he is often hindered and thwarted by their weakness, selfishness and obstinacy; but in the long run his will prevails. It is not easy perhaps for us to think of God in Christ both in terms of the personal relation between God and the individual and in terms of the divine principle operating in and over this world, but Christianity does not repudiate the world, it is not escapist. Frankly, I do not believe that the last word has been said on the cosmic significance of the *Logos*; and I cannot but think that Dr. Temple in his writings has made valuable contributions to what I have already referred to as the most fundamental of problems, namely, the interrelation between God, man and the universe.

We recognize that this is a struggling world; there is too much that is destructive in both nature and man. But religion in one form or another encourages us to co-operate with the Power not ourselves that makes for righteousness; and I, for one, am not content with the view, often held, that religion is concerned only with man, and that religion and science should be left to go each its own way.

We are wont to divide into the celestial and the terrestrial, heaven and earth; whereas the division should not be horizontal — above and below — but, rather, vertical. In the Old Testament Yahweh's spirit distinguishes Israel from other peoples — they are spirit and not flesh; and in the New Testament St. Paul contrasts the works of the flesh with the fruits of the spirit.[11] We need a religious, or rather a spiritual, view of the entire universe. This is a view that would embrace much that, strictly speaking, lies outside religion; but it sees God in the universe. In the same way we can see God in the Bible, and can speak of it as the Word of God; but this does not exclude the keenest criticism of its contents and the most secular of literary, historical and other enquiries, nor does it obscure the evidence which we consider unethical, unspiritual or of merely temporary value.

Just as the aim of Biblical Criticism is to combine our convictions of the permanent value of the Bible with a candid recognition of all its contents, so it should be our aim to combine our deepest religious convictions of God, man and the universe with a complete recognition of the presence of much that we know or consider to be contrary to the will and purpose of God. The Biblical critic has everything to gain from his rivals and opponents; they force him to find an answer to their objections and to examine himself; and in the same way we have everything to gain

[11] *Is.* xxxi, 3; *II Chron.* iii, 28; *Gal.* v, 19; *I Thess.* v, 23.

from a careful attention to whatever we consider contrary to our ideals of truth and goodness. To avert our eyes from what we consider evil or from what we cannot understand is foolish; and a dualistic view only cuts the knots.

When we speak of heaven and earth we are, as always, limited by our lives in space and time and by our modes of thought. We speak of God as 'coming' to us, whereas what is essential is the change within ourselves. Moreover, God could never 'come' to us unless this change were a potential one. And when we speak of the 'prevenience' of God we mean that there is already a relationship between Him and us before ever we become conscious of this. But what place does this hold in our philosophies? The ordinary individual, with his range of experiences, exists on a variety of planes; and we are wont to draw a line between the sacred and the secular, between what we style 'religious' and the 'non-religious.' But actually, the two spheres—if they may be called spheres—interact, and the interplay between them constitutes one of the paradoxes of life. Whereas we usually try to form some synthesis of the two, what we really need is, in the first instance, a synoptic view of the individual and his types of experience and modes of thought. In other words, before we can synthesize our religious and other knowledge we have first to get a 'whole' view of the individual and those varieties of his experience and thought which determine his whole world-view.

Now this interplay can be illustrated throughout all religions. To take an extremely trifling example: the Babylonian women wore veils because the goddess Ishtar was veiled. But how was this known in the first instance? To be more general: certain human attributes are ascribed to God in the highest spiritual degree, and they then become precedents and examples for men. The religious or spiritual forms become starting-points; the religious, spiritual or transcendent phase inaugurates, it marks a new stage compared with what had preceded.

Again we can follow the declension and deterioration of religion. But we can also see new stages, new starting-points, *e.g.* in Christianity, Islam, Buddhism and Zoroastrianism. We can see the decline of the old Indian god Varuna, but we are quite ignorant of the circumstances of his introduction. In history, and indeed everywhere, we can see fresh starting-points, but we cannot always recover the stage which preceded them. In our theories, too, we look for starting-points. Hence some look for the origin of religion in fear, yet fear cannot be the true starting-point; and Freud invented his famous Oedipus myth of the origin of religion,

but he began at a stage of society which already had a history behind it.

Although our thinking doesn't take us back to absolute beginnings, in our religious experience God is the ultimate reality in whom we live and move and have our being. Now we do not know anything of the actual beginning of the universe, and indeed we are sometimes told that this universe, so far as we know it, may even have been preceded by another! But we are justified in the conviction that God created it. We need a starting-point; we perceive the effects of new religious starting-points, and although we have to confess our ignorance of the birth of nature, the opening verse of the first chapter of *Genesis* does satisfy our requirements. It is not only a religious belief; it is in harmony with what we find elsewhere: the religious or spiritual inauguration of a new series of events. Reason justifies faith.

Now this leads me to an important observation by A. N. Whitehead. He comments upon the gradual decay of religious influence in European civilization. 'Each revival,' he says, 'touches a lower peak than its predecessor, and each period of slackness a lower depth.' 'Religion has been on the defensive, and on a weak defensive'; it 'will not regain its old power until it can face change in the same spirit as does science.'[12] Many of us look for, hope for, a revival of religion; but Whitehead's words should warn us that it will not bear the fruits we desire unless we can meet the challenge of the age. Nearly 80 years ago (in 1869), Robertson Smith, an outstanding Biblical critic and orientalist, declared that 'it is the business of Christianity to conquer the whole universe to itself and not least the universe of thought.'[13] He asserted that it was necessary 'frankly to recognize the need of progress in our theological conceptions': 'to cling to an unchangeable dogma is to cease to cling to the Christ of the Gospels who transcends the theology of every age.' More recently, Dr. Inge has agreed with the American writer Santayana that 'Protestantism has not yet fully found itself.'[14] And so, for me, Modernism has its short-term and long-term tasks, and its long-term task is to culminate in a reformed Protestantism.

Many years ago Karl Marx declared that the critique of religion is the presupposition or beginning of all criticism.[15] His

[12] *Science and the Modern World* (1927), p. 233; Pelican edition, p. 218.

[13] *Lectures and Essays* (1912), p. 135; see further *Religion of the Semites* (3rd ed.), p. xxxi f.

[14] *Protestantism,* p. 80 (Benn's Sixpenny Library, No. 138, 1927).

[15] 'Die Kritik der Religion ist die Voraussetzung aller Kritik.' See *e.g. Christianity and the Social Revolution* by John Lewis and others (1935), p. 219; cf. pp. 229, 508 f.; also S. Hook, *From Hegel to Marx* (1936), p. 249.

followers have not followed up this aphorism with anything like the care and competence it demands. The critical study of religion is doubtless disturbing and distressing to some of us, and not all writers are tactful or well-informed; but I am persuaded that the more penetratingly we endeavour to study the phenomena of religion together with modern developments in knowledge and thought the more confidently can we meet the challenge of the day.

This, I think, is especially true if we bear in mind what the writers, to whom I referred earlier, have said of the Christian conception of the Logos. It points the way, in my opinion, to sound views of the interrelation between religion and science. It enables us to lay our finger upon the fallacies of the crude forms of materialism that prevail. And finally, deeply moved as we are by the researches of physics and the terribly destructive possibilities of nuclear or atomic energy, we should not fail to realize how destructive it will be for our civilization if we have imperfect, misleading or false ideas of the Divine Energy or Power in the universe. To read some books one would imagine that the source of true progressive development lies entirely and solely in the hands of man: this is to ignore the reality of that transcendent Power working in men and the world which we call God, and this we cannot ignore at our peril.[16]

[16] What do we think of the following brave assertion: 'Having slaughtered the god of our own creation we continue irresistibly to believe that our own will is the one "real cause" in the world'? (Eden and Cedar Paul, *Creative Revolution* [1920], p. 218.)

MODERNISM TRUE AND FALSE

By the Very Rev. W. R. Inge, D.D., K.C.V.O.

THIS title was chosen for me. But we are seekers; we keep our minds open. We sympathize with Clement of Alexandria who said that if it were possible to separate the venture and the experience of faith from eternal salvation he would choose the former. We hope that our own beliefs are true, but are all others false? We leave cocksureness to the dogmatists — Catholic, Protestant, Rationalist, and shall I add Agnostic? For I have noticed that those who are certain of nothing are ready to believe anything. The sorcerer lies in wait for the sceptic and leads him by the nose. I shall not use the word falsehood of any honest beliefs. I shall only suggest, at the close of my paper, that we should try to understand those who differ from us, and that we who stand for toleration should be gentle with the traditionalist. '*O sancta simplicitas*,' said John Huss when he was being burnt alive. The longer I live the more convinced I am of the profound truth of St. Paul's words that in this life we can only see as in a mirror by means of symbols, though, to quote my favourite Isaac Pennington once more, the shadow is a true shadow, as the substance is a true substance.

Nevertheless, as organized religion is the most potent of antiseptics, archaistic by instinct, preserving impartially those traditions which are the experience of mankind and those which are only survivals of outworn ways of thinking, there are roads which lead nowhere; there are proofs which prove nothing. Was it not said by the Johannine Christ, 'I have many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now'? Religions die, if they ever do die, of arteriosclerosis. It is the task of Modernism to find new bottles for the old wine, and there is no scripture against this.

What is the seat of authority in religion? Hooker says: 'What scripture doth plainly deliver, to that the first place in credit and authority is due; the next is whatever any man can necessarily conclude by force of reason; after these the voice of the Church succeedeth.' These are the three external seats of authority. The inner light, the testimony of the Holy Spirit, must be considered presently.

Let us consider first the claim of the infallible Church. We must have Churches as we must have governments, though we may agree with Helvétius that there are only two kinds of government, the good and the bad; and the former does not exist. We must have Churches; but a political or institutional Church is a

secular corporation in which the half-educated cater for the half-converted. It seems incredible that the presence of the Spirit of Truth has been canalized in one denomination. The claim suggests a not too creditable trick of trade. The high Anglican theory is or was that only the undivided Church is infallible, which is like saying that no Act of Parliament is valid until it has been ratified at a joint session of the House of Commons and the American Congress. Incidentally, the baseless dream of corporate reunion with unreformed Churches—'not even a beautiful dream,' as Moltke said of peace—is perhaps the worst enemy of Church reform. It forecloses all debate on some urgent problems, such as birth-control, the ordination of women, the marriage law—questions which we wish to decide on their merits.

'By their fruits ye shall know them.' Amiel says: 'All the great religious and political edifices have crime for their foundation, injustice and fraud for their masonry, and human blood for their cement.' This is too strong, but it is what I am tempted to say when I let myself go. We know now how formidable totalitarianism still is. Catholicism does 'deliver the goods'; it makes its votaries happy; and, as Amiel says again, there is no return from it, any more than from mutilation of virility. Political religion in its various forms is our most dangerous enemy. 'Pour truth into a child's mind,' said Newman, 'and then seal it up in perpetuity.' This is the worst kind of abortionism, said Bernard Shaw. What would the 'good churchman' have done if he had lived at Jerusalem on a famous occasion? 'Have any of our rulers believed on him?' Nevertheless, we know that the Roman Church still produces saints, self-sacrificing missionaries, and deep theologians. A continental thinker said, 'There are three indestructibles—the Roman Church, the German army, and the Standard Oil Trust.' The Roman Church is by far the strongest of the three, and deserves to be; for there is much good in it.

The infallible book was the inevitable weapon of the apostolic Church against the Jews, and of the Reformers against the Catholics. Both needed an external support, the authority of which was admitted by its opponents. Prophecy and miracle were the favourite arguments of the primitive Church. Several stories in the Gospels are obviously due to the wish to find predictions in the Old Testament of the birth and life and death of Christ. When the controversy with the Jews was over, Christian scholars like Origen were well aware that, as he says, actions are ascribed to God in the Old Testament which would disgrace a ferocious tyrant. The remedy was allegorical interpretation, which had already been used by the Greeks in their mythology, and very

lavishly by Philo in dealing with the Old Testament. The Reformers did not find this method useful for their purposes, and there are affinities between Calvinism and Judaism, though not many between Calvinism and the Gospel of Christ, for Calvinism is just baptized Stoicism. Accordingly the doctrine of verbal inspiration was stiffened in Protestant countries.

This is now the weakest of the traditional props of faith. The Bible is unhappily very little read now. Parts of the Old Testament are either unintelligible to the man in the street, or terribly unedifying as well as incredible. We no longer believe that any human being, even our Lord Himself, has had the power of predicting the future, and miracles, even if they could be substantiated, prove nothing that is of vital importance for religion. Miracle may be, as Goethe said, the dearest child of faith; it can never be its parent.

We may therefore dismiss the reliance on a divinely inspired and infallible book as no longer cogent except in very simple intellectual strata. I shall have more to say about the New Testament presently. And as regards the Old, though we must read it 'like any other book,' how much there is in it which we could not afford to lose! What a wonderful picture it gives us of the slow growth of the religion of the Spirit out of a barbarous tribal cult! And is it not true that all the great advances made by humanity have followed on the fusion of two or more different cultures? Ours is a syncretistic religion, a river with many affluents, as Clement of Alexandria said. A good lady once said to me, 'We owe more to the Jews than we can ever repay.' I suppressed the obvious witticism. And James I's translators did even more than Shakespeare to keep our language undefiled. Now that we do not read our Bibles we see the result.

The third of the three authorities mentioned by Hooker is human reason. Archbishop Laud, I learn from Canon R. D. Richardson's excellent book on *Conflict of Ideals in the Church of England*, mentions the same three, and adds the fourth, to which we shall come presently, the testimony of the Holy Spirit within us. 'No one of these doeth it alone.' I would emphasize these last words, for though the first three are in my judgment only subsidiary, and unable to bear the weight which some would still lay upon them, I am far from thinking that they are worthless. It is almost a shock to find that so great a philosopher as John Locke in his book on *The Reasonableness of Christianity*, published in 1693, 'maintained that Christianity might be reduced to a single tenet, that Christ was Messiah, whose advent was foretold by prophets, the truth of whose divine mission has been attested by

miracles.'[1] We are in a different climate of opinion now, but Locke was no fool. 'I oppose not rational to spiritual, for spiritual is most rational,' said Benjamin Whichcote, Provost of King's, in the seventeenth century. 'Take away reason,' said his friend Henry More, 'and all religions are alike true, as the light being removed all things are of one colour.' Is this what is now called rationalism? Not at all. These men wanted to recall the Church to 'her old loving nurse the Platonic philosophy,' and Plato, if anyone, knew the difference between *Nous*, which is almost the same as St. Paul's *Pneuma*, and what Coleridge called the understanding, *Dianoia*, which as Aristotle says 'moves nothing by itself.' The higher reason, *intellectus* in the Schoolmen, is the whole personality acting under the direction of its highest faculty; it is what Christians, following St. Paul, call Spirit. This is rather elementary; but as long as people continue to talk rubbish about Greek intellectualism and Platonic dualism, this distinction, which Coleridge rightly regarded as fundamental, needs to be drawn.

In the eighteenth century, in spite of the Cambridge Platonists and William Law, reason meant mainly common-sense philosophy, based on naïve realism. 'Nature,' rather than Reason, was the shibboleth, and Newton was its prophet.

> 'Nature and Nature's laws lay hid in night:
> God said, Let Newton be, and all was light.'

Time was to come when men would groan:

> 'We thought that lines were straight and Euclid true:
> God said, Let Einstein be, and all's askew.'

Descartes, Boyle and Newton were theists. Nature, says Mr. Willey, was rescued from Satan and restored to God. Design, order and law reign everywhere; what happier message could be given to an age which, as Dryden said, had witnessed 'the restoration of our happiness'? 'All faiths have been shaken,' says Blount, a contemporary writer, 'but those which stand upon the basis of common reason.' What of Revelation? All religion is revealed, because all religion is natural. 'The Gospel,' said Toland, 'affords the most illustrious example of close and perspicuous ratiocination.' Christ made the truth 'easy and obvious to the meanest capacities.' He revealed a God who, as Shaftesbury said, is 'the best-natured One in the world.' Natural Law was the ultimate court of appeal. 'The works of Nature sufficiently evidence a Deity,' according to Locke. As the century advanced, to follow Nature became more emotional; it included homage to

[1] A. V. G. Allen, *The Continuity of Christian Thought*, p. 353.

beauty, which had always been part of the humanist tradition; it produced the semi-pantheism of Wordsworth. Butler's *Analogy* carries no conviction to us; Voltaire in *Candide* saw through the shallow optimism of his contemporaries. Nature is not the best-natured One in the world; she is red in tooth and claw. To lift the veil of Isis is not an introduction to optimism. In the course of the eighteenth century the illusory belief in a beneficent Nature gave way to an illusory belief in a cosmic law of progress, 'the last Western heresy,' as Catholics call it. It is dead, so we will leave it.

So we come to the Victorian age, and the pitiful dog-fight between dogmatic materialism and materialistic dogmatism. Both sides were half right and more than half wrong. Natural science is an abstract study, which for its own purposes disregards the whole world of values except the search for truth. The scientists of the nineteenth century disliked to be called materialists, but all their thinking was on materialistic lines. The imponderables, as Bismarck called them, were mere 'epiphenomena,' floating idly and ineffectively over the real world of stars and atoms. In morals they were happily traditionalists, but this was a tree without roots. The philosophy of Victorian science — and we may remember the German gibe that England is a country where you may buy 'philosophical instruments' — was a naïve realism; reality is what we can count and weigh and make models of.

And on the other side, the defenders of religion? This was the age when Samuel Wilberforce challenged Huxley, when Gladstone championed the Gadarene swine, and Disraeli declared himself on the side of the angels. The orthodox were tired of the deistic God, a *roi fainéant* with little more concern for a changing world than the gods of Epicurus. Carlyle complained that God 'does nothing.' In a static world there might be not much for Him to do, but a historical sense was awakening. And in controversy with science what could be done except to intercalate 'acts of God' in the natural order? This, after all, had always been the foundation of Christian apologetics. But this was to claim for certain events in the past and future exactly that kind of reality which natural science could not concede without abandoning its own primary postulates.

Both armies have broken up from within. Science is becoming religiously humble, religion scientifically humble. The hard little billiard balls of the earlier atomism have become charges of electricity. Matter has been defecated to a transparency. The material world, if we may still use the word, is not at all like what our senses report to us. The mathematician, who is rather irritated if his symbols are confronted with concrete facts, tells us, with

Jeans, that God is a mathematician. How should we pray to a mathematical God? 'O x^n, have mercy upon us'? Space and Time have contracted a mystic marriage, like a pair of gnostic aeons. Space is finite but unbounded. Does that mean anything? A flippant American remarked, 'If Einstein thinks nobody can jump off his sphere, he can't know much about fleas.' And what of the second law of thermodynamics, that the universe is running down like a clock? Eddington tells us that to doubt this law is to condemn a man hopelessly as a man of science, and yet that if it is true the universe must have started 'with a bang' at some date which we could name if we knew it, and must have started in a most improbable condition. 'Incredible,' he honestly says; so what are we to believe? Science is looking to faith for support. It turns wistfully towards Berkeleyan idealism, as we see in Eddington and Jeans.

And is not the old orthodoxy equally helpless? Is it really Christian? 'A wicked and adulterous generation seeketh after a sign, and there shall no sign be given to this generation.' 'If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded though one rose from the dead.' Do not these words sound authentic? The notion of God as a mechanic who now and then tinkers with his machine satisfied Bishop Butler in his half-hearted dispute with the deists; it does not satisfy us, for whom God is not only transcendent but immanent. And the traditional teachings about future rewards and punishments — do we not in our heart of hearts agree with the mystics who wished that they might serve God for Himself alone? Do we not approve of the manly protest of Spinoza? Can we deny that Plotinus spoke the truth when he said, 'If a man desires the good life for any reason outside itself, it is not the good life that he desires'? What horrible and vulgar fancies have been grafted upon the unworthy desire to fortify religion by bribes and threats! We must honestly admit that our Lord is reported in the Gospels to have sometimes made this appeal, and there is no doubt that He used the current symbolic language about Paradise, Hades and Gehenna. But while He was on earth He knew no more about the future than we do — 'of that day and hour knoweth no man.' His only argument against the Sadducees was 'God is not the God of the dead but of the living, for all live unto Him.' *Quod Deo non perit sibi non perit*, is St. Augustine's fine version of these words.

We must not hope to reconcile fully the two worlds in which as psychic creatures — *amphibia* — we have to live. The world of facts and the world of values—the visible things that are temporal (or rather temporary) and the invisible things that are eternal. We

must not put mind inside matter, or matter inside mind. But to take 'Nature,' as understood by eighteenth-century deists and nineteenth-century physicists, as the complete revelation of the Deity, is not sufficient. Our picture of the external world is a construction made by and limited by our needs; it might be compared to a tune picked out on a piano of which half the notes are dumb. And it neglects the whole world of values, which are at least as real as protons and electrons, and which philosophy disregards at its peril.

I have said that the lay religion of the nineteenth century was futurism, a belief in a cosmic law of progress and human perfectibility. Bosanquet says that to throw our ideals into the future is the death of all sane idealism. It is indeed the negation of all sane realism. That particular fetish lies shattered at the foot of its pedestal.

This brings us to the fourth of our seats of authority in religion, the inner light or testimony of the Holy Spirit. That this is the *core* of personal religion, not only in Christianity but in all the higher religions, will hardly be disputed. I do not think I need say much now about what is known as mysticism, except that in our time the centre of gravity in theology has changed from external authority to experience, and some even who do not call themselves Christians are willing to accept the testimony of contemplatives both within and outside the Church. But since my conviction is that this inner authority is strong enough to take the place of those external authorities which, as perhaps most of you will agree with me, have lost most of their cogency, I should like, as briefly as possible, to meet certain objections which are sometimes brought against this type of religion.

We are told that mysticism is a psychological or pathological phenomenon, with no claim to objective validity. The mystics themselves are entirely convinced that they are in touch with the deepest reality; they care nothing for states of consciousness in themselves. If they are right, nothing in the world can be of more importance. If they are wrong, our highest faculties must be in a conspiracy to deceive us. In all philosophy we come to a point where a man must trust himself. Thomas Aquinas, who as is well known will not use the ontological argument, says *impossibile est naturale desiderium esse inane*, 'it is impossible that our natural longings should be vain.' Not strictly impossible, perhaps, but, as Lotze says, intolerable. Even Bradley, in whom the sceptic and the mystic were perhaps never quite harmonised, says that he could not accept a hateful conclusion. It is a reasonable act of faith that the truth is knowable, though not fully known.

We are told that the mystical experience is not transferable, and therefore valid only for those who have had it. Of course it is not transferable; language was not made to express it, and in recollection a man cannot at the same moment be outside and inside the vision. But to say that it is therefore useless for others is nonsense. If a dozen honest men tell me that they have climbed the Matterhorn, I am satisfied that the summit of that mountain is accessible, though I shall not get there myself. A man may say, 'I have never experienced anything of the kind.' Well, have you earned it? The pearl of great price is not easily come by: 'Who would win me must give and hazard all he hath.'

I am very fond of what Clement of Alexandria says about the spiritual life. The first stage is faith, an experiment which ends as an experience. Determine to stand or fall by the noblest hypothesis, and you will find that you were right. This is the second stage, knowledge. But knowledge passes into love, which unites the knower and the known. The Neoplatonist Proclus, in giving the same chart of the journey, says acutely, 'the first and third stages are simple, the second is complex.' One of the best modern books on the spiritual life is *God with Us*, by the Russian Frank. But he hardly realizes that the certainty which he enjoys and declares so impressively is not given to us to start with, and also that people are very differently constituted in their capacity for the mystical experience. Many good people go through life without it, serving God humbly, as in their great Taskmaster's eye. Those who have it must not dream that they are near the top of the ladder.

Mysticism, says Keyserling, always ends in an impersonal immortality. This is very important. Crashaw makes St. Teresa say, 'Leave nothing of myself in me.' Some German mystics have said, '*Ich bin entworden.*' The New Testament, as we know, tells us that he who would gain his *psyche* must lose it, and that we must kill the old man in order that the new man may come to birth within us. Does this mean, as Indian mysticism on the whole teaches, that we must surrender our personality and be absorbed in the Absolute? No; we must remember St. Paul's distinction between *psyche* and *pneuma*, between soul and spirit. As we advance in the knowledge of God, as knowledge passes into love, the externality of the objects of our knowledge passes into a richer communion; but it is always *I* (not the empirical *ego* but the real self) which thus loses its separateness without losing its centrality. For unless personality survives there can be no love; and God is love. A certain provisional acosmism, and a negation of merely human consciousness, are often a stage in the upward journey. The

so-called negative road is easily accounted for, but a journey through the unreal is an unreal journey, and this is not the way up the hill of the Lord.

Does God reveal Himself only to the soul in prayer? I believe that He has revealed Himself in what philosophy calls the three ultimate Values — Goodness or Love, Truth and Beauty. These are a threefold cord not quickly broken. They exist in their own right, and are not means to anything else or to each other. Their claim upon us is absolute. We may ask, What is Truth? We may doubt what is our duty. We may disagree about Beauty. But when we know what is right we must do it; when we know what is true we must believe it; when we know what is beautiful we must admire it. We may disobey one or all three; but we shall suffer if we do. As Robert Bridges says,

> 'Thy work with beauty crown, thy life with love;
> Thy mind with truth uplift to God above;
> For whom all is, from whom was all begun,
> In whom all Beauty, Truth, and Love are one.'

I have now told you what, as a Liberal Churchman, I believe, and why. But there are two important questions which I want to deal with as far as time permits. These are the historical Christ and the place of symbolism in religion.

As regards the first, there are Left-wing critics who say it is not a matter of great importance. Of course Jesus lived and taught and was crucified; but what else He was we cannot know. He did not create the Church; the Church created Him. The second and third generations of Christians made Him (as Samuel Butler says) a peg on which to hang their own best thoughts. The New Testament is the record of a movement which crystallized round the person of one of its founders. So Loisy says that we have as it were two Christs, 'a peasant of limited intelligence' and the object of the Church's worship. The connexion between them is almost accidental. Some of these critics further suggest that Jesus was a *Mahdi* like *Theuda*, who marched to Jerusalem with a band of unarmed peasants and women, expecting to establish, with supernatural help, a *coup d'état*. The attempt was nipped in the bud by Pilate, though the Christians threw the blame on the chief priests. Another notion is that He believed Himself to be the Messiah-designate, soon to return to earth in glory, in His own person.

I can only say that if our Lord was that kind of person He was not a peasant of limited intelligence but insane. And yet within a very few years after the crucifixion we find a group of

men and women who had known Him intimately, and who had witnessed His ignominious death, worshipping Him. 'Never man spake like this man.' They believed that He rose because they knew in their hearts that He was risen. They loaded Him with divine honours, the Jews as Messiah, the Gentiles as *Kyrios*, the Saviour-God of their mysteries. St. Paul's Epistles are much earlier than the Gospels, and St. Paul was in touch with the leading apostles. Yet he believed that 'the Lord is the Spirit.' I cannot see why we should wish to suppose that our Lord claimed to be that mythical figure the Messiah. As far as I can make out, the Messiah was to be a lineal descendant of David, who was to restore the old monarchy by driving out the Romans and inaugurating a golden age for the Jews. A Messiah who could say 'My kingdom is not of this world' was no Messiah at all.

You will not all agree with me, but I believe that Jesus was something much greater than a Messiah; He was the last and greatest of the prophets, filled with the Holy Spirit of God. He lived, preached, died as a prophet, 'like one of the old prophets risen from the dead.' The priests denounced Him to Pilate as an agitator who claimed to be Messiah, 'a king,' they said to Pilate. Pilate knew as well as they did that He was nothing of the kind. He was not the man to be content with one execution if he had thought there was trouble brewing. But when they said, 'If thou let this man go thou art not Caesar's friend,' he was frightened and took the line of least resistance, only insulting the Jews by the joke which he affixed to the cross.

The question I want to ask is, was St. Paul justified in identifying the presence of the Holy Spirit in his heart, which was the core of his personal religion, with the historic Jesus, now in glory but, in accordance with His promise, 'with us all the days, even to the end of the world'? The answer will depend partly on what we believe about Jesus of Nazareth. I have told you what I believe, that He was indeed the Temple of the Holy Spirit in a supreme, perhaps unique, degree. St. Paul did not become a Christian missionary in consequence of something which he saw in the sky. He had not known Christ after the flesh, but he knew those who had known Him, and the identification did not trouble him at all. 'I live, yet Christ liveth in me.' We shall never understand St. Paul unless we realize that he is the founder of Christian mysticism. 'Let this mind be in you which was also in Christ Jesus'; 'Christ in us the hope of glory.' He meant exactly what he said.

From this conviction came another, that the Christian must re-enact in little what our old divines called the whole process of Christ, the life, the death, the resurrection. This, rather than the

Atonement, is the meaning of the Incarnation. The Greek Fathers, using the word *theos*, which is not quite the same as our 'God,' were not afraid to say that Christ became man that we might become divine. It is a splendid assertion of the potential nobleness and dignity of human nature. We are all aristocrats in virtue of our kinship with the Son of God who is also Son of Man. Is it not a terrible loss that in our politics, social life, and notably in our fiction, the nobility of man has been so much forgotten? We are what by God's grace we may become.

My Christology is that of St. Paul's Epistles, so mischievously distorted by Martin Luther, and of the Platonic foundation of the *Epistle to the Hebrews*, though in both cases the controversial Rabbinism, directed against the Jews, has little or no interest for us. The doctrine of the Logos, more than adumbrated in *Colossians*, is, I think, intelligible and instructive if we remember the associations of the Greek word *theos*, and the distinction which the author of the Fourth Gospel is careful to maintain between 'the Father,' the Godhead, and the divine Power as manifested and revealed in the world. Our devotion to Christ is not exactly 'Jesus worship'; it is our communion with 'the Spirit of Jesus,' as the *Acts of the Apostles* calls Him, with Him who liveth and was dead, and behold He is alive for evermore.

I now come to the last section of my paper, the place of symbolism in religion. In my last book I have quoted from Bradley a sentence which is impressive as coming from him:

> 'Nature viewed materialistically is only an abstraction for certain purposes, and has not a high degree of truth or reality. The poet's Nature has much more. The process can only cease when Nature is quite absorbed into spirit.'

The poet's Nature is thus described by Alfred Noyes:

> 'The outer world is but a pictured scroll
> Of worlds within the soul,
> A coloured chart, a blazoned missal book
> Whereon who rightly look
> May spell the splendour with their mortal eyes
> And steer to Paradise.'

We have rejected both naturalism and subjective idealism. The latter leaves us with an empty heaven, the shoreless ocean of Nirvana, for in denying all reality to the outer world we grasp at infinity and find only zero.

There is a knowledge which is not symbolic, but the language in which we speak of it—yes, and the thoughts by which we imagine it—are symbolic. Some of the mystics have been too eager to have a vision of God 'without images.' The images may help, not

hinder. Everything, said Lewis Nettleship, in being what it is is symbolic of something more. This is the faith of Plato, and we must not kick down the ladder by which we have climbed, nor drop stones upon those who are climbing after us.

In what sense is dogmatic theology symbolic? For some of us any stigma is good enough to beat a dogma; but these untransparent middle forms of dogma and cultus are best looked upon as a bridge by which we, who live mainly on the unstable psychical plane between the eternal and the temporal, between spirit and matter, between reality and appearance, may cross from one to the other. The cloistered contemplative and the satisfied worldling don't wish to cross; but most of us do. There are traditional bridges which still serve their turn for some of us; for others they no longer bear, or do not carry us across.

The language of faith is *unconscious* symbolism. This is the trouble. The traditionalist is indignant if his dogmas are called myths or symbols. He insists that they are facts in the natural order. If they are less than this they would not connect him with the external world. And yet he does not really regard them as on the same level as such historical facts as the murder of Julius Caesar. If I believe that we are the lost Ten Tribes, or that Bacon wrote Shakespeare, the traditionalist may think me a fool, but he will not think that I am eternally damned. His reaction when he hears one of his dogmas denied is quite different. And we Liberals, who are ready to allow these historical dogmas a symbolic value, do we really need them as symbols? If we can see through them, are they of any more use to us?

A symbol, we say, ought to resemble that which it symbolizes. Wordsworth insisted on this in interpreting Nature. He had no use for what he called loose types of things. But is this universally true? The early Christians died rather than sprinkle a few grains of incense on an altar. The Private of the Buffs died rather than kow-tow to a Chinese mandarin. In the late war an English civilian was murdered by the Japanese because he refused to trample on the Union Jack. We commend their action. There may be a decent loyalty in the obstinate conservatism of the reactionary. We can hardly exaggerate the thoughtlessness of the average Christian. When I held a West End living I used to watch the great ladies, in their furs and jewellery, complacently singing the *Magnificat*, which is more violent than the *Red Flag*, and cheerfully repeating such nonsense as the verse about 'the company of the spearmen' and such unchristian malignity as 'blessed shall he be that taketh thy children and throweth them against the stones.'

Do any of you say, 'I don't need symbols'? My friend, where do you expect to go to? To Abraham's bosom, or the Elysian Fields, or Valhalla, or Nirvana? All eschatology must be symbolic, for we cannot even imagine life 'beyond this bourne of time and place.' We may imagine eternal life as somewhere yonder, not here; as somewhen, not now; or, optically, as reality, not appearance. The Christian heaven is a jumble of various incompatible symbols.

The few who still go to church do not want changes, and would resent them, because they feel an affection for symbols which are really dead. Some of them have petrified, others have evaporated; either process is fatal. Christianity is cluttered up with these dead symbols, which yet cannot be abandoned. It is a real danger to which we Modernists are very much alive. We want to make our religion as spiritual as possible, and to free it from dogmas which, so far as they appertain to events in the natural order, are irrelevant or untenable. And yet we must remember that as ministers of Christ we have to provide spectacles for persons with every degree of myopia, spectacles which will help them to see the invisible. There is no standard pair, and in our teaching we have to consider the wide intellectual disparity in those who hear us. Preaching is at best an unsatisfactory business. It is like throwing a bucketful of water over a row of narrow-necked vessels. A drop or two may find its way in here and there.

I am pleading for tolerance because I really think that we have won our battle against the reactionaries. Bishop Canute has quietly moved back his chair again and again. I think he may congratulate himself on having at last reached high water mark. Perhaps there will be no more heresy-hunts. But do not let us deceive ourselves. There will never be a crowd at the narrow gate. Even if we could produce another Origen or Erasmus, he might end by having his books placed on an index of prohibited literature. To some extent the divergence between mysticism and institutionalism is like that between internationalism and nationalism. Royce, who cannot identify his 'beloved community' with any existing Church, yet says startlingly, 'Membership in a community is necessary to the salvation of man.' Churches, like nations, fight for survival; they do not love each other. Whether fighting membership is totalitarian or democratic, a tightly organized Church will not encourage Modernism. We are, and we shall remain, a little flock; we shall be accused of a 'reduced Christianity.' It is because we are in favour of an enlarged Christianity that we are unpopular. We shall continue to think that the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace is better than exclusive loyalty to a Church

which tends to divide all other Christians into those who unchurch us and those whom we unchurch. It is difficult for us to be 'good churchmen.' 'The prophets prophesy falsely, and the priests bear rule by their means.' Alas! this is the only time when priest and prophet are quite happy together.

THE FAITH OF A MODERNIST LAYMAN

By R. B. Henderson, M.A., B.D.

οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ κακὸν οὐδὲν οὔτε ζῶντι οὔτε τελευτήσαντι.

No evil can befall a good man either in this life or in any other.

(The *Apology* of Socrates)

τοῖς ἀγαπῶσιν τὸν θεὸν πάντα συνεργεῖ εἰς ἀγαθόν.

All things work together for good to them that love God.

(*Rom.* viii, 28)

RELIGION has been defined as man's dealings with God and is, therefore, the most important thing in life, and if by 'dealings' we mean dealings both ways — man with God and God with man — the definition may be accepted. Before all things, therefore, it is necessary to be sure of God, and we meet with a serious difficulty at the outset. There is no sure proof that any God exists; we were apparently not intended to enjoy certainty on the most important article of our faith. This is a general rule of life — the greater the importance, the less the certainty; but this does not mean that we are left, as Omar has it, like little children to stumble in the dark; it means that we are called upon to make a venture. Risks are to be taken — the only certainty is the grave. The risk, however, is a reasonable one, and the theist who begins, as must everyone, with a working hypothesis discovers, as he goes along the path he has chosen, that conviction broadens and deepens until he finds that God is the most certain of all his experiences. Thus, though no unanswerable demonstration of the existence of a Deity can be given, experience provides the theist with enough confirmatory support to justify an acceptance of the hypothesis to the exclusion of its opposite. To put the matter quite simply, it is easier to believe in God than to believe in no-God. If there are difficulties in belief, those of disbelief are greater, and the theist is ready to give reasons for his faith. The three classical proofs of the existence of God, though not proofs in the mathematical sense, lay down useful lines for us to follow.

In the Universe as we know it there is much to suggest a Creator, and although Creation itself is, and probably always will be, a mystery to our finite minds, yet Creation is a fact. The Universe is there — it exists — and, what is more, we ourselves can and do share in the mystery of Creation. As the derivation of the word suggests, a poet is a maker, a creative artist. No one can deny the existence of a work of art, nor is the mystery of Creation confined to this realm. Our own individual existence is mysterious —quite beyond our comprehension as to origin, nature or destiny— yet we exist. We do not know how we came here, we do not fully understand what we are in ourselves now that we are here, and it does not yet appear what we shall be. In the face of all these mysteries, the most reasonable hypothesis is that God made the Universe, that He has a plan for its development and that the aim He has in His mind will ultimately be fulfilled. That there is evidence in the Cosmos of a Master Mind is the cosmological 'proof,' that there is evidence of some far-off Divine event towards which the whole Creation moves is the teleological 'proof,' and both deserve some respect in spite of the obvious difficulties presented to us by the problem of evil and the apparent defects in the world as we know it. Allowing full weight to these difficulties, there remains a third line of approach — our own nature seems to demand a God who, though within us, yet goes beyond us; a God both immanent and transcendent. We have standards within ourselves—standards of truth, of beauty and of goodness— without which our own experience would be meaningless. We have powers of judgment and we use them; we even base our actions on them and take fearful risks in doing so. Nor do the obvious differences between men's standards necessarily invalidate, though they do complicate, the argument. A geometer usually refers his points to fixed axes, but moving ones are not unknown to him, and we have no right to expect life to be simpler than geometry. It is true that our judgments are tentative and changeable, but the mere act of judging presupposes an Absolute somewhere. There is a right and wrong, and there is a categorical imperative from which there is no escape. We may rebel against God, but we are unable to ignore Him.

Once the existence of God is admitted — at first as a working hypothesis — the belief, confirmed by every moment of our lives and not least when we are most forgetful of Him, increases in intensity until the time comes when the believer must say that it is the strongest of all his convictions and is, indeed, the fountain and source of all others. It seems that, as Augustine of Hippo

pointed out long ago, our souls were made for God and can find no rest until they rest in Him.

This, then, is Theism — it is also Monotheism: there is the One Only God. But as well as the One, there are the Many, and the Many do not seem to be in harmony with the One. How is this to be explained? It seems that the Creator has endowed His creatures—all of them in varying degrees—with some tiny fraction of His own power of creation, thereby emptying Himself to some extent in His creatures. Creation involves a measure of this *kenosis* (emptying). Creatures are themselves creators, and therefore, to some extent, free agents; therefore also, to that extent, free to do evil. God has done this — has, so to speak, taken this risk — just because he is a loving Being and the essence of love is freedom. Compulsion is incompatible with love. God, then, is best thought of as a perfect Father, and this is a thoroughly Christian doctrine though not a doctrine confined to Christianity. But there can be no Fatherhood without Sonship; we, His creatures, are His family; we are heirs of God and joint-heirs with Christ.

We, then, are sons of God but we are not very good sons. It is impossible not to feel a little sympathy with Zeus in his quarrel with Prometheus. Zeus thought that it would best to destroy the human race and create something better. 'Give them fire,' said he, 'and they will only do themselves some deadly hurt with it and they will injure us gods as well.' Given our freedom, we depart, like the Prodigal, into a far country and waste our substance, if not always in riotous living, nevertheless only too often in vain attempts to satisfy our own not very noble desires. As the Buddha taught, selfishness is at the root of all our troubles. Life is intended to be a pilgrimage from self to God, and God does not use compulsion even to make us begin to run the course. But such as do begin find that they are not left helpless. God gives knowledge and He gives power, and He gives both in increasing measure to those of His children who ask for them. But surely, it will be said, He will give without being asked. This is true but it is not the whole truth; the value of a gift depends on the receiver as well as on the giver, so although it is rightly said of God 'more Thou givest every day than the best can claim,' and also that 'He is ever more ready to hear than we are to pray,' it yet remains true that we cannot proceed by work alone — '*orando laborando*,' by work and prayer. Prayer is the most important activity of man. It will be remembered that almost the only recorded request made by the disciples of their Master was 'teach us to pray.' They were bidden not to use vain chatterings (*βαττολόγειν*)

but to concentrate their whole minds on the task. A point here needs to be emphasized: in prayer we are not trying to impose our will on God; a foolish thing to attempt in any case, even if such a thing were possible; we are, on the contrary, trying to find out His will for us. Therein lies all the difference between priest (*sacerdos*) and prophet in Old Testament times. The priest claimed to be able to influence God in favour of the people by the performance of magical rites; the prophet began his message with 'Thus saith the Lord,' which meant that he believed himself to be the bearer of a word from God to the people. His claim was to be an inspired forth-teller (foretelling was a later and debased conception of the functions of a prophet). Those who have tried it know the value of taking all their hopes and fears and thoughts and difficulties direct to the throne of God. Some will say that the noticeable effects of such prayer — effects which can neither be denied nor belittled — are the result of what is called auto-suggestion. Even if this were so the practice would be amply worth while, but the evidence of all the sages and saints of every race, age and clime is against auto-suggestion as being a *sufficient* explanation of observed facts. There is an immense and overwhelming body of witness to the existence of an external answering power. This is not mathematical proof, but it is the kind admitted as valid in a court of law. In other words, it is a proof of a kind admitted as sufficient in the dealings of man with man, and it is the only kind admissible in the dealings of man with God. This belief in the possibility of communion with God takes us to the heart of true mysticism; Jesus spoke from that heart when He said, 'Possible? — all things are possible,' and in the spiritual world so they are. *Of course* God wants us to talk to Him, even though it be true that He knows all that is in our hearts. Whoever heard of a silent family?

God's family — it is a powerful thought in itself, powerful and comforting, but it brings in its train other thoughts that are not so comforting. God may be a perfect Father but we are not perfect children, and even those who are seemingly good may be at heart as selfish as those who are openly rebellious. 'Doth Job serve God for nought?' taunts the Accuser; and, until our minds are set at rest on this point, we cannot be sure that the whole work of Creation, with man as its culminating peak, is not a ghastly failure. It is far easier to believe in God than it is to believe in man. God does not disappoint us, God keeps His promises. The scientist, for example, builds entirely on his belief that, whatever he may do and whatever other people may do, Nature will not play him false. But man may play false and very often does.

'What doth the Lord require of thee?' cried the prophet of ancient Israel seven centuries before our era, 'but to do justly, to love mercy and to walk humbly with thy God'—a large part, perhaps the whole, of the secret of life lies in those words, and the essence of it is 'to walk humbly with thy God.' The world needs, above all things, to become God-conscious. 'He came unto His own and His own received Him not, but as many as received Him to them gave He the power' (or right—the Greek can mean either) 'to become the sons of God.' How, then, is the world to be made more conscious of God? Something very much more than intellectual assent is needed. It must be an ever-increasing awareness of the presence and power of God so that there come moments when we almost feel that God is all in all. This is perhaps what the mystics mean by the Beatific Vision; if so a warning is necessary. The Vision will never be revealed to those who seek it as their chief aim; it must no more be sought than any other form of happiness, but, while it thus eludes its pursuers, it comes nevertheless to those whose joy lies in humble attendance upon God.

We are sometimes told that the first step towards God-consciousness must be the painful one of self-abasement. No doubt there is a valuable truth here, but it can be misunderstood. Depreciation of man is not necessarily the best approach to the exaltation of God, and the consciousness of sin can hardly be said to be 'good news' in itself. It is bad news, but while Browning is possibly right in saying that the best in man is knowing he is bad, it may not be always wise to insist on the badness. There are sick souls who know their urgent need of a Physician, but those who are not sick show a not unnatural resentment at being told that they ought to feel a sickness of which they themselves are totally unaware. It is true that the sinner must repent, true also that we are all sinners, but there is something a little unreal in making us say in the Church's services that we are miserable sinners and that there is no health in us. The sinner is not miserable—nor ought he always to be so—nor does he consider himself to be entirely unhealthy. Another line of approach is open: God can drive out not only the bad but also the not-so-good. That is true in art—good music often destroys the taste for bad—may not the same be true of the soul? The end must be kept in sight and that end is union with God. Let a man once get a glimpse of the Holy of Holies and there will be no need to convict him of sin. The complacency of the righteous, the easy-going morality of the average decent man, are deadly sins; none is more deadly unless it be the self-righteousness of those who think that they are already made whole, but the way to destroy noisome microbes is

to bring them to the light. Let the glory of God shine about and there will be no need to proclaim the littleness of man.

Man, for all his sinfulness, is not little; he is the greatest and noblest of God's creations, capable of probing the mysteries of the heavens and capable of responding to the call of the all-good God Himself. Only the God in us can do that. The capacity to know God, to understand Him and His works — however slender the appreciation, however distant and blurred the vision—is proof of the Divinity in man. *Only God* (θέος) *can commune with God* (ὁ θίος). There is a light lighting every man; a light that may be faint but does not die; may flicker, but does not go out. In the feeble state in which the Divine Essence is found in most of us it may be difficult of recognition, and it is possible that it should always be thought of as potential rather than actual; but, of the Divinity in man, in some measure, there is no doubt: 'I have said ye are gods' — this can be postulated of us because we possess the capacity to recognize and to respond to the Good, the True and the Beautiful; and not only do we recognize these attributes of the Deity, but we are constrained to follow ideals and find our peace only in their pursuit. God the Son is shown to us essentially as in communion with the Father: the Father-Son relationship is revealed in prayer. Jesus is known the world over by the Lord's Prayer. We are told, too, that He could remain a whole night in thus communing with God. Five minutes is a liberal allowance for most of us, and we take refuge in public ceremonies as if they could be a substitute for the inner communion of the soul with God. If in the New Testament there is much about the necessity for this intimate communion, there is astonishingly little mention of public worship. When the temporarily popular initial ministry of Jesus in Galilee was brought to an end by the adverse report (*Mark* iii) of the embassy from Jerusalem and Jesus was virtually denied the use of the Synagogue, it seemed to make so little difference to Him that most people read through Mark's book without noticing that an entirely new phase of the ministry begins at that point of the narrative.

Uninterrupted communion with God, utter dependence upon and complete obedience to the will of the Father — these are the characteristics of the life of Jesus, these are the explanation of His power. It is thus that we would live and it is thus that we would teach our children to live. Training for a life of complete service to God, and therefore to man, is what education means to the theist. Anything less than that is not merely worthless, it is positively dangerous, for it tends to separate power from responsibility by developing mind and body and neglecting the spirit which

should control both. If, as we have said, life is a pilgrimage from self to God, it would seem that there are many who never set out on the journey and show little inclination to do so. Strait is the gate and narrow the way and few there be that find it. And most of those who do make a start seem to get such a short distance along the road that when the Satan (accuser, not tempter) of the *Book of Job* asserts that mankind is a failure, we are inclined to plead guilty and have done with it. There is none good, no, not one. But at this point comes the thought — are we in quite such a desperate position? Have we not one perfect life to offer to God as a *satisfaction*? Is there not God the Son — faithful in life, faithful unto death? In this sense He is our advocate with God, and since nothing less than God can so fully respond to God on the human plane, we are justified in speaking of Jesus as God the Son. He is of the same substance as the Father — the fulness of the Godhead bodily (*Col.* ii, 9). He is also of one substance with us, for out of His fulness have we all received and grace for grace (*John* i, 16). There are some well-meaning people who would separate Jesus from us by doctrines like the Virgin Birth, but it is difficult to see how they do it without becoming at best gnostics and at worst tritheists. Jesus was a man of like passions with us, but because he identified His will with that of the Father, He became spiritually all-powerful. This, however, does not mean that His powers are a denial of ours; on the contrary, they are a guarantee to us of a like power.

Jesus fulfilled the promise of the prophets. What they had proclaimed in words, He set forth in a life. The prophets said that what God required of man was that he should do justly, love mercy and walk humbly with God. That is what Jesus did and the effect was cosmic. Such power was displayed that no category was great enough to explain Jesus to the world. In the four Gospels and in the Epistles we have attempts to explain the inexplicable. They are noble attempts but they are necessarily limited by the mental horizons of their authors. To St. Mark, Jesus is the Messiah of Apocalyptic hope; to St. Matthew, a greater Moses giving new laws to all people; to St. Luke, Jesus is the man born to be King; and to St. John, He appears as Logos (Wisdom of God), a gnostic emanation of the Godhead, full of Cosmic significance. All are right, all are inadequate, and each is coloured by the human weakness of the author. Uprooted from their natural soil, each book is liable to misunderstanding, and this applies with especial force to the Fourth Gospel, the gnostic environment of which was so quickly forgotten that the Emperor Julian may be forgiven for finding in it what he called the blasphemy of the

Deification of Jesus. At least Julian is entitled to credit for his observation that it is only in this book of the New Testament that the equation of Jesus with God could be maintained. Actually this difficulty disappears from the *Gospel of St. John* if the prologue is brought to bear on passages of obscurity. To this author Jesus is the Wisdom of God, and there is no real difference between his teaching and that of St. Paul. The author of the Fourth Gospel might almost himself have written 'in Him was the fulness of the Godhead bodily.' Would that the creed-makers of subsequent centuries had been content with this simple formula and had not tried to improve on it.

The books of the New Testament illustrate but do not exhaust the matter; there is a gospel according to the experience of every disciple who honestly tries to do justly, to love mercy and to walk humbly with God.

The known activity of the Divine Being is not, however, exhausted by the manifestations of God as Father and God as Son. We mortals have the right to become sons of God and, as we have seen, we already share in the Divine prerogative of creation. Whence this God-like power? The answer is to be found in the Holy Spirit which spake by the prophets—and poets, dramatists and artists. We say that these people are inspired; we do not know, and they cannot tell us, whence comes the voice to them; the wind bloweth whither it listeth and they catch the sound thereof and interpret the meaning to us. This also is a manifestation of the Deity; it is the same God. Three Persons and one God —that is the time-honoured way of putting it but the word 'Person' is somewhat misleading; at least it is likely to mislead those unacquainted with its origin and history. The mixture of many languages—Greek, Latin and English, with Hebrew in the background—has led to much confusion. 'Manifestation' almost certainly gives a clearer meaning to us with our present modes of thought and a meaning much nearer to the original.

If this be the rationalizing of an ancient formula, the charge need not be allowed to weigh very heavily on our consciences—what is any formula but the result of a process of rationalization? Our object should be to make our own thoughts clear, and to do this we must make use of the thought forms of our own day. This is exactly what the Evangelists did, it is what St. Paul did and it is what the Fathers of the Church did in the early days. If it be further urged that 'three manifestations of the one God' was *not* what the New Testament writers meant nor what the Church Councils were trying to say, the answer is—how can that be known? It is at least possible that this was very much what they

were trying to say; it is at least possible that, if these men were with us to-day, they would prefer this way of putting it to any other. We can go further and say that when we make full allowance for the Apocalyptic atmosphere, for the gnostic phraseology and for the necessity to compete with Mithraism and all the other Mystery Religions, it is difficult to see what other language could have been expected.

These men believed in God, they believed in men (at least, in some men). 'I have said—ye are gods'; but the quotation goes on 'but ye shall die like men.' The Fourth Evangelist was perhaps right to omit the second clause. If, indeed, we are gods, we find it very difficult to live up to our Divine calling, and we meet with serious disagreement about the methods to be used. This being so, toleration is clearly indicated as the only wise policy; it is unfortunate that what people have themselves found to be helpful they too often regard as essential and try to impose on all others. There are certainly some who can and do make direct communion with God the Father Himself, while others seem to require the services of an intermediary. Many more seek help in such external aids as Church and Sacraments, but it should not, therefore, be assumed that such aids are universally necessary, for experience shows quite clearly that they are not. It is not possible to set bounds to the activity of the Holy Spirit; there are, for example, groups of Christian people who have no sacraments (in the narrow ecclesiastical sense) and are yet prolific in the fruits of the Spirit. We are bidden to judge trees by their fruits.

No Church, no Book, no Code of Laws—no System whatever—can take the place of God. To some, but not to all, these may be powerful aids, but to place them on the Throne of God is to commit the sin of idolatry—the Lord our God is a jealous God and will allow no rivals on His throne, however friendly these rivals may seem to be.

MODERN SCIENCE AND CHRISTIAN MODERNISM

By Martin Davidson, D.Sc., F.R.A.S.

IN presenting to this Conference some views on the necessity for Modernism in a period of rapid developments in scientific knowledge, I shall use the word 'science' in a restricted sense, including within its scope only physics with a mere reference at the end to biology. I do not propose attempting to define the word 'Modernism,' of which many definitions have been given, and it will be assumed that everyone present accepts it, not so much as implying a party as representing a method which should permeate every branch of Christendom in its presentation of the Faith. Many of those here this morning are well aware of the necessity for this presentation in such a manner that it does not shock the intelligence of the average thinking person to-day. The charge has been made against Modernism that it appeals primarily to the *intelligentsia* and that there is little or no occasion for it amongst the greater portion of our people, but my own experience does not corroborate this view. A recent revelation on the outlook of a body of young people convinced me more than ever that attempts to bolster up a system in archaic language, and also by appealing to legends and citing incredible stories, all of which seem to be regarded by some as fundamental in Christian doctrine, are doomed to utter failure and are likely to estrange people from our churches.

The young people whom I met at an informal conference were members of a large Settlement where social recreation under the supervision of a very competent staff plays an important part in their lives. Religion is not neglected; the members attend services in the School Chapel—a *sine qua non* for membership of the clubs—though it must be admitted that some of them avoid these services where it is possible to do so. I invited them to answer some questions quite candidly, forgetting that I was a clergyman, before whom, as most of the clergy are aware, there is frequently a considerable amount of reticence in discussions which appear unorthodox. They accepted my invitation, and the replies, emanating from young people whose ages ranged from sixteen to eighteen, and who had received nothing beyond an elementary school education, were very illuminating.

One of them appeared to be a Fundamentalist, as he accepted literally all that the Bible said, though he admitted that he was puzzled by certain historical (perhaps lack of historical would be better) matters in *Genesis*. His favourite Gospel was *St. Luke*, though he could not give any reasons for his preference. Perhaps, being a Fundamentalist and accepting all the miracles recorded in the Bible, he had a high opinion of the writer of the third Gospel because, in the words of a well-known Modernist, 'Luke dearly loved a good miracle.' If he could be included under the category Fundamentalist (though he had never heard of the name) the others could, with equally good reasons, be included under the category of Modernist.

Miracles were not accepted, and some of those recorded in the Gospels were a hindrance rather than a help in their views of Christian doctrine. Turning water into wine was regarded as nothing better than a conjuror's trick, and the story of the raising of Lazarus was scarcely considered worthy of serious discussion. Not only did these young people disbelieve the accounts of the Resurrection and Ascension, but, even if they had accepted them, they were unable to see what practical bearing such events could possibly have on their lives and conduct. Some had a vague belief in God and admitted that they might even pray for a loved one in pain or on the point of death, but in such circumstances God seemed to be more of a fetish than a living reality in their lives. This view was confirmed by the statement of one of them that during the last war his uncle had prayed for water in the desert and had found an oasis within three days. They had little or no belief in heaven or hell, though one of them discussed the possibility of reincarnation. The story of the Virgin Birth and other similar stories were placed on the same footing as stories about Father Christmas—quite harmless for children but scarcely the sort of stories that should be seriously narrated to people of sixteen or more.

As a result of this conference I was convinced that there appeared very little room in the lives of these young people for religious observance, and various reasons might be given for their outlook. Is it possible that one reason is due to their association of the Christian Faith with mere legendary lore and obsolete theories about the Universe, and if so, will an entirely new presentation of Christian doctrine prove effective? I am reminded of the words of Dean Hastings Rashdall: 'A Church that has lost its hold over the intellect of the age will not long retain its hold over its emotional life or its practical activities.' (*God and Man*, ch. xi, 'The Greatest Need of the Church.')

It may be pointed out, however, that the Roman Catholic Church can scarcely be credited with retaining its hold over the intellect of the age, but it decidedly retains its hold over the emotional life and the practical activities of its adherents. Judging from appearances, therefore, we might conclude that intellectual difficulties are not the only obstacle confronting us to-day; but that they are real obstacles very few will deny, and we must give the Modernists credit for devoting so much time and energy — to say nothing of the best intellectual equipment that the Church of England possesses — to this problem.

The task undertaken by the Modernists is a formidable one, and I should like to deal with a few of the difficulties and also the dangers confronting them in their attempts at restatement in conformity with the scientific outlook. Some of my remarks will apply equally to others who have never identified themselves with the Modernists.

I believe we all need to beware of hastily accepting new discoveries in science, and especially new scientific *theories*, as final pronouncements and of attempting to modify or restate our theology accordingly. A few instances of this danger will be given.

Not very long ago it was believed that planetary systems were extremely rare, this belief being based, not on observational data, but on the probability of a close approach of two stars. The tidal theory of the origin of our planetary system postulated the approach of a star sufficiently close to the sun to produce disruption through differential attraction. The probability of such a close approach was very small and hence the number of planetary systems associated with the stars was considered relatively small. Some theologians, accepting this view, reverted to something like a geocentric view of the universe — ours was practically the only planetary system and in all probability the earth was the only planet inhabited by intelligent life, so it was assumed that the Creator had a special interest in our planet. Now these views were based on mere theory (speculation might be a more appropriate term), and it was shown in 1935 by Professor Henry Norris Russell that the tidal theory of the origin of planetary systems was dynamically unsound. In addition, within recent times two comparatively close stars were each found to have a rather massive planet. Such planets cannot, of course, be discovered visually; their presence is deduced from dynamical considerations, but the method is not easily applicable for distant stars. It may be assumed that many of these also possess planetary systems which cannot be detected, at least by present-day equipment. So much for accepting a *theory* which seemed to be valid but which was

disproved by theoretical considerations and this was later corroborated by observational evidence.

Another matter of greater importance and with far-reaching repercussions has arisen in connection with developments in atomic physics. Questions relating to causality, freedom of the will, a closed universe, the interpretation of the universe—material or spiritual—and others, have been very prominent recently, and some theologians have eagerly accepted the verdict of a few physicists who have held certain views favourable to a number of Christian tenets. My own view, which I have expressed elsewhere[1] on more than one occasion, is that developments in physics have left these problems practically where they were, and that we cannot include some of the theories of physical science in our theology without incurring grave dangers. Amongst these may be mentioned the risk of being accused of clutching at any new theory so long as it seems to support cherished dogmas, and the hasty acceptance of comparatively recent pronouncements by a few physicists has not enhanced the prestige of some theologians who have clung tenaciously to the coat-tails of popularizing scientists.

Within the last few years there has been an increased interest in the borderland territory between physics and philosophy—an interest which has been accentuated by controversies on some of the subjects just mentioned. I am convinced that many people still believe that the late Sir Arthur Eddington accepted the downfall of determinism, though all that he asserted was that physics was no longer pledged to determinism. While the late Sir James Jeans held somewhat similar views, he did not commit himself to any definite statement as to whether determinism had been banished from Nature, and considered that the answer is probably more subtle than a mere 'Yes' or 'No.' The fact that radio-active substances disintegrate in an apparently spontaneous manner, and also that Einstein's investigations pointed to a spontaneous process of this kind pervading all Nature, led Jeans to the conclusion that the phenomena of Nature are inconsistent with a *strict* determinism. On the other hand, Einstein endorsed Planck's view that some day it would be possible to extend the operation of the law of causality to the highest achievements of the human soul, and even asserted that the idea of free will in Nature was preposterous. I need scarcely remind you that the views of Eddington and Jeans have been critically examined by physicists and philosophers and that they have not passed unscathed through the ordeal. I have not been able to find any refutation of Professor Herbert Dingle's criticism, which showed that both Eddington and Jeans had actu-

[1] *Free Will or Determinism* and *The Free will Controversy*.

ally been forced back into the very positions from which they had retreated — positions which they regarded as untenable. Perhaps some who are unconvinced by Professor Dingle will be more convinced by the late Professor L. Susan Stebbing and others from the philosophical point of view. Personally I find it extraordinarily difficult to see how the new physics is so favourable to some form of philosophical idealism, and in such matters as indeterminacy and responsibility there is much to be said in favour of Professor Stebbing's comment on the diverse views of Professor Planck, Sir Arthur Eddington and Viscount Samuel: 'Each of these three thinkers has reacted to the contemporary situation in physics in conformity with his own philosophy of life.' (*Philosophy and the Physicists*, ch. ix.)

Of course this danger of hasty acceptance of theories formulated to explain certain phenomena does not apply in the case of well-established facts. As an instance from the realm of astronomy, which can be regarded as a branch of physics, take the story of the Ascension. You have noticed that the Commission appointed by the Archbishops to consider Church Doctrine did not discuss in detail the narrative of the Ascension, or the allusions to it, in the New Testament. Its physical features could only be interpreted symbolically, 'since they are closely related to the conception of heaven as a place locally fixed beyond the sky.' At this stage I should like to deal with an important point regarding the views of Copernicus and their impact on certain dogmas of the Church; this is relevant in connection with the Ascension and a geographical heaven and hell, and also with another matter to which I shall refer later.

Before the days of Copernicus[2] it was believed that beyond the realm of the stars there was the abode of the blessed and hence there was a strict limit to the distances of the stars. This view became less certain as a result of the Copernican astronomy which suggested the possibility of infinite space; the implications seemed to be utterly contrary to the teaching of the Church, but they were not fully realized during the lifetime of Copernicus. In later years, however, the work of Bruno[3] was largely responsible for spreading the conception of the infinite universe and the Church became hostile to Copernicanism. This largely explains why it regarded the doctrine as dangerous and placed *De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium* on the *Index*. This may seem a very trivial point and scarcely worthy of any consideration, but I have mentioned it to emphasize that, while the acceptance of scientific

[2] Copernicus, Canon of Frauenburg, died 1543.

[3] Bruno, Dominican friar, burned at Rome for heresy, 1592.

heories without due consideration can be detrimental to religion, n the other hand the rejection of new scientific theories merely on he ground that a theory or a discovery seems to militate against ny tenet of the Church can be very much more disastrous. It is ifficult to believe that any Modernists would ever adopt the latter ttitude, but I sometimes think they incur the danger of adopting he former. I shall refer to this point towards the end of my ddress.

I now come to a subject on which, from the scientific point of iew, my opinion will appear very unorthodox — I refer to the law f entropy. If we accept this law, as practically all physicists do, here seems to be no escape from the conclusion that there will ome a time when the temperature of the universe will be the ame everywhere, and under such conditions we can speak of the eath of the universe. No more useful energy will then be avail- ble, though of course the total energy, in accordance with the first aw of thermodynamics, would be the same as it is now or as it was housands of millions of years ago. The second law of thermo- ynamics is based on probabilities (and is of course confirmed as result of experimental evidence), and if the probability that ntropy must increase were found to be comparatively small we hould not be so ready to accept it; but, as is well known, the robability of the validity of the law is so great that it has been ccepted almost without question. For the theologian this law has ery important implications; the universe is running down and as been doing so for an unknown period; but such a process ould not have continued indefinitely, and so we are forced to onclude that the universe has been created in time. The question rises, Does the second law of thermodynamics hold on the macroscopic scale or is it applicable merely under the local con- itions to which the astronomer is limited — a mere five hundred illion light years, which will soon become a thousand million ight years now that the giant telescope at Mount Palomar is in se? I do not propose making a frontal attack on the validity of he law; to do so would be suicidal policy. It will be more profit- ble to attack it indirectly by referring to another law which has een, and generally speaking is still, accepted, though I am onvinced that observational evidence suggests that it is not uni- ersally true.

The law of the conservation of angular momentum has many pplications, not only in terrestrial matters, but also in celestial roblems. It is the basis of a number of important dynamical omputations and has been responsible for overthrowing some of he theories of the origin of planetary systems — including those

of Laplace and Jeans. Any theory of the origin of our solar system — and there have been many in the last few years — which ignores this law is doomed to disaster. It is generally believed to have a universal validity, but if we extend it to the extra-galactic nebulae separated from us by distances varying from a million to a thousand million light years (or perhaps very much more, but this is the limit for photographic possibilities at present), we are confronted by a difficulty. In *Science and the Unseen World*, the Swarthmore Lecture delivered by Sir Arthur Eddington in 1929, there is a passage on pp. 9-10 which describes the beginning of the stellar systems. There is one relevant sentence that has an important bearing on the view I am advocating. Speaking of the extra-galactic nebulae he says: 'They acquired rotation (we do not yet understand how) which bulged them into flattened form and made them wreathe themselves in spirals.' The admission of ignorance regarding the origin of the rotation of these nebulae is a contrast to the assertion of some cosmogonists that lack of homogeneity in the original nebulae was responsible for the rotation, but these cosmogonists know perfectly well that their view is untenable if they accept the law of the conservation of angular momentum. According to this law the total angular momentum of the system of particles composing the nebulae around its centre of inertia remains constant, and no internal forces, such as might be caused by lack of homogeneity, could produce rotation. Kant assumed the same thing about the nebula that was supposed to have formed the sun and planets; he believed that the movement of the heavier material towards the centre, opposed by gaseous expansion, generated lateral movements which produced rotation. Laplace adroitly avoided the angular momentum difficulty by postulating a rotation — he did not suggest how it arose. No cosmogonist accepts Kant's view, and yet some are prepared to apply his principle to rotating spiral nebulae—a very inconsistent attitude.

In dealing with the dynamics of spiral nebulae, Sir James Jeans admitted that it was almost impossible to explain pure rotation in terms of any known forces. He thought that there must be some forces unknown to us, and even the interpretation of the spiral arms was one of the most puzzling problems of cosmogony.

All this may seem to have little or no bearing on the law of entropy, but it has been introduced to show that certain principles which we apply without hesitation in what may be described as local conditions are inapplicable if extended to a macroscopic universe. Extrapolation into the unknown regions is a danger well known to mathematicians, and although the above considera-

ons are restricted to a principle quite different from the law of ntropy, is it merely wild speculation to suggest that perhaps fter all it, too, may require some modification because some itherto unsuspected forces are operative? So far as experimental vidence goes we can rest assured that the law holds on our lanet, and there would be rejoicing in the hearts of engineers it could be shown that it is invalid; but there seems the possiility — very remote, it is true — that it may not have a universal alidity.

My chief motive in dealing with the law of entropy has been o issue a *caveat*. Some Christian apologists are prone to build an mposing structure on this law, and my own feeling is that, from he Christian point of view, it should be regarded as utterly irrelevant. That this feeling is not shared by everyone will be obvious rom what follows.

If the law of entropy is assumed to hold universally there rises a remarkable contradiction in its implications with which I hall now deal. I am sure there will be no objection if I contrast he point of view of the Modernist with that of the Roman Catholic who, in this particular case, represents the Catholic outook in general, which I shall now consider. In *The Beginning nd End of the World*, the Riddell Memorial Lecture delivered n 1942 by Sir Edmund T. Whittaker, the subject of entropy has special chapter to itself. Accepting the law of entropy, Sir Edmund points out how important for the metaphysician and the heologian is the knowledge that the world (using the word to denote the whole universe) was created in time. 'For it implies that God is not Nature, and Nature is not God; and thus we reject very form of pantheism, the philosophy which identifies the Creator with creation and pictures Him as coming into being in he self-unfolding or evolution of the material universe. For if God were bound up with the world, it would be necessary for God o be born and to perish.'

Later on he shows that the certainty that the human race and ll life on this planet must perish is fatal to many conceptions of he meaning and purpose of the universe. In particular, it is atal to the view of those whose central idea is progress and who place their hope in the ascent of man. Within recent times some ave invested the world with a power of self-unfolding, on the purely naturalistic basis of the power of man to control his environment. As a result the sense of dependence on God has passed away and mankind has been set up as the chief object of aspiration. Central in the humanist philosophy is the ideal of carrying society to a splendid future. But no one who reflects on

the beginning and end of the universe can accept such a doctrine as a true interpretation, and it is more reasonable to see the true purpose in creation — that which persists and is immortal. While the individual counts for nothing in the humbler forms of life and the race is everything, the race loses its importance in humanity and the individual life acquires supreme value, so that the goal of the evolutionary process and the justification of creation are found in the existence of human personality. 'Of all that is in the universe, this alone is final and has abiding significance.'

There is a remarkable contrast between this view and that advocated by a few Modernists, more especially in their attempt to fit the doctrine of the Incarnation into the frame of the theory of biological evolution. Certain *ad hoc* postulates regarding the factors in evolution are assumed on which I should have liked to make some remarks, but as my time has almost expired it will suffice to deal with the conclusions, which are almost diametrically opposed to those of Whittaker. Very briefly, the Modernist position, if I understand it correctly, is somewhat as follows :

In the creative process of evolution when we come to deal with man it appears that he himself has a very large part to play in the creation, and the emergence of moral and spiritual values out of the actual conditions of man's life reveals the quality of the end that is to be. But notice that these qualities are not imposed from without; they arise within man's own nature and are the output of himself. They are his estimates of what is really good and in the course of his evolutionary progress they remove him farther from his earlier ancestry in a steady moral and spiritual ascent. Although from the evolutionary point of view Jesus was the product of the past, yet He was also new — an emergence of a new consciousness and a new quality. It appears that the evolutionist revelation supports the rationalization summed up by the writer of the Fourth Gospel, 'Logos,' 'Incarnation.' Spirit is ordering and organizing towards the production of higher orders of beings and higher qualities of life, but there is no suggestion that man has reached his pinnacle — on the contrary, he is still rising to greater things.

If we accept these views we pledge ourselves to the acceptance of inevitable moral progress in the human family — a fetish which, I thought, had been dethroned many years ago. It is a very optimistic conception of man's nature and destiny and, if I understand it correctly, it emphasizes the supreme value of the race at the expense of the individual. In fact, the individual does not appear to be important in this evolutionary scheme and the hope for the future lies in racial progress, though we need not concern

ourselves very much about it because it is assured by virtue of man's innate qualities. I do not assert that the necessity for the help of a Supreme Power is eliminated in this scheme, but it is kept well in the background.

It is worth noticing that the views just referred to are quite independent of the validity or otherwise of the second law of thermodynamics, though I feel certain that the validity of the law would be upheld by those who advocate the views. They would be prepared to accept the doctrine that at some period the universe had been wound up—intervention at some period by God is a necessity in their scheme — that it had been running down ever since, and that some day its death-heat would end its career.

Conclusions so diverse make us pause and enquire where science is leading us. Perhaps this state of mind might alter if and when we have a more comprehensive knowledge of all the factors operative in the evolutionary process, and I am not opposing my opinion against those who have studied the problem from every point of view and are competent to make authoritative pronouncements on the subject. Irrespective of this, how are we to explain such divergence of views on the destiny of man — views based on accredited scientific data — and what conclusions can we draw?

One very important conclusion, I believe, is that, while scientific theories or even established facts can and do guide our philosophies of life, yet there are limitations and they very often fail to decide what those philosophies shall be. Another conclusion follows — it may be regarded almost as a corollary of the first — and it concerns the responsibility of the Church. It is not only the duty but it is the privilege of the Church to undertake the task of presenting the Christian Faith in terms of contemporary thought, but in doing so I believe it may be necessary to preserve a more independent spirit than has hitherto prevailed. I have already pointed out some of the dangers in hanging on to the mantles of men of science whose pronouncements favour some of our own cherished tenets, and I think such dangers ever beset us.

If my paper has appeared to err on the pessimistic side I should like to correct such an erroneous impression, and I cannot do better than quote from J. N. Figgis, *The Gospel and Human Needs*, p. 17:

> 'The Church goes on. . . . Its adversaries have demolished it a thousand times in argument and pronounced the Christian Church a dead thing, and cried to carry out the corpse, for all was over but the shouting. And they have betaken themselves to shouting, only to find when it was all over that the slain hydra had raised a new head, and all was to do again.'

CHRISTIAN MODERNISM AND BARTHIANISM

By J. S. Boys Smith, Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge

THE theological movement in German-speaking Protestantism, known after its leading figure, Karl Barth, as Barthianism, came into prominence between the two world-wars. It is a revival of Calvinism in violent reaction against the liberal theologies of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Though not the only manifestation of that reaction, it is the most pronounced. But in further respects also it is an expression of the conditions and tendencies of our day. The 'theology of crisis' bears the marks of its period, the loss of trust in reason, the despair of man and his ideals, the subordination of the individual person, the love of paradox. It may seem harsh to attribute to this theology the very features which found political expression in the totalitarian state against which the Churches professing this theology were driven to fight for their liberty of preaching. Yet this affinity of Barthianism with the contemporary world gives the movement its present influence and at the same time affords the reason why it should not be uncritically accepted as the permanent expression of the Christian Gospel.

The Barthian theology insists that knowledge of God is in and through Jesus Christ alone. Human nature is totally corrupted, and the corruption so pervades human reason that man is incapable of apprehending God by his own thought and conscience. God is known through revelation only, through the revelation that is in Christ alone. Revelation is the Word of God which enters the human world 'vertically' from above. Man, of his own power, cannot receive it, or even seek it; it alone can create its own acceptance. Consequently, Natural Theology is impossible, a false aim. Further — and this is the practical consequence of the teaching — the Gospel must leave the world to itself. It is not concerned to permeate the world's interests and institutions; its business is only to proclaim the revealed truth. Some not unimportant divergences of opinion have appeared within the movement; but these are the characteristic doctrines, enunciated with vehement conviction.

I do not propose to examine this theology directly, but to set against it another view. The Barthian theology in one of its

important aspects is a doctrine of divine grace, and I shall express my criticism in terms of a doctrine of grace which I conceive to be widely different from the Barthian. Belief in the grace of God is the common possession of all Christian traditions, a fundamental feature of the Christian religion. Yet doctrines of grace have been the centre of the most persistent and deeply-seated theological controversies in Christian history. The controversies were more than theological; for the issues concerned mark divergent conceptions of life and contrasted standards of duty.

When we enquire what we mean by the grace of God, we tend to begin with the distinction — in itself proper and unavoidable — between God's agency and man's. Grace enables man to be what, apart from grace, he could not be. From the distinction we too easily proceed to an opposition. When grace operates, man does not act, but God acts in him. And having thus opposed God's agency and man's we go on to develop the notion of God's action on lines that seem fitting to His power as unlimited and to His wisdom as unerring. Grace, where it operates, cannot fail of its object, but must attain it unswervingly and completely. When it seems to do neither, we conclude that it does not operate; and since its absence cannot be due to any obstacle, there being no effective obstacle to divine action, the absence of grace must be a consequence of inscrutable divine decree. Grace, in any case, we argue, by its very meaning is not deserved; and what is not deserved has not been unjustly withheld. Already we are involved in formidable difficulties. Grace enables man to be what, apart from grace, he could not be. But if we interpret this to mean that man is passive and God acts in him, can we say that grace enables man to *be* anything at all? And if instead we say that man's actions are his, but that in order that he may do them his mind must be illuminated and his will strengthened, the illumination and strengthening remain mysteries which lack coherent connection with the self's own growth in insight and decision. Moreover, man's responsibility, apart from which his deeds are devoid of moral quality, has been surrendered at the essential point—the point at which decisive choice is made. And having attributed the first step only to God, it is not easy even to preserve to man the power to profit from it. At most man is left responsible for the evil that he does. But then grace has not brought succour to man in his own being. Further, if grace operates in this manner, unhampered by the personality of man, what reason can we assign for its limited result? If behind it is unlimited power and unerring wisdom, why should it not operate everywhere without discrimination, so that all evil and error are removed? There is

no answer, except again by appeal to the inscrutable divine decree; and how can we then distinguish the inscrutable from the arbitrary? Our conception of grace, designed to ascribe glory to God alone, is too triumphant. Unwittingly, it makes God responsible, not only for the good, but likewise for the evil that remains; for what could be removed is not removed.

These grave difficulties are the consequences of an initial defect: God's grace is conceived as operating in ways unrelated to human personality. The doctrine fails, not because it ascribes too much to God, but because what it attributes to Him cannot meet the needs of man. The remedy lies, not in drawing narrower limits to the sphere in which God's grace operates, but in transforming the manner in which it is conceived. If God's grace is directed by God's love, is in fact His love in operation, we shall understand its method best by looking first at its end, which must be the succour of His children. That love seeks first the other's good, and therein finds its own glory, is the only assumption we need make at the outset. This assumption our experience confirms, and it has far-reaching consequences for a doctrine of grace. Our primary questions are then seen to be three: What is the nature of human personality, what are its needs, and how is it succoured?

We must first assert that God bestows His grace through the whole range of human experience. It is man with all his powers and in all his activities who needs God's help. If any part of man's world is excluded, so that there he cannot trace God's hand or find his own good, his life is so far frustrate: his experience has not justified faith in a gracious God. God's gifts must be as varied as man's interests and needs. Christianity has taught that God is the source of all being and the goal of all right desire, and we can set no closer bounds to the sphere in which His blessings are bestowed. We may, however, concentrate our enquiry on those higher spiritual qualities in which human personality attains its supreme fulfilment and speak, for brevity's sake, of moral personality, the attainment of a fully personal stature, as the supreme blessing it is God's purpose to confer, the supreme gift of His grace.

This personal stature is itself God's gift, both in the sense that man in his whole being and with all his possibilities is God's creature, and in the further sense that it is through God's grace that these possibilities are fulfilled. Their fulfilment is not a precondition of the granting of His grace, as though we had first to make ourselves worthy to receive what He will bestow, or as though we could do so apart from His help. It is of the essence

f the Christian gospel, and not less of the Christian experience, hat while we are yet sinners God's grace is given us. To this e must hold fast, and it helps to account for, though not to istify, the conception of God's grace as irresistible. Grace does ot wait upon our worthiness, or even upon our penitence; it akes them possible. But to assert this is very different from sserting that penitence and righteousness are not our own re-ponsible achievement. Our task is to see how the achievement an be, and must be, fully our own, whilst yet it is ours, and more lly ours, by God's help. And this we can see if we consider the ature of moral personality and the nature of a personal elationship.

When, then, we consider the nature of a moral person, we find is unique characteristic to be what has been called his 'autonomy,' *e.* his consciousness of himself in relation to his world and his esponsibility for his own behaviour. He is more than an animate reature, impelled by, and as it were momentarily absorbed in, ach successive impulse. He can estimate the worth of alternative nds, weigh them in relation to himself as a whole, and deliber-tely choose between them. No doubt all these powers have their mits; he cannot know all that is in himself or in the world about im; he cannot do all that he would, or when he would. But the ower to value, to deliberate, to choose is the unique quality of a erson; and in it, in what we may sum up as his responsibility esting on personal insight and personal decision, resides his nique worth. This unique worth of the individual person does ot consist of his actual achievements, but in his potentiality, his ossessing this personal nature which alone makes possible all ne higher spiritual qualities. This it is which makes the individual erson deserving of respect, and at the same time lays upon each uch person the radical duty of respecting each other unique indi-idual as a person like himself. This, too, which makes him the hild, not merely the handiwork, of God. Apart from it there could e no meaning in God's love for the sinful and evil, no ground for nan's continuing duty towards his erring brethren. Yet without nese, what sense could remain in the Christian gospel of God's race or in the Christian duty of charity to men?

The essential point we must notice is that all true personal ttainment, especially the higher qualities of action and character, s gained only by responsible decision resting upon personal in-ight. An action may be outwardly correct, yet unless it is done ecause it is seen to be right it falls short of moral goodness. A udgment may be formally correct, yet we cannot be said to pprehend the truth until we see it as truth with our own eyes;

'truth cannot be said to prevail when it is assented to on irrelevant or insufficient grounds.'[1] It follows that the purpose of God is not to lessen our responsibilities or to remove from us the burdens they impose, but to enable us to carry them with an independent mind and in the assurance that it is His gracious purpose that permits them. In the affairs of life it is a commonplace that a person is not truly helped until he is helped through himself; and if we venture to extend this statement to God's help, it is not because God's help is subject to the limitations of man's, but because only when so bestowed can any help be truly personal, either on the giver's side or in what it does for the recipient. Its end has not been achieved until it evokes a voluntary personal response. This truth, I submit, must be accepted as fundamental to a doctrine of grace. It is just because God's grace is personal in its operation and meets the needs of persons that it cannot override the nature of a person.

To emphasize 'autonomy' as the unique characteristic of personality is not, as is sometimes strangely asserted, to proclaim an arrogant ideal, as though we thereby set up man as the supreme judge of all things. It is indeed to emphasize his duty to use his moral and rational powers to the utmost, fearlessly but always with sincerity, and to assert this to be his fundamental duty as a person. But to fulfil this duty is not to be arrogant; it is to be humble. We do not *create* the standards of goodness and truth, we grow to *recognize* them. To recognize them is to learn to reverence them; and reverence for unconditional worth is the source of all true humility. Further, there is no conflict between rational and moral independence and the religious experience of dependence upon God. Where religion has risen above impurities and irrelevancies, dependence upon God is dependence upon Him as holy, and as holy in its moral meaning. But to depend upon Him thus we must recognize His holiness and the sacred claim it lays upon our devotion; and that we can do only as we exercise a moral discernment. Only by this moral discernment can we know His will and what it means to serve Him in righteousness; and it must be so if God's will and the moral order are one. Moral and rational independence, far from conflicting with dependence upon God, is its essential precondition.

If God's purpose is to confer upon us this personal nature, the manner of His giving must be consistent with the nature of His gift. Changes in our natural endowments and in our environment might indeed be wrought in ways beyond our control and beyond the reach of our understanding. The endowments with which we

[1] F. J. A. Hort, *The Way the Truth the Life*, p. xxxvi.

enter on life are not of our own making in a sense which makes us responsible for them; and influences outside our control may modify them at a later date. Some persons enter on life better equipped than others, and some are more fortunate than others in the influences and opportunities life brings them. But we have no secure warrant for postulating transformations not ideally subsumable under natural psychological and material processes. We must not look for such occult transformations as our evidence for the working of God's grace. To do so would mean that at best the evidence was occasional and uncertain. But there is a more important reason. It is that the greatest gifts could not be so given. Natural endowments and relatively settled dispositions are but the raw material, as it were, of personal character. Character results from the use we make of them. A new or strengthened endowment might afford new opportunities; but at the same time it would bring new responsibilities; for every personal opportunity is also a personal responsibility. God may well increase both, but not one apart from the other. It is just here, in the use we make of our talents, that we most need the grace of God; and in the good character — the single eye, the right motive, the firm will — we must surely see the greatest gift His grace can grant us.

Thus we reach the result that personal character is always our own responsible achievement; yet it is also God's greatest gift, His purpose for us and His end in creating us. How can it be both, our own achievement and God's gift? It can be both, we must reply, because the manner of God's giving is gracious and personal. Whilst His giving meets our personal need, it respects our personal nature; and only because it respects our personal nature can it meet our personal need.

To understand fully all that this involves would be to understand the mysteries and intricacies of personality in all the complexity and variety of our experience. Yet in this matter we have, after all, more first-hand experience to go upon than in almost any other; for we ourselves are persons who can confer personal gifts graciously upon other persons. No doubt we cannot unreservedly assimilate God's giving to ours. But still less should we rest satisfied with a doctrine that represents His as less personal than our own. Since in any case we must seek help from analogies, we should choose the best; and these are the personal relations we know at first hand.

Where one person helps another, the person assisted is not always aware that the help he receives has a personal source. He may be aware only of changes in his environment affording him new incentives and new opportunities. But where the help in-

fluences his decisions and promotes the growth of his character, it always operates by eliciting from him some active response. It does not make his own initiation unnecessary, it makes it possible. The extent of the help is not measured by the extent to which the person is relieved of effort or responsibility, but by the extent to which he is enabled to grow in personal achievement. Examples are too familiar to need elaboration. We may think of the contrast between real education and mere instruction, or between moral training and mere direction in the rules of right conduct.

To say that to help a person is to enable him to act for himself is so far correct. But it is insufficient because it suggests that the aim is to make further help unnecessary. That is plainly untrue of God's grace, and it is also untrue of the most important relations between human persons. As a personal relationship grows more intimate and profound, the persons become more, not less, interdependent, till they are so bound to each other in affection and mutual reliance that parting is tragic bereavement. Yet then, too, and then especially, the relationship strengthens and integrates each of the two persons and enables each to judge and act with a greater personal originality. The relationship makes each self a fuller self. And just because so deeply bound to the other, each must treat the other as a person like himself and must abhor any action that would violate the sanctities of the soul he worships. There is no conflict between the 'autonomy' of true personality and the need of personal communion, whether it be communion between one human person and another or between a human person and his God.

In the personal relationships we actually experience, when one person is helped by another he is enabled to do what, apart from that help, would have been strictly impossible; yet what he does has not ceased on that account to be his own responsible deed. The greater the help and the more important its sphere, the more profoundly is this true. The achievement is our own; yet it is ours by a gift conferred. The grace of God given to man and the help one human person gives to another must obviously be widely different; but as given to persons to meet the needs of persons they must also be profoundly alike—alike both in the end they serve and in the manner in which they operate. No analogy unrelated to personal relationships is likely to be of service in a doctrine of the grace of God; and the more fully personal the analogy chosen the more likely is it to approach the truth.

The higher expressions of personal life all involve the exercise of the conscious mind, the response of the affections, the decision of the will, the estimation of worth, the apprehension of

truth. The highest and most personal help is that which evokes these, that affords them their opportunity, their incentive, their adequate object. It is on such lines that God's grace too should be conceived. To foster and purify this higher personal life must surely be His purpose; and by what different method could that purpose be effected? The working of His grace is primarily and most typically through what speaks to our conscious mind, to our intelligence, our estimation of worth, our higher affections. His grace consists in giving us an experience which offers scope, unlimited scope, for the exercise of these personal activities and affords an object which enthrals them. But, if so, to distrust man's reason, to belittle the potentialities of his nature, to direct him away from the fullness of his world, its interests and its institutions, is to refuse the gifts God's grace would bestow. It may be that in no aspect of man's present experience can he find the object wholly adequate to his needs; yet it is through his present experience that he must seek that object; for through that experience, and only through it, is God's grace given and His revelation made. The supernatural is known, and made known, through the natural — through the natural used and valued aright.

The Barthian theology is not wrong in the emphasis it lays upon the grace of God and upon the need, as it sometimes seems the desperate need, of man. But by its conception of the nature of man's need and of the manner in which it is met by God's grace it perverts and stultifies the gospel it would interpret. If man's nature is totally depraved and his reason impotent, his attainment of the moral and rational personality in which his salvation consists is precluded, because unless attained by personal decision and personal insight by the nature of the case it is not attained at all; and God's grace as personal succour of a personal nature in a manner also personal no longer has relevance to man's condition. Violence, even though it be the violence of God, has taken the place of the gracious and the personal; and where this change occurs in a conception of God it has its counterpart, sooner or later, in the conduct of man.

CHRISTIAN MODERNISM AND EDUCATION

By Sir Cyril Norwood, sometime Master of Marlborough, Headmaster of Harrow, President of St. John's College, Oxford.

THIS is by no means the first occasion on which this Conference has had to endure a paper from me upon this topic, and I hope that you will forgive me if I do not deal this time with the content of that ideal educational syllabus, which would satisfy the modernist critic, but rather with certain general issues which bear upon this important problem. It is indeed a problem of very present urgency, since presumably for every stage of secondary education as well as for the preceding years of the school courses those responsible are seeking to draft and to implement schemes of religious instruction which shall be living and not dead, and so help and not hinder the growth of the individual consciousness towards greater awareness of those spiritual values, for lack of which modern civilization is dying.

I think it is right as a beginning to use a broad brush, and to consider the changes wrought by the world events of the last fifty years in the mental outlook of the ordinary European or American citizen : it is relevant also to bring into consideration any developments or retrogressions which are due to our own national experiences. Fifty years ago one would have said with some confidence that most intelligent persons were impressed by the progress which the world was making, and expected it to continue : many in every leading nation of the world were laying their plans for the future as if for a period of enduring peace, in which war would become steadily more and more obsolete. The controversy between religion and science had died down, and the provinces proper to each were becoming more and more clearly delimited. The world had only to accept the dictates of the trained reason, and to follow the lines of advance which it marked out; thereafter and at no long interval would follow the era of health and well-being, cheapness and abundance, security and international goodwill and fellowship, which might bring its own problems indeed, but none which would not yield to the exercise of human reason.

We have encountered instead fifty years of disillusionment, and the power of human reason which was ranked so high now stands very low, in common estimation. Fifty years ago Germany, for

instance, stood in many respects at the very top of human achievement, leading humanity in scholarship and science, advancing its trade and industries in all directions, holding within its grasp the leadership of Europe and therefore of the world. This is not in any respect an exaggeration: indeed I think that with peace and good fellowship the dominance of Germany would have happened inevitably. But instead, under the compulsion of an irrational German ambition, the nations were driven into a death-struggle for the exclusive possession of material values, in which the only certainty was that the values must perish while they were being fought for. The nation which might have had everything lost everything: its portion has been poverty for riches, weakness for strength, disease for health, scarcity for abundance, and death for life. It has perhaps inflicted upon the leading nations of Europe a mortal blow, and sent the leadership of the world across the Atlantic. A state of affairs has been produced in which blind greed points on to a third struggle between the nations, in which all must fall victims to wholesale destruction. All this human reason can foresee quite clearly, and equally it is apparently powerless to prevent the blow from falling. It is no wonder that human reason is a stock that stands very low, and that human beings who feel that they are like driftwood in the rapids find no useful purpose served by any attempt to make anything rational. Religion at its best is a way of escape from the grimness of present reality: it is no gain to make Christianity rational, to strip it of accretions, to clear the way back to the teaching of its Founder. Modernism sets out to do all these things by the exercise of human reason, but who can trust it? The cry of a puzzled and frightened humanity comes more and more insistently that none even wants to trust human reason any more. We must make up our minds to be stoics in a gathering night of atheism and despair, or we must find refuge in some form of mysticism, each building up his own experience, and disregarding what is now held to be the irrelevant fact that it is all irrational. There is at any rate nothing in the common presentation of Christianity which we can, or need, reject on the ground that it is contrary to reason. For where we can in any case explain nothing, it is waste of time to make any attempt to do so. Tertullian's is the truest wisdom and the day of the return to currency of the slogan *Credo quia impossibile* is not very far away.

We have been told on many hands recently, and the statement is obviously true, that the great quarrel of the present age is between the spiritual and the material as to which shall be the directive of human life; more popularly it is said to be between

Christianity and Communism, between Christ and Anti-Christ. Neither side bases itself on the exercise of reason as the foundation stone of philosophy, though reason has a more honourable place in the Christian interpretation of Life than in Communism. In the latter indeed reason is just a tool to be used, to promote the truth or to forge a lie, to exalt to the skies or to cast down to the depths: after all, truth and goodness are but bourgeois conceptions. The decline in respect for truth comes out on the Christian as well as the Communist side, in that the lesson has been learned that an ideology can be imposed, a creed can be established, in the schools: you can do anything with education, if you are unscrupulous enough. After all, the Gestapo and the Comintern had their prototype in the Inquisition, and if you are profoundly convinced that you are in possession of the whole truth, or of the only way to salvation, you will always feel justified in removing the heretic or in liquidating the capitalist. With neither side in this great conflict does Modernism, which is tolerant, prone to discussion, and often open-minded, find much favour. And yet in the later stages of the battle it may well be that Modernism, which is the application of reason to human problems, may have a good deal to contribute. There is another line of thought, not perhaps so influential as once it was, which has still a number of adherents and which is opposed to any touch of Modernism in education. It is held that every child belongs to its own time and generation and will not be at home in it unless it is brought up to share all the current beliefs of the period, and so to come to maturity in possession of all the normal antecedents of its contemporaries. It will then both understand, and be understood. It is assumed on this theory, without any substantial justification, that all that is wrong and mistaken in this religious education will be as it were shaken off when maturity is reached. I have never been able to find any evidence that this is so. Indeed I think that this theory fully deserves the severe strictures meted out to it in the fourth chapter of Morley's book *On Compromise*: the passage is indeed a good statement of one of the chief justifications of Christian Modernism in claiming a full place in education:

> 'There can be no good plea for the deliberate and formal inculcation upon the young of a number of propositions which you believe to be false. To do this is to sow tares not in your enemy's field, but in the very good ground which is most precious of all others to you and most full of hope for the future. To allow it to be done merely that children may grow up in the stereotyped mould, is to perpetuate in new generations the thick-sighted and dead-heavy state of our spirits. It is to do one's best to keep society for an indefinite time sapped by hollow and void professions, instead of being nourished by sincerity and whole-heartedness.'

It may perhaps be to the point if I here make occasion to insert a little piece of autobiography to illustrate the effect of a purely conventional course of religious instruction on a young and interested mind. As a schoolboy within limits conventionally prescribed I was well and thoroughly taught, and used the then accepted school text-books of the Greek Testament. I learned from these that there were a number of perverse critics, mostly German in nationality, who were always wrong, and the arguments were so manipulated as to show this lamentable fact quite clearly. But there came the inevitable time when I read one of these perverse critics for myself, and discovered, to put it bluntly, that there had been no fair play, that it had been made to appear that he had said what as a matter of fact he had not said, and further, that what he had said had been omitted, always in part and sometimes as a whole. The result in my case was that for some years I walked in the wilderness as an agnostic until attendance long ago at one of the early conferences of the Modern Churchmen's Union taught me something of the value of Christian Modernism in education, and brought me back into full membership of the Church to which I naturally belonged, and from which a dead tradition of instruction had estranged me.

I do not think that there is a better rule for those who would bring into all our education a reverent Christian Modernism than to try so to teach that nothing will later have to be unlearned. There are issues over which controversies have raged in the past, or are still hot in the present, issues in which there is a case on both sides. I need not particularize since typical instances will occur to you all. In these I submit that the right treatment is to state the argument on each side as impartially as you can, and not to conceal your own opinion, so long as you do not represent it as a final and judicial decision. You can then leave the pupils to decide for themselves, and if you have been so successful as to impart the right standards of respect for evidence and desire for truth you need not be over-anxious about the result. I think this is all so admirably put in a passage on Religious Conformity in the chapter of Lord Morley's book from which I have already quoted that I cannot forbear from quoting rather more extensively. The writer in his own day was regarded as an agnostic and a radical, yet this passage seems to me as good a statement as I know anywhere of the right way to give religious instruction in the conditions of the present day. It has far more real Christianity about it than the purely orthodox instruction which I received.

> 'The great object is to keep the minds of the young as open as possible in the matter of religion; to breed in them a certain simplicity and

> freedom from self-consciousness . . . It is of course inevitable, unless they are brought up in cloistered seclusion, that they should hear much of the various articles of belief which we are anxious that they should not share. They will ask you whether the story of the creation of the universe is true: whether such and such miracles really happened: whether this person or that actually lived, and actually did all that he is said to have done. Plainly the right course is to tell them, without agitation or excess or vehemence or elaboration, the simple truth in such matters exactly as it appears to one's own mind. There is no reason why they should not know the best parts of the Bible as well as they know the Iliad or Heredotus. There are many reasons why they should know them better. But one most important condition of this is constantly overlooked by people, who like to satisfy their intellectual vanity by scepticism, and at the same time to make their comfort safe by external conformity. If the Bible is to be taught only because it is a noble and most majestic monument of literature, it should be taught as that and no more. That a man who regards it solely as supreme literature should impress it upon the young as the supernaturally inspired word of God and the accurate record of objective occurrences, is a piece of plain dishonesty. Let a youth be trained in simple and straightforward recognition of the truth that we can know, and can conjecture, but not with any assurance as to the ultimate mysteries of things. Let his imagination and his sense of awe be fed from those springs, which are none the less bounteous because they flow in natural rather than supernatural channels. Let him be taught the historic place and source of the religions which he is not bound to accept, unless the evidence for their authority by and by brings him to another mind. Youth trained in this way has an infinitely better chance of growing up with the true spirit and leanings of religion implanted in the character, than if educated in formulae which it could not understand by people who do not believe them.'

It is obvious of course in this passage that the writer was thinking of the picked few such as were to be found in the sixth forms of the best public schools at that time: this is well illustrated by the remark that the young should know the best parts of the Bible as well as they know the Iliad or Herodotus. The problem to-day is wider and differs profoundly, and to this consideration we must return. Nevertheless, allowing for these differences, we have in this passage a valuable statement of an ideal which we should never allow ourselves to forget in planning the education of the next half-century.

Having borrowed one such statement from a famous writer of a generation that is past, may I take one more from another famous writer of the present, quoted in the very last number of the *Modern Churchman*; it is taken from Albert Schweitzer's *Declaration of Faith* as stated in a letter written to the International Association for Liberal Christianity and Religious Freedom. To them he writes:

> 'In this conference you will not forget that you are serving an unwanted object: unwanted because the spirit of to-day is opposed to free religious thinking. However, it is needed more than ever before, because

for the spiritual life of our time it is a necessity. Only out of the renewal of ethical and religious thought can arise the spirit which gives to mankind the understanding and power to go from darkness and struggle into light and peace. Free Christianity has the great task of bringing to mankind once and for all the conviction that thought and religion are not irreconcilable but actually belong to each other. Every deep religion begets thinking and every truly deep thought becomes religious.

'The greatest human spirits have striven for the combination of thinking and religion because they saw this as a necessity for man's spiritual well-being. We continue this effort in a time when mankind must first of all learn again to respect spiritual truth. The heart of Christianity is, for us, the Kingdom of God. Only a Christianity which is inspired by this idea and is actively willing the Kingdom of God, is near the original Christianity: only this can give mankind what it needs.

'By standing for free Christianity, and not asking men to become religious, by giving up the thinking which is part of their very nature, we have in Jesus one who denounces the laying on man, in the name of religion, heavy burdens which do not belong to it. We keep to the words of St. Paul: *Where the spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty.*

'May our free Christianity show itself able in spirit and in deed to fulfil its task in our time: may our religion become ever deeper and more real, so that the spirit of Jesus shall not only make us free, but deepen the reality of our Christian living. May this be our ideal.'

There, I think, you have a noble statement of the modernist ideal, that thought and religion belong to each other, that the heart of Christianity is for us the Kingdom of God, and that the first step out of the morass in which the world flounders to-day will be taken when mankind again learns to respect spiritual truth. And now, having contemplated the ideal, let us turn from the heights to the valleys, and see how the actual problem shapes itself in relation to the task of national education to which the State has set itself, and to which the Church must contribute.

In this great scheme embodied in the Butler Act there are four separate problems awaiting solution. The first is, the planning and carrying into effect of an education up to the age of 11+ of all the children of the country, who will at this stage be drafted off to secondary schools. Leading on from this, is the problem of planning a suitable religious education for children up to the age of 16 as a maximum, who will be attending modern schools, and who will learn by seeing and doing, more than by thinking and reading. There is, I think, a distinct problem in finding as a variant on this type of education a scheme suitable for those who are passing through technical schools to technical colleges, and are likely to terminate their ordinary school lessons also at the age of 16. There is finally, what is perhaps the most important problem of all, the education up to the age of 18 of the grammar school children, the academically gifted: I call this the most important,

not because I am undemocratic in sympathy, but because from this class must infallibly be drawn the future leaders in thought, and most of the governors and administrators of the country. It is here, in the teaching of the sixth forms everywhere, that in my belief Christian Modernism can play its most serviceable part.

It will, I think, be generally conceded that this universal education with religious instruction as a definite part of it is to be carried into effect in a country which can no longer with truth be styled Christian. The children will be the sons and daughters of parents who frequently go neither to church nor chapel, and are not conscious of any want on that account unsatisfied. They know extremely little about Christianity. What little they do retain consists in great measure of fragments of a fundamentalist treatment of the Christian Faith, against which their adult reason has reacted not unnaturally, since it has no relation to life as they know it, and does not help them at all, so far as they can see. Those who still call themselves Christians in the poorer districts of our big cities are generally members of little sects of crude and uncompromising views, mostly connected with the Last Day and the Judgement, and these are a poor substitute for the old Nonconformist congregations which are now decaying. In the big cities again the parochial system has broken down, though fine and eager congregations drawn from many parishes can be created by the enthusiasm and leadership of the right sort of clergyman. I do not think that I am painting too black a view, and even if it were only half true, it is not a favourable soil on which to cultivate an enlightened Christianity. I do not see how this can come from the Churches as they are, since they are the Churches of a minority only and they are divided from one another by a lack of fellowship varying indeed in its degrees of intensity, but everywhere, and not least in the field of education, handicapping and sometimes stultifying national effort.

There remain then the teachers in all types of schools, the lecturers and professors in our universities and university colleges, and the staffs of our training colleges. All children pass through their hands, directly or indirectly, and they so pass in small and more or less homogeneous groups working according to a planned syllabus. Children can be withdrawn indeed from all this under a conscience clause, but I am pretty sure that it is a right which parents will seldom exercise. One can assert with some confidence that the teachers could lay foundations, if they were competent, which would bring the reconversion of England much nearer, and enable the Churches, if they were united and capable of fellowship, to make and keep this country really Christian. But I am

afraid that I have fallen into using phrases which show that, humanly speaking, I am not sanguine.

As to the teachers, there are in the first place nothing like enough of them, particularly in the case of the women, who are in Scripture teaching and religious instruction generally, better qualified than the men. Women teachers are becoming fewer, because teaching in their case does not readily lead to marriage, and new careers for women open up nearly every year. The prospects of finding more women teachers accordingly are not good, though the standards which women are setting up are encouraging. The men teachers in all types of school evince a strong and often a successful desire to get out of religious instruction altogether. Their own faith is often vague and unassured, and they are mortally afraid of being asked questions: they have never been at the trouble of reading any scholarly work in the fields of Biblical and religious criticism, and I have known schools where suitable volumes are provided in the common room library, but the masters do not take them out. In the wide field of elementary education they nourish a genuine, if unfounded, fear of religious persecution, and see themselves debarred from promotion because they are sincere in not concealing their agnosticism. But the fault all the way through is that the teachers do not know enough, and are not interested enough, and the teachers are like this, because these faults are characteristic of the laity of the whole nation, of which the teachers form a part.

It seems to me to be clear that professing Christians should at this present juncture make their main effort in promoting Christian education by increasing the number and improving the quality of the teachers. From this might, and I think would follow, a demand for a presentation of our religion on the lines of Christian Modernism, and Modernists would render great service by producing suitable text-books. For the time being, things are not moving this way, the human reason is belittled, and a faith is being preached with many accretions of one kind and another which reason and scholarship will quite certainly in the end reject. It is possible, and some would say probable, that greater troubles than any which we have known lie in front of us, and progress will live through suffering. If so, it will be a real progress, and many shams will disappear: there is no easy way now to the bringing nearer of the Kingdom of God.

CHRISTIAN MODERNISM AND EDUCATION

By Alice Ashley, M.A., Headmistress of Honor Oak School

I AM glad that the topic allotted to me is 'Christian Modernism and Education,' *not* 'Christian Modernism and Schools.' My professional life has been spent in schools, but life contains much besides one's profession and the various departments of life—with their activities, pleasures and problems—cannot and should not be regarded as separate and distinct. My own views have been influenced, no doubt, by inheritance and environment; by family and friends (in this country and beyond the seas), by travel, reading and the radio; by social duties and domestic cares, by the whole local, national and international setting of our lives. Added to this there are the more recent experiences of war-time, evacuation, billeting, bombing; improvisations and emergencies and all the rest of it. I have been asked to-day to speak as a teacher, but I cannot speak as a teacher only, for my general attitude has been affected by all these influences and many others.

I say this by way of introduction, because what I say of myself is true of all teachers, and is sometimes forgotten in generalizations about our profession. Furthermore, it is equally true of our pupils. The school has a great part to play and alarmingly wide responsibilities, but there is very much else that shapes the development of the child. Home matters far more than school, and there are all the other contributory influences—the neighbourhood with its cinemas, advertisements and shops, or with the fields, farms and flocks of the countryside; there is the radio, the Youth Club, the Church and Sunday School; the factory, the football ground, and the office; all these play their part, and the picture is both composite and complicated. Education is something very different from schooling; it is largely unconscious and is conditioned by the air which is breathed, physically, mentally, emotionally and spiritually.

'Christian Modernism and Education' is therefore an immensely wide topic. The school can do little alone—the larger setting of the child's growth must always be remembered. There is, however, this to be said—much that happens outside is fortuitous and unplanned, but we teachers, and the so-called 'Education Authorities,' have the duty of planning. We must decide the

curriculum and the time-table, the external structure of the school day, the content of the lesson, and the nominal activity of the child in the classroom or laboratory, in the gymnasium or the playing field. I say 'external' and 'nominal,' for who can say what really goes on in the child's mind? And I say 'so-called authorities,' for the spirit is free, and the decisions of the administrator deal only with things of secondary importance. No Ministry or County Council has authority over the mind. Human relationships, health of body and mind, beauty or ugliness of surroundings, intellectual curiosity and inward peace, these matter infinitely more than the details of the time-table, and any discussion on education must take this into account.

The spirit is free, and the best of the Education Authorities know it. The Agreed Syllabuses, with all their limitations, are beginning to recognize this. As an example, may I refer to the newly published London County Council Syllabus of Religious Education, which rightly places on the teacher the whole onus of choice? In the Syllabus the teacher is presented with material 'which may guide and help him in his studies.' The compilers continue: 'It cannot be over-stressed that the Syllabus is planned to be suggestive rather than compulsory, and that a slavish adherence to, or a blind following of, the contents in their entirety will defeat its own ends, and be contrary to the spirit in which the Syllabus has been written.' The teacher is asked to study the whole, and then 'decide what is essential and what non-essential to his purpose. He will exercise his power of choice, and may adapt, reject or supplement.' Surely this marks a very significant progress from the authoritarian standpoint which too often dominated the teacher in the past; and it is a progress which we as Modernists should welcome whole-heartedly. The Syllabus itself does not, in my view, entirely maintain this high level. Though much is excellent, the topics suggested to the teachers of the younger children will too often, I fear, lead to those tensions regarded as inevitable in the sections dealing with the older boys and girls. This is a common defect of all Syllabuses I have seen, and arises, I suppose, from the 'agreed' nature of the document.

To return to the school itself and the quality of its community life, I have just been reading Dr. Major's pamphlet *The Church Nobody Knows*, and am interested to find that much he writes of the Established Church applies equally well to the life of a school, and in particular a school which is closely bound up with the State. Dr. Major speaks of the harm wrought by fanaticism; in a school also this would be a menace, and 'freedom, flexibility

and tolerance' are among the characteristics most essential to its well-being. Just as the Church of which Dr. Major writes owes its continued existence to the comprehensive nature of its membership, so also a school, maintained and assisted by a public authority, can glory in the wide scope of its appeal and the comprehensive character of its community. In school, as in Church, the claim for freedom of thought, which is granted to the individual, must be exercised under the discipline of study, and should be inspired by worship and prayer. And 'obedience to a common public order' in school, as in Church, is essential, and not incompatible with the individual needs mentioned above. Finally, a school is 'not static, but evolving,' and constant change, combined with continuity of tradition, is essential to healthy growth.

All this may seem to have little relation to Christian Modernism, but I contend that a good school produces an atmosphere congenial to what we value most in our Modernist philosophy — a reverence for truth, a confidence that God's self-revelation is progressive, a determination to accept and not shirk responsibility, a readiness for comradeship with those who differ from us; and whether they know it or not, teachers and pupils are much nearer to Modernism than to any religious philosophy which draws its sanction from either an authoritarian Church, or a literal interpretation of the Bible. Why is this? Is it not because Modernism, by its very nature, is not remote from the mental thought-forms of the age, and in its presentation of Christianity is less hampered by the unessential accretions which tend to mar the sincerity of other presentations? The problem is, of course, not how to make good Modernists, but how to contribute a little, if only a little, to the growth of good men and women — and incidentally to help boys and girls, as they leave school, to accept the challenge of the Christian faith and not lose the joy and help of comradeship within the Christian Church.

For all this, much is needed. First, better living and better teaching in the school, and by this I do not mean the better teaching of Scripture but the better teaching of every subject. Next, and this is equally important, better preparation in the Training Colleges and Universities. For this the time is ripe, and there are already many hopeful signs. Ten years ago, when I had the honour of addressing this Conference, the standard of religious education in many Training Colleges was known to be deplorably low; and in the Universities it was not easy for an intending teacher to combine serious Biblical study with other academic work. Now, I understand, the position is rapidly changing. Several of the Universities now offer combined courses, where

systematic Biblical or theological study may be undertaken in combination with history or English or another subject. In the Training Colleges, since the 1944 Act, religious studies are no longer an extra, but may count towards the final certificate. Many students are preparing themselves to teach Scripture in every type of school, and in the Emergency Colleges also there is much keen interest.

But to return from college to school, I feel it is important that there should not be too great a contrast between standards of worship within the school and outside. The parishes also must do their part. I am sure you will agree that in many churches a far higher standard of preaching is needed, combined with more beauty and sincerity in forms of worship, and a frank recognition of the present unsatisfactory stage of liturgical development by which the Church so often says, and asks us to say or sing, what it does not mean. May I venture to add that there often seems to be a lack of vitality?

I have been asked to emphasize this point by a headmaster to whom I have recently been speaking. With reference to school chaplaincies, he urged me to remind you that it is useless to appoint a chaplain with a Modernist approach unless he is also a man who has energy, good judgment and infectious enthusiasm. Two of these qualities, energy and enthusiasm, are often characteristics of the High Church party. The third quality, good judgment, ultimately matters most, but it is useless without energy, vitality and powers of leadership. This is very true in school life; it must also be true of parish life. If boys and girls, on leaving school, are to keep or attain any degree of religious fervour, they must find these qualities of warmth and energy in the life of the Church around them. Professor van Holk, at our Annual Meeting, asked us to admit with humility the need of more zeal and a livelier missionary spirit in our work. He called upon us to show a pioneering spirit. Let Modern Churchmen, no less than others, proclaim the 'Glory of the Gospel'—its freedom and its love, its wisdom and toleration—and let us proclaim it openly in our lives and in the dynamic quality of all we do.

Much thought is put nowadays into school worship, to ensure that it is sincere, dignified and harmonious, a rest to the soul in busy days, a stimulus when effort grows slack. At most schools a daily assembly is traditional, and indeed the recent enactment by which a daily Act of Worship has become compulsory was often quite unnecessary. Children will not, of course, analyse their relation to school prayers, and I doubt if we should intrude into their mental privacy by questioning. But young people who have left

school have often told me how much they have missed the daily Act of Worship, and I am sure that it plays a great part in their unconscious development.

It is also, incidentally, a proof of the easy and natural comradeship in worship between young people of different denominations. School life in this respect is happily free from the inhibitions which hamper too many of their elders. I cannot imagine any sixth-former hesitating as to the wisdom of the South India scheme. And here may I pay tribute to the work of the School Broadcasting Council of the B.B.C.? The connection of thought may not be apparent, but the link is the interdenominational character of school broadcasting, combined with the attempt which has recently been made to show the relevancy of Christian doctrine to the contemporary scene. The lecturer last term on the *Epistle to the Romans* instances South India as affording one of the greatest proofs that the unifying power of Christ is still working in the world. Not all the broadcast talks to sixth forms have been on the same high level, and indeed the actual lectures (like much in the Agreed Syllabuses) are sometimes (perhaps inevitably) too conventional and 'safe' to be acceptable to most members of the Modern Churchmen's Union. The virtue of the broadcasts, in my opinion, is largely that they throw open to discussion many subjects of theological import which teachers have found difficulty in introducing on their own initiative. A class will discuss the views of a broadcaster with an ease and lack of self-consciousness which would be rarer if the lecturer were in the room (or if their teacher were attempting to deal with the same topic). I have sometimes agreed with Mr. Henderson as to the timidity of the B.B.C. But in spite of that, I feel that a debt of gratitude is due to those who plan the school services and give the talks. Next year, when the theme of the Monday series passes from Biblical commentary to the more generalized topic of 'Philosophy and Religion,' it is possible that some of Mr. Henderson's criticisms may have less validity. The change of topic is to meet an expressed demand. It has been apparent that our sixth forms — particularly perhaps in the larger boys' schools where a considerable degree of intellectual maturity is attained — contain many sceptics, and the new series has been devised to meet their expressed desire. Among girls, in my experience, emotional maturity often precedes intellectual self-reliance, and I think that there is less revolt from inherited dogmas in girls' schools than in the schools attended by their brothers.

But far more disturbing than diversities of verbal faith is the extreme contrast between standards of Christian conduct, as pro-

claimed in school or in the home, and the devastating disasters of the outer world. In my childhood, there was still an optimism of outlook, a faith in evolution and in a benevolent guidance of everyday concerns. The tension was between different brands of Christianity, or between the Christian standpoint and agnosticism. Now the disturbing element in the minds of thoughtful young people is the contrast between any form of Christian teaching and the world as we know it. The Christian values of Faith, Hope and Charity seem strangely weak and ineffective. This must rouse a puzzled questioning in the minds of a generation who have grown up in time of war, with all it brings in destruction, separation and misplaced effort. Wars and rumours of wars have formed so large a part of their inheritance, and the knowledge of starving generations, concentration camps and torture, and the frustrations which have made peace an unreal thing. Social injustice, international tension, racial prejudice, dishonesty, laziness — these seem so strong. How can the Christian faith be easy to acquire and to maintain? Is it surprising that many of the finest young people cease to go to church? Their lips deny what their lives may proclaim — the dedication of their powers to the search for beauty and truth, and the promotion of goodness and self-sacrifice. I can, then, offer no easy solution to the problems of Christian education in the world to-day. More sound learning will do something, and a mental approach which will be patient, and take long views, and will not give way to panic or propaganda. And in the preparation of the teachers for their task, that there should be clearer knowledge of 'Modernist' theology (I dislike the word, but use it for convenience) is essential. In the highly complicated pattern of life school teaching must stand for something stable and yet dynamic, forceful and yet not transitory. And even if there appears to be little success, the effort will still be a positive good and not without value in the end.

CHRISTIAN MODERNISM IN PASTORAL WORK

By the Rev. F. E. Compton, M.A., B.Sc., Rural Dean of East Birmingham

THE pastoral work of the Church has to be considered in relation to a situation which leaves little room for complacency. The fundamental problems in that situation are deeply rooted, alike in the life of the Church and in the life of the nation; problems of organization such as the maintenance and extension of the parochial system, the supply of clergy, and the financial resources of the Church are of secondary importance. The present position of the Church may be seen most clearly in a new housing area where the contribution of the traditions of a past age is at a minimum. In a parish so situated, even after ten years' hard work there is often but a handful of 'Church people.' The Sunday congregation is numerically less than one per cent. of the population; Church life consists of a number of societies forming a small community within the natural, but often almost non-existent, community of the locality. Those outside this small community, apart from the occasions of weddings and baptisms, turn but rarely to the Church, though it is obvious, often even to themselves, that their lives are impoverished, socially, culturally and spiritually.

There are those within the Church who, aware of the realities of this situation, claim that the Church of England may no longer be considered the Church of the English people. In a world which they regard as increasingly pagan they would refuse its privileges to those whose membership appears to be no more than nominal, and would make the Church a strongly guarded fortress of the Faith with its ways of thought and life kept remote and untouched in a changing world, its conditions of membership strict and uncompromising.

This attitude is clearly opposed by the spirit of Christian Modernism, and need concern us no further. It is more important to consider the necessity for Modernism in those movements within the Church which, with a greater sense of its pastoral responsibility, make no harsh judgment on those who are outside or on the fringe, but are concerned with the problem of how the Church may serve those who, though clearly in need of the foundation of a spiritual life, make no attempt to find it in the life and faith of the Church. Their starting-point is to consider the spiritual needs of the people

and the underlying cause of the spiritual poverty of modern life. Thus Canon Demant, who is representative of one such movement in the Church, describes the present condition of society as

> 'post-Christian, because it has retained in the democracies a real devotion to some of the ethical and social results of the Christian outlook. But our world has lost the doctrines and feeling upon which these results have been reared.'

The loss is due to two schisms; the one

> 'between man and his natural organic relations with the earth; the other and deeper schism is in men's conscience between the human spirit and the divine. This has resulted in a civilization of technical means but without human control by moral or metaphysical or religious doctrines of ends and means.' [1]

The result, as Canon Demant sees it, is that the natural social functions such as industry, commerce and family have lost their purpose, and our task, therefore, is to recover a 'positive religious conception of human life' which will be shown in 'the average person's attitude to elemental things such as work, happiness, the earth, love, sex, children, life and death.' [2]

It follows that the failure of much of the Church's pastoral work is due to it being too narrowly conceived and so attempting to superimpose a structure of faith and devotion on life in which, at its everyday level, the things of the Spirit are denied and neglected. To-day it should be concerned with the spiritual significance of the whole of human experience, with making clear what is the Christian foundation for a spiritual life, with promoting the kind of life which leads to spiritual experience, and with strengthening and deepening that experience by relating it to the Christian faith and to the life of the Church. In this Christian Modernism has an important part to play. It is often said in criticism of Modernism that it is concerned only with intellectual questions and directs its appeal only to educated thinking people.[3] It has, however, a contribution to make in every aspect of Church life, partly for the reason that the manner in which intellectual questions of belief are approached affects everything that is built on their foundation. Especially is this true when to-day it is often said that it has been found insufficient to speak of applying Christian principles to modern problems, and that the Church has recovered the sense of the importance of theology and dogma.

[1] *The Theology of Society*, p. 45.

[2] *op. cit.*, p. 68.

[3] See, for example, *The Church of England in the Twentieth Century*, by Canon R. B. Lloyd, Vol. I, p. 100, where the valuable parochial work done by those who were early members of the Modern Churchmen's Union is overlooked.

The spirit of Modernism is needed, therefore, lest theology and dogma be interpreted in a narrowly orthodox or reactionary sense and the theological basis for the Christian conception of life wrongly stated, so that it fails to win the assent of thinking people and — and this is important for the Church's pastoral work — becomes the basis for claiming a spiritual value for an unreal kind of life which, because it is impracticable, makes no contact with the ordinary life of the people and leaves the Church as isolated and ineffective as if, in the first place, its own affairs had been its sole concern.

It is this, in fact, which is taking place in much of the life and thinking of the Church, and it is making ineffective the work of many who have the right approach to pastoral work. Thus, for example, Demant[4] criticizes those who 'fail to root their religion in the supernatural Christian dispensation and give the impression that they account it fortunate that in some or many respects the Christian faith is in agreement with convictions they have derived from some extraneous source.' But to make any source of conviction, in so far as it is true, extraneous to the Christian faith, is to introduce yet another schism into modern life, and to destroy any possibility of healing those which Demant had already noted. It is not surprising that he finds it difficult to relate the idea of a Natural Order, to which he attaches great importance, to the 'supernatural mystery of the Church,'[5] and that while finding no difficulty in the doctrine of the Fall, he clearly avoids any reference to 'extraneous knowledge' of the Natural Order, associated in his mind with nineteenth-century liberalism. Further, it is not surprising to find that other writers who accept Demant's point of view show a certain obscurantism in their approach to the practical issues of life. A right appreciation of the scientific outlook is needed if the spiritual conception is to be expressed of life influenced so much, for good and ill, by the application of scientific discoveries. To condemn all scientific knowledge as part of the exploded nineteenth-century idea of progress is to ignore the great advances made through scientific knowledge, and to render impossible the making of a real contribution to the solving of the problems, such as those of industrialism, that have been created. To claim a spiritual value for life which is impracticable has the effect of widening the breach between Church and people and lays the Church open to criticism that it meddles in things which it does not understand. Similarly, an element of unreality is introduced into the life of the Church itself, in its teaching of the

[4] *op. cit.*, p. 65.
[5] *op. cit.*, pp. 72 ff.

Christian faith and in its worship. For if the truth expressed in the dogma and the liturgy of the Church is held to be different from all other truth known to the human mind, in that it is beyond human thought and judgment, then it followed that what is taught and done in the Church is discontinuous with the rest of life and experience. This may pass unquestioned when the Church holds aloof from the 'world,' but it is clearly apparent, when the Church is concerned with its function in the modern world, to those who, taught by the Church, are aware of the spiritual significance of the whole of man's experience. Thus the Church fails to help them, and loses the support of those who have a contribution to make to its spiritual life.

Christian Modernism, however, does more than counteract the reactionary tendencies of to-day. It provides, too, the only foundation for the revival of the life of the Church, a revival which is essential if the Christian way of life is to be commended to others and its pastoral work made effective. For while in any part of the Church's life there is merely a dressing-up of the old, so that it has the appearance only of being new, there can be no new life of the Spirit. The Church needs new experience of the Gospel which first gave it life, and in the light of that experience a new effort to relearn, to reinterpret and to relive the Christian life. Its approach to all who care for the things of the Spirit is to call them to this adventure of thought and of living. Those who say that people in this age of uncertainty are asking for dogmatic teaching, and that the only instruction to which they will pay heed is that prefaced by the words 'the Church teaches,' are interpreting the needs of others in terms of their own refusal to make the adventure of faith. The approach which is both truthful and more effective is that of 'the Church is learning,' and calls on others to bring their contribution of experience and insight, and to share in the riches of the Church's great tradition of religious experience, learning, saintliness and worship. This requires a faith in the ultimate truth of the Christian religion worthy of a truly Catholic conception of the Church, and a faith in the fundamentally spiritual nature of Man, worthy of a truly national Church. Middleton Murry has recently made this point in discussing the contribution of the Churches to society.

> 'They should have the imagination to perceive that to the degree to which they fraternally co-operate with one another in spreading a sense of obligation to the free society *for its own sake*, they will be extending the possibility of an entirely new response to the Christian message. Let them be content to expound and uphold the significance of a truth-seeking society in the confidence that, since the Christian religion is true, such a society cannot fail to rediscover it. The reason why this con-

> fidence is lacking is that the Christian Churches do not present their doctrine as an answer to the search for truth, as a contemporary mind experiences it. They do not invite attention of that conscience which seeks "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth," for they regard that conscience as in itself suspect and "irreligious," whereas it is, in fact, by far the most deeply religious element in modern man, and the very basis of his return to Christianity. The professional Christian mind must have shared the experience; it must have started, as it were, from scratch, emptied itself of all its reservations, and plunged into the search for truth unknowing where it would arrive.'[6]

The spirit in which the Church's pastoral work should be undertaken could not be better expressed.

It is now possible, in the light of the understanding of the essential spirit which should inspire and be expressed in the life of the Church, to put forward a number of principles which should be kept in mind in planning the practical content of pastoral work.

First, all people, apart from those who would definitely dissociate themselves, should be thought of as members of the Church of England, so turning the usually facetiously understood idea of 'C. of E.' into a significant feature in the present situation. The membership of any group or society established by the Church should therefore not be limited to those who are regular churchgoers. This leads to two other important principles. The first follows from what has already been said about the causes of the spiritual malaise of to-day. It is useless, for example, to make the familiar appeal that a week begun in church will be a week well spent to those who, because they lack the vitality and imagination which spring from spiritual insight, spend what is to them the most significant part of their life in escape from the dullness of those elemental parts of life which Demant mentions. They will realize the meaning and value of worship only when they have restored the elemental things to their natural place and have begun to sense their spiritual significance. The effective point of contact, therefore, with those whose membership of the Church appears to be only nominal is at that part of their experience where they are already sensitive to its spiritual meaning and correspondingly aware of their spiritual needs. Pastoral work then will often start with the inspiration and interpretation of one of the elemental factors in daily life. For, in present conditions, it is an important moment in a person's spiritual development when he sees clearly the spiritual significance of one part of his life. It can help him to understand the whole, and through the Christian faith and within the life of the Church it can lead to that kind of personal religion which it is the object of all true pastoral work to foster. Part of the

[6] *The Free Society*, p. 240.

urpose of the organization sponsored by the Church, therefore, is iat they provide opportunities for personal evangelism, at these imes of spiritual insight, when its influence is likely to be most rofound. It follows that in all activities in the life of the Church ieir religious significance and purpose should be understood by ose that promote them, and clearly expressed in the content and pirit of what is done. Activities which aim at no more than 'keep-ig people together' or 'off the streets,' or at raising money, ould be avoided. They are not the Church's true work, and itter away time and energy better used in other ways. It is im-ortant, too, that the Church should not attempt to duplicate or ompete with what is already being done by other societies which e concerned with human welfare, but should seek to co-operate id to help such societies to appreciate the religious significance f their work. Co-operation is always welcomed when the Church's oncern is known to be sincere and disinterested.

Another important principle is concerned with whatever re-iains of the traditional bonds between Church and people. That ny should have survived suggests that they express a deeply felt eed in human life, and that they should be preserved by re-iterpreting their essential character according to the needs of -day. Thus the Occasional Offices should be made occasions of al worship and instruction, and no feature of modern life, even iat of signing the many forms of bureaucracy, that bring the eople to the parson's door should be despised.

In this wider life of the Church it is important that all its ctivities should have their centre and find their inspiration in ublic worship. The spirit of the Prayer Book emphasizes the ongregational nature of the services, and so, clearly (and without iat element of selfconscious artificiality which mars some modern ttempts) linking worship and life, should be expressed in the anner in which the services are conducted, in their revision, and n supplementing them by new forms of service for special occa-ions. These services should not be stunts,[7] but should grow out f the wider life of the Church and be in response to the needs of ne people.

Space does not permit for more than a brief outline of two uggestions for practical experiments in pastoral work, in which ese principles would be worked out and put to the test. The rst, an experiment in promoting Christian Home Life, is sug-ested by the present national concern about the decline in the tandard of home life, and by the fact that it clearly involves some

[7] Rightly condemned by A. G. Hebert, *Liturgy and Society*, p. 225.

of those elemental parts of life through which it has been seen the spiritual conception of life may be approached. That people commonly turn to the Church on the family occasions of marriage and birth suggests that their spiritual significance does not go altogether unheeded, and the links so formed between Church and people could be used as the basis for setting up a fellowship of young married people and of those engaged to be married. The members would be drawn together by their common interest in home-making, and the programme would have to be of such a practical kind that it would give them definite help in the matters that were their concern, and carried out in such a spirit that its religious significance was apparent. Thus the situation would be avoided which seems to exist in some rural parishes, where one movement, meeting in the village hall, seems to be concerned exclusively with the practical side of home life, and another, meeting in the church, with the spiritual. It is of great importance to-day that the two should go together, the practical giving expression to the spiritual, and the spiritual giving inspiration and vitality to the practical.

The second experiment is in the much-discussed sphere of youth work. Compared with some fifty years ago, when such movements as the Scouts and the Boys' Brigade were begun, to-day much youth work both within and without the Church is vague as to its ideals and purpose, and its technique of achieving them is undeveloped. It is true that a club which makes little demand on its members has its place, especially during the early years of adolescence of those who have an unsatisfactory home background.[8] A Christian Youth Movement should, however, surely have more to offer than table tennis, billiards, dancing and occasional unrelated talks and discussions; for it is important that the Church should not give the impression that it is concerned only with the lighter side of recreation, or that its activities should not be thought of as a rival to the facilities for further education, both vocational and cultural, which are to be found in most cities. The need is for experiments to be made in a youth movement in which the programme as a whole expresses the challenge of the Christian way of life. Membership would not be conditioned by attendance at church, but on willingness to take part in the programme, which would, as part of the Christian response to life, encourage, for example, educational and cultural activities both within and without its own organization, service of the community, and a high standard in personal and home life and in daily work. Within the

[8] *In the Service of Youth*, by J. Macalister Brew, shows the possibilities of such a club, given the right leader.

fe of such a movement there would arise many opportunities for ne discussion of the religious issues that its programme and the fe of its members would raise. It would provide the setting for ne Confirmation class, which would gain in value by being linked ith the challenge which is involved in membership of such a ovement. Another vital part of the programme might well be a onthly service of Holy Communion (to which members belong- ig to other denominations would be invited), followed by break- st and an informal conference.

The problem of carrying out such experiments as these, of iving definite shape to their organization and of supplying the spiration that they would need, are indeed great. It has been the urpose of this paper to show that such work can only be done ccessfully in the spirit of Modernism. It should be equally ear to all who regard the pastoral work of the Church as the esponse to the second commandment of our Lord, as to what has o be the ultimate source and inspiration of that Modernism.

WORLD EVANGELISM AND CHRISTIAN MODERNISM

By A. C. Bouquet, D.D., Lecturer in Comparative Religion, Cambridge

MODERNITY is inevitable in any living religion. Unless it is content to become a backwater in the life of mankind, must accept the task of justifying itself as relevant to the needs nd duties of the particular world in which it happens to be set. hat this is widely recognized may be seen from the attempts of rofessor Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan to interpret Hinduism in a odern guise, of Dr. Maneckji Dhalla of Karachi to do the same r Parsiism, and of the numerous Liberal Jews to do it for udaism. The account given by Professor H. A. R. Gibb of oslem Modernist activities hardly needs mention within the pre- ncts of his own university. It is indeed plain that with a skilful ppeal to Hadith or tradition, almost anything can become pos- ble for the twentieth-century follower of Mohammed.

So far as Christianity is concerned, this need for modernity is st as applicable to Roman Catholics as it is to Quakers. odernity matters more to-day than perhaps at any time in Euro- ean or even in human history. The increasing *tempo* of change human affairs and outlook since (roughly) 1453 has reached its imax of acceleration since about 1860, especially as the result

of two rapidly succeeding world-wars. One might say that, taken as a whole, man in 1800 was far more like man in 1066 than man in 1940. In the first half of the nineteenth century man's outlook, at any rate in England, was not so very different from man's outlook in the reign of Henry VIII. To-day the earlier Tudor *Weltanschauung* seems separated from us by a gulf. (Compare, for example, the theological utterances of Liddon with those of our friend the present Bishop of Truro.)

Yet in spite of obvious changes, the fundamental character of man remains fairly constant. He is still the same biological species, and even though he may possess mechanical aids for increasing his capacity to see, hear, move in space, and make artefacts, he only too quickly reverts to the primitive. It is unhappily not at all uncommon to see neglected vagrants who resemble Australian blackfellows. One doubts whether Hermann Goering was in essentials very different from such men as the Roman Emperors Galerius and Maximin Daza, or perhaps Gaiseric the Vandal. Portraits of Stalin bear an odd resemblance to those of some Mongol chieftains.

Thus while the neo-pagan of the twentieth century is the inheritor of the results of that intellectual process which began with the renewed study of Greek free thought at the end of the fifteenth, and culminated in the science of the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (both pure and applied), he is still, as born and left to his own devices, a pagan, and ends by doing the same things as pagans in the past. His disorder is the same old disorder. His pride is the same as the old article. His need of rescue from the disaster of self-destruction is more pressing than ever.

It is this consideration which has encouraged recent utterances such as that which describes humanism as 'the age-long lie,' and of course it is not unnatural to point on the one hand to the still increasing number of adherents which the Christian movement is winning in many countries, to its beneficent effects in such areas as New Guinea, South India and the inland parts of China, and on the other hand to the horrid cruelties and confusion which accompany its repudiation in various parts of Europe.

I suppose that the subject which has been allotted to me may be regarded as a specially appropriate one in this year 1948, when once again the bishops of the far-flung Anglican Communion are met for counsel at Lambeth, and when the World Council of the Christian Churches has held its inaugural meeting at Amsterdam. In any case, Dr. Latourette's recently completed encyclopaedic survey provides us with an inevitable and indeed indispensable starting-point for any useful discussion of the religious prospects

mankind, and leaves a strong impression on the reader that y common world-faith of the future stands a good chance of ing, in a genuine sense of the word, a Christian one. It must be mitted, in passing, that the Christian victories of the past 150 ars were chiefly won in lands where the impact of rival modern eologies had not at that time been felt, and that what is said to the worst government in Europe is strongly supported by a urch which is in communion with Rome, while some of the rst slums in Great Britain are said to have existed in cathedral ies.

The questions that naturally arise in the minds of thoughtful ople are two:

(i) How far is it possible to express the Christian faith in such terms as to make it appear relevant to the situation in the modern world, without surrendering what in it is permanent?

(ii) Is it possible so to re-state it that it can still actually do its work of human redemption in the future?

t me approach these questions in turn.

(i) *How far is it possible to express the Christian faith in such terms as to make it appear relevant to the situation in the modern world, without surrendering what in it is permanent?*

It hardly needs saying that the effort to re-state the Christian ith in terms relevant to the world of the twentieth century has en the central task of our Modern Churchmen's Union since its undation, and a study of the back files of the *Modern Churchman*, especially of the Conference numbers, although it reveals, think, a certain doctrinal development, reveals also a certain nsistency. We have, I think it will be agreed, done what we set t to do.

But we need to remember that we are not the only people who ve been aiming at re-statement, and that similar tasks have been dertaken among the various great denominations, and that these ve been carried out, alike in our own Church and outside it, in rms sometimes more radical, sometimes more conservative, than ose commonly to be found in the pages of the magazine edited Dr. Major.

It is not unfair to say that many of these different attempts ve met with a considerable measure of success. They have moothed away some of the unnecessary obstacles to a modern eker after a respectable faith, chiefly by showing what a Christian liever is not committed to. If I may give a few examples of s, I should quote

(1) The statement by Sir Will Spens about the effect of the

consecration prayer upon the eucharistic elements. Here, defining an *object* as 'a complex of persisting opportunities of experience which have a common situation in space,' he writes: 'In and through consecration those complexes of opportunities of experience . . . are changed not by any change in the original opportunities of experience, but by the addition of new opportunities of experience which are equally ultimate and have far greater significance.' That seems to me a real eirenicon.

(2) The statement of Dr. Whale about the Fall. 'Eden,' he says, 'is on no map, and Adam's fall fits no historical calendar. Moses is not nearer to the Fall than we are because he lived 3,000 years before our time. The Fall refers not to some dateable aboriginal calamity in the historic past of humanity, but to a dimension of human experience which is always present—namely that we who have been created for fellowship with God repudiate it continually, and that the whole of mankind does this along with us. Every man is his own Adam.'

(3) The statement of the late Dean Armitage Robinson in a letter to Archbishop Randall Davidson about the danger of confusing the cardinal doctrine of the Incarnation with a statement about the *mode* of the Incarnation which must obviously be subject to the scientific analysis of such evidence as exists.[1]

But all these, and many others like them, have not been, in the main, official pronouncements, and even the rather mild and reticent 1930 Lambeth Conference memorandum on the Christian Doctrine of God, and the more outspoken *Report of the Doctrinal Commission*, valuable as they both are, possess no canonical authority. This is probably just as well. So long as the permissive limits of interpretation are kept wide enough, it is wiser not to inhibit those who may still prefer to walk in the traditional paths and also not to define too exactly the limits of re-statement.

Yet some limits there must be. I daresay many of you have been reading Professor John Baillie's address, given at Whitby, Ontario, in July, 1947, at the meeting of the International Missionary Council. I shall have occasion to refer once and again to that address in the course of this paper. My point here is that in it Professor Baillie by-passes, so to speak, the vexed questions of detail in regard to the supernatural events recorded in the New Testament, and that his main thesis would be equally valid if, let us say, the interpretation of St. Peter's speech in *Acts* x (which is quoted by Baillie as giving a good example of the original *kerugma*)—if the interpretation of it, I say, were couched in the

[1] In the preface to 'Thoughts on the Incarnation,' lectures delivered in Westminster Abbey and published by Messrs. Longmans.

rms of Pryke's *Modernism as a Working Faith*, or alternatively those of *Essays Catholic and Critical*, or still more in the quant language of Mr. C. S. Lewis. There is but one *kerugma*. here may, however, be more than one *didache*.

Now our concern is with world-evangelism, and it is no use ping to the world with an uncertain voice. Plainly the message ith which the missionary has to start, to-day as ever, must be mething very close to Professor Baillie's main announcement, e *kerugma*, which I venture to quote in his own words :

> 'What made that hour the turning-point of history was that history was then invaded by a Presence of a new kind, a Presence that dwelt among us, "and we beheld His glory, the glory as of the only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth." Very soon the conviction formed itself in the minds of some men of Galilee that in sending them this Presence God had done something decisive for the fortunes of the human race. Our Lord's announcement that the reign of God was at hand was made credible to them by the fact that He Himself showed them the way to a new kind of life, a life worthy of being called the reign of God, and that His Presence with them made this life possible. In His Presence they felt themselves challenged to a decision, as they had never been challenged before. And still to-day, when we stand in the Presence of Christ, we know ourselves to be so challenged. There is indeed a challenging quality in other historical figures, and men had been challenged to decision long before Christ came. But not conversion comparable to that which is brought about by the impact of Christ upon men's minds.' . . . That particular hour of Christ's appearing has lasted ever since. . . . Christ's coming into Galilee and His coming to me personally are fused into a single hour.'[2]

After some such announcement the missionary can, and indeed must in all honesty, go on to explain in due course to his atechumens that as far as detail is concerned there is more than ne possible and permissive interpretation or *didache*, and that o accept what is called '*a modernist didache*' can not only be ore in keeping with what we are coming to know about the nature the universe, but can preserve for them the essence of the *erugma* just as well as, if not better than, the traditionalist or ndamentalist interpretations.

But I am careful to say '*a* modernist didache.' As Dr. Baillie uts it : 'The *kerugma* is from beginning to end a recital of events —of events which are all part of a single grand event.' (The good ews is not merely that God is working out a purpose or chain of

[2] I notice that Dr. Cadoux in his *Life of Jesus* puts the same thought in fferent but arresting terms : 'The whole story of the Christian Church from entecost onward is the Second Coming of Jesus.' Of course the words coming,' 'invasion,' 'appearance,' like the phrase 'came down from eaven' in the Nicene Creed, are pieces of *verbal* symbolism employed to escribe an experience which is indubitable, but which evades expression in nguage determined by pointer-readings.

purposes in the cosmic and creaturely course of events, but that something *happened in history* at a particular time.) 'The events themselves are of course capable,' he goes on, 'of being apprehended and recorded in such a way as to rob them entirely of their decisive significance as glad tidings. Modern positivism habitually apprehends and records them in this way, and (adds Baillie) I suppose Pontius Pilate did the same. But it is not in this way that the apostles proclaim them. They proclaim them as an Act of God in history — God doing something decisive for the human race.'[3]

You see it is a *positivist* modernism, a *positivist didache*, which is excluded. A modern interpretation which can honestly put the emphasis in the *kerugma* where the apostles put it, this at any rate should be exempt from the stigma of heresy.[4]

Objections based upon the date and Galilean provenance of the historical content of the *kerugma* are still heard from time to time; but since the acceptance by so many reputable anthropologists of the diffusionist theory, the provenance of a universal gospel from a single centre in the Middle East loses its offence, while the establishment of the enormous antiquity of man upon this planet makes the emergence of *homo pictor* and *Deus-homo* alike relatively modern appearances, and reinstates the validity of the phrase το πλήρωμα τοῦ χρόνου.

Let us pass to the second question.

(ii) *Is it possible so to re-state the Christian faith that it can still actually do its work of human redemption in the future?*

[3] Let me put the same point in another way. Some twenty years ago, Professor Burkitt, when turning over the pages of *Songs of Praise,* as the book lay on my piano, paused when he came to Walt Whitman's 'Pioneers,' ('All the past we leave behind'), set to music, you will remember, by Martin Shaw. 'No,' he said, 'not *all* the past. As a hymn it is not true and not Christian.' So it appears. No Christian Modernist can shed a certain item from his faith, an event in history, seen and witnessed to, as of supreme significance. This doctrine about events is indeed inseparable from the teaching of Jesus, who opens His ministry with the announcement that the καιρός is ἐγγύς. The significance of certain temporal events for God and man, and so in a wider sense the significance of *all* history, is an essential part of what we have to proclaim to the world. Yet it must be balanced. Besides giving full weight to this anchorage of our faith upon the historical, we need much more to acquire the perspective of the modern astronomer, and this I fear that relatively few Christian theologians seem ready or able to do as yet. The result is that many still look back with romantic yearning instead of forward with adventurous imagination. The *kerugma* in 10,000 A.D. will, we hope and believe, still be the same as ever, yet the *didache* then may be to a vast extent a different one.

[4] Thus the *Life of Jesus,* which is the posthumous work of my old schoolfellow, Dr. John Cadoux, though extremely modernist and liberal, obviously contains the *kerugma,* especially in its Epilogue.

It may of course be possible so to re-state the Gospel that its meaning and implications are easily understood by the large element in the youth of the modern world which has received what is known as 'a modern scientific education.' The right sort of language may be used, and objections of the kind just mentioned may be satisfactorily dealt with; but the intelligent listeners may still be provoked to reply: 'Yes, you have described the disorders of the world quite correctly. We admit them, and we admit that there does seem to be a radical evil from which mankind needs to be delivered. We and our spokesman, Professor Joad, have no quarrel with you on that score. We are even prepared to grant you that your description of what you say is Christianity makes sense, and is neither incongruous nor irrelevant nor palpably absurd. Indeed, on your own presentation we are almost persuaded to accept it. Some of us have also a dialectic interpretation of history which implies that the course of events has a meaning, and we might go so far as to say that certain revolutionary personalities and events have a special and even unique significance. Nor do we see why such a movement as yours should not have diffused from a small centre like Syria. We might say the same of Soho in our own day.

'But we are bound to ask the crucial question, Does the Christian faith in actual fact do what it claims to do? It *may* make out a good case for itself on paper, in the pulpit, or on the rostrum. But what is the empirical evidence that it *is* delivering the world from its disorders? We should be only too thankful if it were. But we are accustomed to judge upon actual evidence, on experimental tests, and these we ask you to produce, since *our* experience of only too many Christians is, as Spinoza once bitterly said, that they differ from non-Christians mainly in their opinions. You never even really know the apparently nice ones until you have to do business with them, and then . . . ! But the exponents of at least one modern ideology seem to have a remarkable success in uniting theory with practice, and they do get things done.'

This kind of challenge *can* be answered; but in mass-churches large numbers of people are conventional members, inoculated with a mild dose of the Gospel, and so proof against capture by zealous discipleship. Under such conditions it is woefully true that the observer may well declare that God is not delivering His people at all. For the real evidence one has to look in the right places; and since it is of the essence of Christianity that it should be 'the seed growing secretly,' publicity is for its exponents an unwelcome thing. Still it *is* possible to take the enquirer to see examples of quiet faithful work in many parts of Great Britain

where the presence of a living Christian group (not *necessarily* an Anglican one) is leavening the whole of the society around it. One can always recall the saying current after Jean Baptist Vianney had been working ten years in his parish — Ars is no longer Ars! But I can also remember in the early days of my ministry coming across more than one little free-lance mission chapel in the London suburbs where the minister, half Congregationalist, half Quaker, was a great power for good in the mean streets where he worked, and where if you had taken away the influence of his consecrated personality there would have been little light left. Dr. Van Dusen's account of the native churches found in the Pacific by the American soldiers is another welcome piece of evidence. I recall that A. F. R. Wollaston of Cambridge, when visiting Papua on a geographical survey, recorded that the one element bringing hope and kindliness and regeneration into that fierce land of tropical thunderstorms and fever (where he says he seldom saw a man alive over the age of 40), the one hopeful element was the Christian Church. What is true of one island is true on a wider scale for the whole planet. Take the pastoral expression of *agapē* out of the world as a whole and what would be left?

Miss Chapman, in her recent journey across Madagascar, noted the marked difference between the villages which had and which had not a high percentage of Christians, and the same difference has been observed in South India. The regenerating influence of Kagawa upon Japanese life is beyond dispute. Schweitzer has been reckoned 'the greatest European of our time.' With magnificent inconsistency a Hindu describes Gandhi in words of praise as 'A Christ-like man.' It is only when we see the effects of a deliberate and planned attempt to eradicate Christianity from a country where it has been working, even though imperfectly, for some centuries, that we are able to realize what its presence during those centuries has meant to the lives of its citizens.

In the end, it comes down to this. Encounter. We are able to demonstrate that where there is *encounter* with the Living Spirit of Christ, followed by surrender, regeneration ensues and fruitful results follow.

Yet we must be careful to warn our critical enquirers that the world and God stand in such a relation to one another that one must not pitch one's expectations too high. Divine Grace is not irresistible. It is always possible for mankind to encounter Jesus Christ and then to turn its back on Him. *βία οὐ προσέστι τῷ θεῷ* Unless surrender follows encounter, the last state of man is worse

nan the first, since God does not override human free-will. More-ver, surrender is an individual affair. Souls are not really won in rowds. As Bishop Walsham How once said pithily, 'You don't ll bottles by sprinkling water over them.' This is put in more erious vein by Bishop Neill in his fine paper 'The Church in a evolutionary World'—also delivered at Whitby, Ontario, and n utterance which all members of this Conference might well onder. He says: 'The challenge of the revolutionary situation omes closer still. The trouble about the world is that there are ar too few Christians in it. And in the end the number of true hristians has to be increased one by one. The lasting work is not one when the five thousand are fed, but when the Son of Man, eary with his journey, sits by the well and talks with the woman f Samaria.'

Leaving now the *kerugma* and the critical enquirer, let us turn or a moment to the missionary evangelist himself. There is no ispute that he needs the most efficient training that is possible, nd that the rise of an excluding policy in new nationalist states lso involves a new technique in evangelism, and puts a much eavier burden upon the native leaders in the young indigenous hurches, the education of whom should be our greatest and most rgent care. There is as much a call as ever to insist on the unneces-ary handicap which the evangelist adopts if he approaches the folk e wishes to win with a purely pre-scientific theology. I wish with ll my heart that enthusiasts both at home and abroad would take onger views, and consider not the mere evangelization or recon-ersion of mankind in their own generation, but the evangelization nd upbuilding of countless generations yet to come. 'On to rthodoxy' is but a shallow slogan, unless that orthodoxy be a beral one. Some of our younger theologians of to-day continue, las, to flirt with a reactionary orthodoxy which cannot stand up o the assaults of science and has no real future. They need to ake sure that the religion of to-day is going to be not merely at of to-morrow but of a million years hence, if need be, and ey dare not achieve a cheap and speedy success which may later n be turned into failure, and to teach a creed to simple Dyaks or Melanesians, still less to English schoolchildren, which they will n years to come have to unlearn. What does it profit a West frican if he enter the Christian fold only to make his exit from into Marxism?

This leads me to my final topic. For some time, as we know, new competitor has been turning up in many different areas, to it, the Communist; and his attitude towards all religions (Chris-ianity included) has shown itself typically that of a Hebrew

mono-Yahwist. 'As for all the gods of the nations, they are but projections of the human mind — idols, in fact: but it is the Dialectic Process which creates everything.' This is no idle parody. It is a fair summary of the argument which can be found in any text-book of Marxist doctrine. Asia, as we know, is now determined to go her own way politically and desires no more European imperialism. Yet large numbers of Asiatics have accepted the new European ideology, and there is hardly a sector of the Christian mission-field in which the disciples of Karl Marx have not been busy. Even since I began writing this paper, Burma has declared her intention of moving 'nearer Moscow.'

Mr. G. K. Chesterton once prefaced his critical study of a fellow-disputant with the remark, 'Most people disagree with Mr. Shaw because they do not understand him. I am the only person who understands Mr. Shaw, and I disagree with him.' It is useless to disagree with Marx without understanding him first. I venture to suggest that by far the most urgent task for Christian propagandists and theologians is to master the tenets of this remarkable man and his followers, and *to get beyond them as quickly as they can*. At a successful Missionary Exhibition held in Cambridge during the recent war we were faced on our programmes by the slogan, 'If you don't think beyond Hitler, you won't get beyond Hitler.' May I recast this with the hero's name changed? What T. R. Glover said of the Christians under the Roman Empire must be proved true of Christians to-day, *i.e.* that they overcame their adversaries 'because they outlived them, out-thought them, and out-died them.'

I remember how in the year 1931 we held in Cambridge an ecumenical gathering of delegates drawn from most of the European Churches, and how we gathered in large numbers at Great St. Mary's and recited the Lord's Prayer together, every man in his own tongue wherein he was born. It fell to my lot to offer some hospitality to the German delegate, Dr. Simons, who had been Chancellor of the Reich for a time under the Weimar Government, and as we walked down Jesus Lane together I said to him, 'Well, Herr Doktor, and what about Moscow?' He replied briefly, 'There is only one possible solution of that problem: we must have a better Communism.' I have never forgotten those simple words of his, and I am sure that they are as true as ever to-day.

It is not for me to dictate the policy of these Conferences. But I do make a humble suggestion that it would be well worth our while as a body to devote at least a considerable part of one Conference to the various aspects of Marxism in theory and practice.

We owe it, I believe, to our fellow-Christians to give them whatever help we can in this matter; and if the subject may seem to us rather a thorny one, it is surely not more so than some of the problems of Christology which past Conferences have tackled with courage and success.

Our neighbours of the S.C.M. have been busy at this task for several years, and the literature which they have issued is both serviceable and informative as far as it goes. But I do not think they have said the last word about it; and if we are planning for the future, as we certainly ought to be, I am sure that we ought to give more attention to a rival creed which is already creating important living issues in parts of Africa and the Far East, and may easily assume greater prominence in India.

There are those, I know, who say that in the face of this new adversary the adherents of the various great religions should unite in self-defence, and emphasize the claims of the spiritual life which it is believed are felt by all of them. I cannot share the optimism of these enthusiasts. I am quite ready to believe that it would be a good thing if we of the different faiths were to get to know more about one another, since some at any rate of our differences are the result of misunderstanding due to the use of different languages.[5] We can also join, often profitably, in silent worship. But I am convinced that many of the attempts at co-operation that are being made to-day are the result of confused thinking, and that those who make them have never really faced the thesis so well set out by the late Edwyn Bevan in his Gifford Lectures, *i.e.* that the paths of pantheism and theism cannot both lead to the same point, and that one or the other must surely be in error.

I fully recognize the truth which is expressed in the famous passage about the Logos—the Light that lighteneth every man—though I am not so sure that it is as easy to apply this to the ethnic pantheists of Asia as it was to the Platonists and Stoics of the second century A.D., and I rather doubt whether Justin Martyr and the Alexandrians would have pressed it as far as they did if they had not believed the pseudepigraphic letters of Plato to be genuine works of the master.

When all is said and done, the real background of our faith is Hebraic, and against Hebraeo-Christian prophetism the great religions of the Far East have a way of wilting when they really

[5] In the fourth century the Cappadocian fathers did useful work in removing similar misunderstandings between Eastern and Western Christians, in the use of such terms as ὑποστάσις, οὐσία, etc.

encounter it. Let them modernize themselves as they may, the future does not lie with them.

It seems to me that if Christians are to deal firmly, sympathetically and successfully with the doctrines of Marx, they had much better go straight to the task and do it on their own, if only for the reason that there is a certain dialectical relationship, as has often been observed, between Christian and Marxist affirmations. It is not unfair to describe Marxism from one point of view as Christianity 'gone sour,' or 'in reverse.'

Of course it is unlikely that our Fathers the Bishops will necessarily pay much heed to anything that is said or done at this Conference. They are far too busy, and have too full an agenda already. Even so, I am moved in all humility to throw out one more tentative suggestion, which those in authority may perchance feel disposed to take up. A large part of the trouble with which we are faced at the present time in this special aspect of our evangelistic problem is due to the language difficulty. We, and in particular our distinguished representative, Sir Oliver Franks, can talk with our American neighbours, and when we disagree we can have explanations and smooth away misunderstandings. But neither we nor the Americans can talk with one hundredth part of that ease to our neighbours behind the Iron Curtain, and they after all are the principal rival propagandists so far as world-evangelism is concerned. If the Anglican Communion had a live general staff (perhaps it has : I do not know)—but if it has, surely one of its foremost aims should be with as little delay as possible to select a substantial number of able lay folk under 40, of the calibre and adventurousness of the early Jesuits, and to give them not only a first-class modern theological training, but to equip them with so intimate a knowledge of written and spoken Russian that they could be employed as intermediaries between ourselves and the Soviet Union, with the certainty that because of the quality of their equipment they would be constantly in request for all kinds of mediatorial work. Though well-grounded in the Marxist philosophy, they should have no political axe to grind, but should make it their supreme object to remove misunderstandings and to explain two great groups of human beings to one another; and if in so doing they ran risks and the danger sometimes of imprisonment or even death, that would be no more than what missionaries of past ages have cheerfully embraced in the cause of Christ.

Brethren, the time is short.

CHRISTIAN MODERNISM AND CHURCH UNITY

By the Rev D. E. H. Whiteley, M.A., Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford

WHAT will men and women think of the twentieth century when this age of iron in which we live has passed into its true historical perspective? Its failures and frustrations, its diabolical cynicism and cruelty are obvious to us all. Prophecy is a dangerous trade, but I am firmly convinced that this present time will be known to succeeding generations not only for its barbarities but for solid and lasting achievements of which the man in the street is hardly even aware.

High among these achievements will stand the growing unity of the Church, which is still the one Church of Christ for all that it has been shattered into many fragments, every one of which is deeply corrupted. Much has already been accomplished: the validity of Anglican orders has been recognized by most of the branches of the Orthodox Church; the unity of the Church of Scotland was substantially restored in 1929; nearly all the denominations which stem from John Wesley have coalesced in the Methodist Church; the United Church of Canada has justified the Union by its success; and the Church of South India is about to celebrate its first birthday. Further progress on similar lines may reasonably be expected: negotiations are proceeding between the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America and the Presbyterians of that country; the Church of England in Canada may soon be one with the United Church of Canada; while, in our own country, conversations are in progress between responsible leaders of the Free Churches and of the Church of England.

Our picture of the growing unity of the Church will be incomplete without mention of such organizations as the World Council of Churches, the first Assembly of which is due to meet at Amsterdam in September of this year. The World Council is a piece of interdenominational machinery for the sharing of ideas and experience, for common study and common action by the constituent Churches. The work of the World Student Christian Federation and the fruitful co-operation of denominational missionary societies, which have largely eliminated overlapping and consequent waste of effort in the areas covered by the younger

Churches, bear eloquent testimony to a spirit of charity which in previous centuries would have seemed impossible, as do countless instances of interdenominational co-operation in our own country.

The reasons for this growing unity, as for the original estrangements, are partly sociological or political, and partly theological in their nature. The Reformation itself was inspired by considerations of theology, but would never have come to fruition if political and dynastic factors had not also been at work. The Free Churches in this country owed their origin to sociological developments as well as to disagreements about doctrine or ecclesiastical government. In our own time the sociological and political causes for denominational antagonism have largely passed away, although denominational separatism is maintained by the innate tendency of organizations to outlive the conditions which gave them birth. The Church people of this and other countries, whatever their denomination, are faced with similar problems. The common fight against materialism and dwindling congregations, the common shortage of men and resources, is driving the Churches together. Yet he would be a cynic indeed who supposed that the movement for Church unity was due solely to considerations of expediency. Theological and spiritual motives are playing a greater part in bringing the Churches together than ever they did in promoting separation. We have begun to realize that a multiplicity of Churches is almost a contradiction in terms. It is a mockery for small bodies of Christians in the same locality to partake of the sacrament of unity in separate buildings. The movement for Church Unity is not a surrender to expediency but obedience to the will of God.

But we are living in a fool's paradise if we imagine that the outlook is 'set fair.' Union alone is not enough; a bundle of corpses is not a united body of men. We shall have failed if we unite on any basis which impairs the spiritual quality of the Church. Throughout Christendom there are unmistakable signs of ossification, signs of an increasingly hard and mechanical temper of mind as well as signs of new life. The cause of reunion itself is threatened by the same harsh and reactionary spirit which imperils the spiritual effectiveness of the Church. The same narrow ecclesiasticism which is leading some to retreat into the Church and leave the world to its fate, forgetting that the Church is the instrument of God for the salvation of the world, is also reopening the old wounds of denominational intolerance. And the tragedy is that the supporters of intolerance are fully convinced that they are serving God.

It is impossible for the Church to be united or to fulfil the purposes of God except on a basis of what I should call the principles of Christian Modernism, although I hasten to add that those same principles would be accepted by many who would not call themselves Christian Modernists.

Within the Churches the tide is set against these principles in many quarters, although not so strongly as was the case a few years ago. The reason is not far to seek. A country engaged in total war is forced to adopt the methods of total warfare in order to survive; there is clearly a danger that the outlook engendered by total war may become permanent. Christians who have to contend with materialism and bitterness are liable to become bitter and intolerant in their turn, and to adopt doctrinal positions which are almost as legalistic and mechanical as the pagan doctrines against which they are compelled to fight. In harsh conditions survival by adaptation may easily become survival by degeneration. So much for our fleeting survey of prevailing influences. Before we go on to make positive proposals there are two points which must be stressed.

First, it is not possible to attain immediate organic unity simply by writing constitutions. We can only establish the conditions out of which organic union can arise. The Churches must grow into unity; they cannot be forced together. I am sure that the Archbishop of Canterbury is right when he maintains that there must be a period of co-operation, preferably on a basis of mutual supplementary ordination, before we can embark upon organic union.

Secondly, we have to deal not with abstract doctrines but with persons. The same human being who horrifies us with his bigotry and his obscurantism in one direction may fill us with admiration for his devotion and self-sacrifice or for his spiritual awareness in other respects. We have long maintained that we should hate the sin and not the sinner: it is equally important to condemn the false doctrine but not to bear resentment against the man who holds it.

The late Archbishop William Temple once told the story when preaching in Oxford of two dons who were well known in his undergraduate days: one of them wished that Christianity were true, but feared that it was false; the other wished that it were false, but feared that it was true, like the devils 'who also believe and tremble.' We are reminded of our Saviour's own words, 'Not they who say unto me, Lord, Lord, but they who do the will of my Father which is in heaven.' In so far as it is possible to accept a dichotomy between thought or intellectual

belief on the one hand, and will or action on the other, we must maintain that devotion to the cause of Christ is more important than correct conceptual beliefs about Him. This point must not be pressed too far, since man is a unity, and thought and action influence each other. The faith which saves is not the faith which consists in a correct intellectual belief about Jesus Christ, though this is vastly important, but the faith which consists in a positive response of the whole personality. 'Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and with all thy soul and with all thy strength and with all thy mind; and thy neighbour as thyself.' This is the standard which God demands; and yet if membership of the Church were dependent upon the fulfilment of these demands, then Jesus Christ alone would belong to the Church. The Church consists not of just persons who need no repentance — such just persons do not exist — but of forgiven sinners. All men have in them elements of good and of evil inextricably interfused: in the language of traditional theology, all men are made in the image of God, though fallen. The Church consists not of men who are perfect but of men who, with all their weakness of will and failure of belief, are yet responding to the God who calls them into the Church both that He may heal and wipe away their weaknesses and sins and that, through them, He may extend His purifying power over all mankind. We do not expel a man from the Church, we do not amputate a limb of the body of Christ, in so far as it lies within our power to do so, unless the health of the whole body is seriously imperilled by his presence. We do not demand from members of the Church perfection in moral matters, which would be as foolish as for a hospital to expel all those inmates who did not enjoy perfect physical health, since, just as hospitals exist for the healing of our sick bodies, so the Church exists that we should be made whole every whit. The conclusion is surely irresistible that the Church should be, not a body of men who believe that they are irreproachably orthodox, for that is a lofty standard to which no human being has ever yet attained, but a body of men and women who confess their shortcomings in the spheres both of conduct and of belief, and pray that God through His Holy Spirit will purify their hearts and wills and lead them into all truth. A true knowledge of God is not the condition for entry into the Church but the goal of the Christian's life.

I cannot attempt to define the minimum body of theological belief which is necessary for lay membership of the Church. I suggest that we should recognize as true branches of the Church of Christ and as true priests, so far as doctrine is concerned, all

those denominations and all those Christian ministers who accept the Bible, the Gospel sacraments and the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds interpreted with the kind of latitude exemplified in the Report of the Commission on Christian Doctrine appointed by the Archbishops of Canterbury and York in 1922 and published by the S.P.C.K. in 1938 under the title *Doctrine in the Church of England*. I avail myself of this somewhat loose phraseology because such matters cannot be expressed with the same degree of precision which is rightly required in a legal document such as a deed of conveyance. Moreover, the range of controversial questions changes from generation to generation; those doctrinal issues which were burning questions when the Commission began its work in 1922 no longer occupied the centre of the stage when it completed its task in 1938. I propose that on this doctrinal basis intercommunion and arrangements for mutual supplementary ordination be established as soon as practicable with the Free Churches as a stepping-stone towards organic union when the time is ripe. Believing as I do that episcopacy, though not of the *esse*, is very much of the *bene esse* of the Church, I would suggest that the episcopacy ought to be preserved in any scheme for organic union. It would be unwise to insist that the same scheme should be adopted in all cases. The South India scheme may be the best possible for that area, but I am personally convinced that mutual supplementary ordination would be better suited for this country. But there is no valid reason why the Church of England should not enter into full communion with the Church of South India.

I suggest this, not in a spirit of compromise or as a measure of expediency, but in accordance with what I believe to be sound principles of theology. The problem of Church membership and of excommunication arose in the sub-apostolic Church. A parable of Christ was reinterpreted to meet the situation, and in St. Matthew's Gospel it is suggested that, since it is impossible to distinguish wheat from tares, both should grow together until the harvest. Men of differing theological views, provided that they conform to the doctrinal basis outlined above, should live, work and worship together, both during the preliminary period when existing denominations retain their identity upon the basis of intercommunion or mutual supplementary ordination, or whatever scheme may be evolved, and also after organic union has become a fact. What is good in each denomination will be gathered like wheat into God's barn. Those elements which are evil — and here I am referring not to sinful men but to false ideas and practices — will finally, under God's guidance, be re-

cognized for what they are and cast aside like weeds that are thrown on to a fire.

So much for theoretical generalities. What can each one of us do in a practical way to forward the cause of Church Unity? We should certainly pray that God may guide and inspire both ourselves and those from whom we differ, whether Free Churchmen or Anglo-Catholics; the cause of Church Unity will suffer if we harbour resentment against them, and we cannot harbour resentment against them if we have truly prayed for them. We should also try to know as many of them as possible on a personal level. If we merely invite them to coffee after supper we shall accomplish something: if we achieve nothing more than improved personal relationships we shall have achieved a great deal; and we may achieve far more.

This we can do as individual Christians, but we can do other things in our professional capacity. Most of us are clergy, teachers or instructed lay folk who ought to aim at being lay theologians, which is part of our duty of loving God with all our mind. The Church in South India is a subject which should be studied in Bishop Newbigin's book *The Reunion of the Church.*[1] The Bishop of Chichester in *Christian Unity*[2] has given us an invaluable summary of the Anglican position and of our relations with other branches of the Church. Those of us at least who are Anglican clergy can hardly escape the obligation of reading *The Apostolic Ministry*,[3] which has cast a spell over some members of the Church, although the Rev. H. E. W. Turner, who is extremely sympathetic to the Anglo-Catholic view in this respect, maintains, with many Anglo-Catholics, that Dom Gregory Dix has defended the right position by the use of arguments which are largely fallacious.[4] It is, I believe, our duty in Ruridecanal Chapters and elsewhere to rescue those who are under the influence of this magic spell! Some valuable information is provided by the Bishop of Truro in *Theology* (May, 1948). Dom Gregory concludes the somewhat inadequate reply which appeared in the July number of the same periodical by accusing the Bishop of a lack of courtesy. Since the Bishop of Truro, according to Dom Gregory, is a *shaliach* of Christ, it would appear to follow, in the light of Dom Gregory's contention that 'the *shaliach's* action irrevocably commits even his divine principal; for God has conditioned Himself by His own word of promise,'[5] that

[1] S.C.M. Press, 1948. [2] Hodder & Stoughton, 1948.
[3] Hodder & Stoughton, 1946; £2/2/-.
[4] *cf.* Turner's review of *The Apostolic Ministry* in *Laudate,* the Quarterly Review of the Benedictines of Nashdom for June, 1947.
[5] *Apostolic Ministry,* p. 230.

God is responsible for the lack of courtesy alleged to have been displayed by the Bishop of Truro. This is a piece of blasphemy which Dom Gregory would be the first to disown. I mention this, not in order to score a cheap debating point, but because I agree with Dom Gregory that much remains to be done on this theological as well as on the historical side of the *shaliach* theory of the episcopate. If, for example, a bishop is the *shaliach* of God only when he acts in accordance with the will of God, how does the bishop differ from the layman? Surely God is bound by the words and deeds of every man who acts in His name and in accordance with His will. All would agree that the discussion is by no means closed. It should be carried out at all levels, in Rural Decanal Chapters and in Ministers' Fraternals as well as at Lambeth. I should like to recommend for this purpose *The Ministry of the Church*,[6] a reprint of some valuable articles contributed to the *Record* by a body of evangelical scholars, with an introduction by Bishop Stephen Neill.

Those of us whose work lies in schools ought to make our pupils conscious of the oecumenical movement and of the growing unity of the Church, so far as our syllabus permits. In sixth forms a series of talks by carefully chosen spokesmen of different denominations has often proved successful, especially if the members of the team of speakers have talked matters over beforehand. In addition to imparting factual information these 'circuses' can make pupils realize that, although the various denominations do disagree on points of doctrine and of order which are certainly not trifles, yet the basis of agreement and the unity in Christ which exist in spite of these divisions are vastly more important.

Lay folk who are members of Parochial Church Councils can often do good work in this capacity, or by taking the vicar aside and speaking carefully chosen words in his ear.

There is, however, one point which I wish to underline as heavily as possible. Church Unity is normally a by-product of obedience to the will of God in other respects. In this it resembles happiness, which eludes us if we seek it directly. The denominations which have now joined together in the Church of South India became conscious of the theological truths which form the basis of their union because, in the course of their practical work of evangelization, they realized that Christ's command to preach the Gospel was a command which His followers could not adequately perform in a state of mutual isolation. The practical task of taking part in 'commando' work has brought Christians of different denominations together far more effectively than could

[6] Canterbury Press, 1947; 2/-.

have been done, at least in some cases, by a series of study or discussion groups on the subject of Church Unity. On the other hand, joint study or discussion groups, meeting on a limited number of occasions — for example, during Lent — are not to be despised. There might be in a parish a few men who were concerned about the application of Christianity to their job. In this case a joint study or discussion group could be held in conjunction with one or more chapels; a growing sense of Church Unity would be a valuable by-product. In some cases local churches and chapels might unite for musical or dramatic purposes. Or again, Churchmen of different denominations might unite for humanitarian purposes, such as after-care work or prison and hospital visiting. Youth groups of local churches and chapels can combine to help elderly people who need assistance in running their houses or gardens or in shopping. Those who have worked together and prayed together realize that they are one in Christ, not as a theoretical proposition, but as a fact of experience.

I do not suggest that this work is easy. When the first stage of sentimental joy in co-operation, and perhaps of politeness towards strangers, has passed the real difficulties begin to emerge. It is when the 'honeymoon' period of co-operation is over that the process of really growing together begins. Notable successes have been recorded in many parishes. Methods have to be varied from place to place in accordance with local or personal factors. To my personal knowledge there are men and women present in this hall to-day who can give us illuminating accounts of the successful application of all the methods of co-operation which I have suggested. It is to be hoped those who have done work on these or similar lines will tell us about their experiences, recounting their failures and their partial successes as well as their more noteworthy achievements, in order that the rest of us may be enabled to adapt our methods to the circumstances of our own pastoral work. That we shall often fail or meet with only limited success may be taken for granted. Whether we meet with success or with failure, it is incumbent upon us to make the attempt not once but many times, since we are called upon to play our part in promoting the growth of that Church Unity which is destined, I believe, to rank among the abiding glories of the twentieth century.

PSYCHO-THERAPY AND THE EXPERIENCE OF CONVERSION

By E. Graham Howe, M.B., B.S., D.P.M.

I. What is Conversion?

GRANTED that conversion must mean a change of some kind, I in what I have to say about it I do not mean a change of belief, mind or opinion, or even of intention or behaviour. Such change uld be too partial, too intellectual and too superficial for the ole process which I have in mind, which is a process that must ect the whole man and his whole attitude to life. Furthermore, must be his own personal experience, and not derived by injec- n, as it were, from an exterior instruction. It must result in a anged attitude to life, and especially to personal relationships. would define this change in relationships more particularly as a ange from a partial, acquisitive, gainful-or-dismissive attitude, pressive of the instinctive level, to an all-accepting, all-inclusive lingness to make the best of life as it comes, that is the mark of wholesome and the good-humoured, as much as it is of the ly, man.

Conversion implies, therefore, what may be described as the velopment of an additional dimension of experience, a kind of ration through a right angle that gives a different view of life, vider perspective, a broader good humour and a more balanced, olesome view. It is a change of heart and life which is per- nent, because it is the end result of a process, all of which has en experienced and digested in due time.

I wish to make it quite plain from the beginning, however, t I am speaking of conversion as an experience which may pen to certain people in certain circumstances, without any erence whatever to the Christian faith, or indeed to any theistic other religious belief. What I wish to discuss with you is what I nsider to be the basic experience common to all true conversion, cause I believe that as psycho-therapists we can study it in tail and slow-motion, as it were. I do not wish to suggest, how- er, that the process of which I am speaking can be regarded as a al one, or as having reached its goal. For this basic experience a way of life is no more than a renewal for a new beginning, being born again with greater willingness to participate more ly in the process of becoming. Yes, there is always more, yond.

If you will admit that my description of conversion is not a

false one, then I suggest that it is the common consequence — in some degree, at least — of psychotherapy. Realizing the danger of over-simplification at this point in my argument, I believe that we can say that the symptom with which the patient comes to us is simply an effect of a defensive attempt at dismissal in the past of some event, experience or relationship. Our work, as healers, therefore, is to re-introduce that 'rejected other,' acceptably, so that the patient who was in conflict, divided, can become whole again. There are, of course, many degrees of rejection, as there are many degrees of wholeness, but I believe that the principle of psychotherapy in general is acceptance of what has previously been rejected or ignored. It is as if a door which was shut, defensively, is now opened again: or as if protective barriers are rotated through a right angle so that they become bridges, and effective means of communicaion for two-way traffic with the outer world. The significance of such a change, simple as it may seem to be, is actually very deep indeed, for it implies no less than willingness to be born again. It is this Rebirth which seems to me to be the essence of the process of conversion.

How does this process come about? What is the role of the healer, the psychotherapist? It may be said at once that we are not simply physicians or surgeons; that is to say, the manner of our healing is not a 'giving' medically, nor a 'taking away' surgically. The key-point of our method of cure is to enable a negative attitude to become a positive one, so that what was previously rejected is now able to be accepted. This is, I believe, what is actually meant by a 'change of heart.' But our very practical question is, how does this change come about?

II. How Can One Change Another?

Yes, indeed, how can one change another? This is a question which should be asked quite simply, because it is so often wrongly assumed that there is a simple answer, and a simple magic method of enforcing change. And while I am asking how to change another, I would like to know, too, how can I change myself? My mother and father, my brothers and sisters, my teachers and so many others all my life have seemed to imply that I could change myself at will, to oblige them. They all told me at different times that I ought to be different; I ought not to be as I was, I ought to be 'other' — and I ought to make haste about it too, for no time was allowed for this stupendous jump from bad to betterness. [So we are all striving to change one another, if we cannot change ourselves; so nations go to war, but all history proves that change does not occur so easily.]

Of course it is easy to change a front, a façade, a kind of belief, mode of behaviour. In so far as we are merely 'things' we are ry changeable, and respond to the pushes and pulls of external rces. In so far as we are animals, we respond to fearful threats d the enticements of bribery. And again, in so far as we are ildren, we respond to example, exhortation and encouragement. ut none of these imply the kind of change that is fundamental, at change of heart in which the whole personal life is completely ected — in fact, what we mean by this word conversion. How es that happen. Is it only a Divine gift in the theological main, but denied to the psychologists and physicians? Can ly God save man? Yes, indeed, I agree, if this will spare us m the benevolent tyranny of our all-too-human saviours! But , indeed, I deny it if you mean to imply that God works *only* rough parsons and miracles, and not through other men and eryday experience.

I believe that the mending of the broken bone is not achieved the doctor or the patient, but by a mysterious element which is iven': I believe that the doctor's job is to provide the skill to ean the wound and set the parts in right alignment: and that e patient's part is to rest, 'patiently,' allowing time enough for e miracle of mending to happen: and that meanwhile it is best keep out the helpful advice of well-meaning but over-anxious, d therefore over-active, relatives. I believe that there is a eative relationship, in which neither you nor I are responsible r what happens, but both are required to play some minor part it, and then to receive what is given. Love is the common word r what I have called the creative relation, but it seems to me at we know too little of what love means to be trusted to use e word in any careful statement of our problems.

Meanwhile, may I summarize at this point to see if my argu- ent is clear so far? Yes, we need and want to change: but no, e cannot change ourselves, nor can we change each other: only mysterious element, undefined, can heal us: the healing is a ay of making whole again: and this change occurs when the arts are involved in the 'creative relation.'

The psychotherapist does not give, medically, nor take away, rgically: he does not threaten or bribe: he does not expect his atients to make great efforts to change themselves, nor does he y to change them: he rarely gives advice, and when he does, e does not expect it to be taken. He does not exhort or cajole, each or teach. He is a kind of mirror, providing his patient ith matter for reflection: he is a kind of chemical catalyst, in hose presence events happen which would not if he were not

there: he is a kind of obstetrician, waiting for the baby to arrive. But I think that the particular function of the psychotherapist is that he represents this 'creative relation,' and it is this special relationship that I now wish to clarify further, if I can.

III. What is the Creative Relation?

It is simpler to start with what it is not, in order that we may first clear the ground of some possible misunderstandings. The creative relation is *not* benevolently 'good,' in the sense of someone omnipotently giving another what is asked for. It is *not* a somebody-nobody, tyrant-slave relation, as the doctor-patient or parent-child relation too often tends to be. It is *not* additional or subtractive in a mathematical sense: nothing is given and nothing taken away. And, what is most important to be clear about, it is *not* a condition of agreement between similars, in which we can feel perfectly happy with one another because we are both so gloriously certain or so hopelessly vague. The creative relation is not cheerfully saying 'Snap!' and grabbing all because we see ourselves exactly reflected in the other's mirror.

Perhaps the most important fact about the creative relation is that it is always mysterious; it depends for its reality upon an unknown element, upon some unseen intervention, leading to some unforeseen emergent 'accident,' which cannot be planned. (Indeed, the creative relation never can be accurately planned in advance, and therefore any planned relation is to that extent inevitably not a creative and not a fertile one.) The creative relation is a reciprocal one, the related parts being also *opposed*, in the sense that a lock and key are related and opposed to one another, or the patterned piece of a jigsaw puzzle is related to the space into which it fits. The parts so opposed in their reciprocal relationship may be described as being 'dynamically polarised' to one another, and it is in this *bringing together* of the parts which are opposed that the creative importance of the relation lies. The creative relation always requires 'acceptance of the other half,' and thus the development of a new attitude of willingness to meet and engage the 'opposition,' which was previously rejected as intolerable, and either avoided or dismissed.

The rôle of the psychotherapist, therefore, is inevitably a disappointing one from the patients' point of view. They come to us hoping that we will be 'good' to them and that we will make them 'better.' They project on us the omnipotence of the all-wise father and the unlimited bounty of the generous and kindly mother-figure. In the beginning it seems to the patient that we know all, we have all, and we shall give them all in time, or so

hey hope. But if this hopeful picture of us is true at all, it is ertainly only true in part. It is only true if it is related to its pposite half, the shadow side, of abhorrent Death itself and eeming Tragedy. We stand for the acceptance of that also, if we tand for wholeness. If we are to play our part in this mysterious rocess of Healing, and if we are to preserve the dynamic power f the creative relation, it is when we receive this opposite pro- ection of the Destroyer, the most hateful one (in what is called y the Freudians 'the relation of negative transference'), that we re actually doing the more valuable healing work. Then we are ndeed leading opposing forces to meet one another, bridging vast hasms of intolerable terror and making even starkest Tragedy cceptable, as we stand silent with them at the death-bed of their ope.

The creative relation is, in fact, the one which you and I have een most anxious to avoid! It means letting go the rock, raft and nchor of security and slipping into the stream in fear and rembling. Because it is an engagement with an uncertain adver- ary whom we cannot control, therefore it means for us an experi- nce of suffering and suspense, of inferiority—intolerable word!— f not actually impotence. It means not-knowing, with all given, rembling in the balance, as we let ourselves go towards some nknown end. It means being shocked, shaken, smitten some- imes—once at least—if we are to travel full circle and accept the hole of life.

To live wholly, which is in health, we must accept the whole f life. To be healed, we must discover our 'rejected other,' our hadow side, the lost one, the one we have been so anxious to void, the one we tried to kill so long ago. It is the rôle of the sychotherapist to help the patient to find and to accept, one by ne, each 'rejected other' until all are safely gathered in. We annot take our patients all the way upon this endless journey, nor s it necessary to do so for healing any particular symptom. But ve can show them the early steps in this way of better understand- ng of themselves, and their problems of relationship with others, nd with Life.

IV. A Way of Better Understanding

Now that I have used that phrase, 'a way of better under- tanding,' I want to try if I can to make clear the kind of change vhich might take place in our understanding, parallel with that hange of heart and change of attitude to life which we experience n our conversion.

The progress of Science during recent years has added enor-

mously to our power over things. It has pushed the frontiers of the Unknown further and further back, as the horizon of our knowledge has been increasingly extended. Pride and anxiety alike have fed greedily on this new opportunity for hope that man's power and knowledge could — and would — one day become unlimited. Surely, if we knew more and more, we must one day know all; if we become ever more powerful, we should one day become all-powerful? So anxiety and pride have hoped for a Scientific Paradise, where everything — and everyone — would be under control, and in which scientific psychology would at last know all about human nature.

But alas for all-too-hopeful pride and best-laid humanistic plans which leave out that shadow side, the element of uncertainty, which there must ever be in Life, to cause defeat and dejection both to our pride and our anxiety. Our power over things depends upon our power to control the relations that exist between the things. As far as we can control *all* the relations, so far can we control the consequence of those relations. Here it is very important for us to realize our limitations. A thorough grasp, a complete comprehension, of *all* the relations can only be acquired over *things*. It cannot be acquired over people, because of the mysterious uncertainty of the personal factor. We can only have power over people if we treat them as things, which eliminates the personal factor of free will, and eventually destroys them. It is for this reason that scientific progress, by enormously increasing our power over things, without increasing in the least degree our power over ourselves or one another, has threatened us with a state of moral collapse. Now we are threatened with the total disruption of our civilization, unless we can solve this problem of personal relationships, of living together in better understanding, without calling on our power over things in order the better to destroy one another.

The practical aspect of this problem is particularly important in our work of healing. Doctors in general are exceedingly bad philosophers and are in grave danger of missing a point of utmost importance in their work. In medicine and its branches, of which psychology is only one, there is an immense mass of detailed knowledge, of grasp of fact that has been measured, compared and proved with scientific certainty. About disease in all its branches we understand immensely more than we did a few years ago, and our knowledge grows daily, hourly, more. Indeed, we are almost literally bursting with knowledge, but we are in danger of using it only to give us more power over the 'things' — the symptoms, the illness, or the bacteria that are sup-

osed by some to 'cause' it. Medicine in all its branches, with s ever increasing knowledge and mechanical power, is in grave anger of treating patients increasingly as things, or cases with a abel, classified with other similar things, and not as the persons hom they are, unique, unknowable. This can in the end only be ery bad for persons, and I doubt if it is even good for things.

In my own experience, one of the most outstanding examples f such misunderstanding, and consequent mistreatment, has been n regard to epilepsy. Is epilepsy some*thing* from which some*one* uffers, and can it be removed from the person, to leave the person ured? Does the doctor's knowledge of the thing enable him to ure the thing, because of his power over the thing? Or is it wiser o regard the patient, the symptom and the environment, the past nd the present, as all relevant parts of one complex whole, that ust be considered and treated together? Certainly I have seen sychotherapy succeed in cases of epilepsy in which orthodox edical treatment has completely failed; and I believe that sychotherapy is successful in such cases because our method is n fact more scientific in its approach to human problems, as being lways problems of relationship and never things in themselves erely to be removed.

This new understanding, which is required at least as much in he art of medicine as in any other walk of life, is not greedy for ower and does not assert itself to control others by force. It has o scapegoats and does not blame or ignore what it does not under- tand. It does not despise knowledge, but it regards all problems s problems in relationship, of part to part, and part to whole. To his extent every event is a new experience, in which the whole erson is to be presently involved, without prejudice. The moment ow is not a rock on which one can stand secure and unaffected. t is rather a point within the stream of Time into which we lunge, and by which we must be willing to be totally embraced.

By contrast with the acquisitive, grasping, proud and greedy ay of 'comprehension,' which stands outside experience, nxiously squeezing at its meaning, this new understanding is a aiting patiently, agnostic, unprejudiced, uncertain, beneath and ithin, instead of above and outside, the relationship. It is a ondering, concealed and sensitive, but alert and listening. It is perpetually renewed adventure, intimately personal, as fluid nd changing as the changing moment. It cannot be neatly arcelled up and passed from one to another who is prepared to old it in the same unchanging way. The new understanding ould be living, now, springing spontaneously from our experi-

ence of our immediate relationship. But — we are not living now. No, hardly any of us, hardly ever. And we should wonder, Why?

We are not living now, I think, because we are all somewhat caught up in the past, time-bound. We are rather living in the past of our partly undigested experiences; or, as in the case of so many of our patients, we are still held tied to some past hateful experience, which was at the time rejected as intolerable, and which we are still denying and avoiding. That is to say, we are either *living* in the past; or, in the sense that we have rejected it in part or whole, we are *not-living* in the past. In either case we are debarred from living in the present tense, with one another, now. Morbid but unwilling to die, prisoners of our own past but unwilling to escape, we are like ghosts who need a blessing of forgiveness before we can be free to live again.

So at first we find ourselves (if we ever find ourselves at all) concealed in our past, time-bound, submerged, sunk deep within ourselves and our experience. In this state we are blind, unborn, asleep; in spite of the functioning of consciousness and memory, we are not 'self-conscious' yet. Then, through the outer and objective eye of our observant analyst, we can learn to review and revalue ourselves and our past, as we set apart and bring together old events in new relationships, exploring the field of our experience. This second stage of understanding is on a different plane from the first, which was the plane of implicit or unconsious experience. It is as if we have set up a point of self-observation high above the ground.

But thus lofty and detached, our new extension of self-consciousness is a winged and timeless traveller who sets us dangerously free. We have new powers for pride to exploit greedily to our material advantage. The irresponsibility of merely thinking, talking, planning offers a new escape for anxiety from the burdens of the flesh and the limits of the factual ground. It is true to say, I think, that collectively we are all now in this second stage of understanding, dangerously free to exploit the power which our evolution has so patiently and perilously earned. The third stage is before us, and it is the first as it is also the last, because it is an end to the old and a beginning to the new. This is the stage of return to the world, of a willingness to re-enter and redeem the old with the powers that have been gained by the new. It is an experience of re-entering the other, the shadow, in the creative relation. It is the fulfilment of understanding in its own 'self-noughting,' as it is given to experience. It is the marriage of the

nner and the outer, the old and the new, whose child is wisdom. It implies forgiveness.

V. Forgiveness

But forgiveness is another word whose meaning has to change before we can understand the part that we have to play in the process of our conversion. Forgiveness is not something which is either given or refused by another in reply to our request. Forgiveness is an experience which happens, when we on our side play a certain vital part in a process of relationship. On the other side of the relation, forgiveness may or may not be 'given'; but on our own side our experience of forgiveness depends upon our willingness to go through a certain process, completely. Forgiveness depends upon our acceptance of something that we have previously rejected in our lives. To put it another way, we become accepted, or acceptable, according to the measure of our acceptance of ourselves, our past experience and our past relationships.

The patient would not be suffering at all unless he was striving to dismiss, avoid or forget some part of himself or his experience, being thus divided against himself. The dissociated factor may be an event in itself, or more precisely the subjective element in the experience, the 'feeling about' it: or it may be that the patient has been living on the wrong lines, with a job in life for which he has no heart or aptitude. In any case, whatever the missing link, it is the psychotherapist's task to bring the patient's attention to it, and to obtain its final and complete acceptance and inclusion. It is this that will enable him, in the end, to become whole or healed.

For psychotherapists there can be no moral veto; nor can there be any moral exhortation. We cannot say that it is wrong to hate your mother, because it may be necessary for you to realize that you certainly did hate her and would still do so now, if you had the courage to admit it. But it is no use exhorting the patient to have the courage to admit the hate, when all the while the truth is different: that in sober fact I am *afraid* to hate the one I want to love, because of the threat that it would mean to my security. Indeed, it is hard for all of us to accept our hatred of the one we want to love, but it is especially intolerable for children, who regard it as proof of final loss of love, and therefore utter insecurity.

As we put back the clock, putting our patients back into the past emotionally difficult situation, it is as if we are indeed reincarnating them into their own world again, and thus enabling them first to re-experience their old situation in the old way before they can experience it in the new way. Before they can be born

again they must re-enter the womb of the past which still holds them. They must first accept what was, and what they felt about it, before they can experience change. They must first re-experience their own unwillingness, rejection, fear, hate, insecurity and inferiority — *and not do anything about it.* This, it seems to me, is the all-important point for our salvation; namely, that we should not take protective steps, inside ourselves, to save ourselves from pain. Healing, grace, forgiveness — call it what you will — is given, yes: but it can only be received by those *who have not assumed it for themselves.* If we can only get our patients to admit a weakness or a fault, and leave it so, the strengthening process will grow and the healing will begin. But, unfortunately, anxiety and pride cannot leave ill alone; the awkward and unruly situation must immediately be made right, or safe, or better, with no time allowed for the process to occur. Acceptance takes time, and forgiveness is a process of gradual realization, as we emerge slowly and painfully again from the past into which we have been willing to let ourselves die back.

There are no short cuts in psychotherapy. The process is a very hard, detailed and long-suffering one for the patient, before he can achieve the end. But when the whole of 'it' (the experience) has been thoroughly accepted by the whole of 'me' (the experiencer), then I believe that we have in fact obtained a wholesome, spiritual or even 'holy' solution to the current problem of living.

VI. Meeting is a One-to-One Relation

Meanwhile, I would like to turn to Martin Buber's favourite word, 'meeting.' Meeting means bridges, not barriers, so that we can get across to one another. Meeting means undefendedness, and a willingness to enter and be entered, inquisitively but not acquisitively. Meeting means 'mating,' which is the reciprocal experience of the creative relation, in which both sides are involved. Meeting another person is a perpetual adventure in the unknown, in regard to which beliefs, opinions, and all such facile preconceptions are a defensive barrier designed to keep us safely undisturbed.

Meeting is a one-to-one relation. You cannot meet at a 'meeting.' It is only possible to meet *one person at a time*, across that mysterious gulf by which we are all set apart from one another: that mysterious gulf that makes us feel so intolerably cold and lonely that we sometimes prefer to dwell in crowds and cafés, or political meetings and religious congregations, where we can be assured of agreeable company! It is a very scaring thing to meet

—really to meet—one other soul or person, which might even be our stranger self. Meeting, real meeting, needs a plunge into the unknown, immersion in the stream, without rock, raft or anything to hold.

You will notice that I have used the symbol of water, which by common tradition represents the stream of life. 'Water'—in inverted commas—is the mysterious creative element from which life springs. It is the constantly recurrent symbol of our problems of relationship in our dreams, as it is also the traditional symbol for the experience of conversion. 'Water' is the symbol of 'between-ness.' Utterly undefinable, it is the relevant actual, the fact of the relation, the meaning of experience, now. It is as if when we know what this mysterious element means, we meet one another—if we meet at all—in the 'water,' and not on the familiar shore. I am certain that we can only change one another, or experience change ourselves, by immersion in the water of our mysterious meeting, and not by our valiant efforts to alter the offending landscape upon either bank.

Life, now—if we lived it, surely—would be like that, flashed up freshly out of the stream for us to catch. To obtain that freshness of actual experience in living relationship with every other is, I suggest, the whole point and purpose of conversion. Here is where we experience change and only here can we be born again. It means letting yourself go, giving up, relaxing, dying down, down, down, as if in deepest sleep. It means giving all and risking all in meeting one another. It means developing new fields of force and a renewal of will. It means both the passivity of a willingness to suffer, accept, endure; and a free activity of choice, 'I will . . . now . . .!' This is the supreme statement of a living soul, renewed, reborn, the end to which all our meetings are but the prelude and the means. And, of course, to be thus born again is not an end at all. It is just a very simple new beginning.

I believe that the purpose of all our hard-won understanding of experience, of all our recurrent suffering in various ways and situations, is to gain for us in the end this further freedom for the re-engagement of the personal will.

VII. The Will—Its Reorientation

Here is another word whose meaning changes, through paradox, confusion and contradiction, beneath our very eyes. If that were possible, it is almost worse than the word Love.

Psychology knows little of the will and is very suspicious of it, for two reasons. The first is that the will is unscientific. It is the essence of unpredictability and irregularity. You cannot prove it

or do any of the things with it that Science likes to do. The more you pursue this will-o'-the-wisp of the will, the more it disappears in front of you. It is like Life itself. When the body is thoroughly dissected, Life is gone; when the person is thoroughly analysed the Will has flown. This is because both Life and Will are the effects of a synthesis, of a coming together in a creative relationship. When there is no creative relationship there is no power, no Will and no Life.

There is, however, another good reason why psychologists, since Coué and probably before him, have regarded the will with disapproval. 'Will-power' has meant tension, strain and conflict, with all the insomniac excitement and ceaseless over-activity that characterizes our nervous and unstable world. Wise and simple (for once), the psychotherapist has at least this amount of good advice to give to anxious and excited dwellers in our restless, dangerous world: 'RELAX. Let yourself go! Don't try or strive for anything more.'

At this stage such negative advice is wise because we are engaged in 'overcoming the resistance,' in bridging the gap so that our patient can for once allow himself to meet the other, and to see what happens when the meeting takes place. We are enabling him to experience a true relationship, without trying to control or interfere with it. Therefore, *at this stage*, relaxation is essential. But as some people are inclined to regard relaxation as the be-all and end-all of life, I should like to add my word of warning that the healthy life is not the life of lethargy or inertia. The healthy life is the life of battle and the full and free engagement of the will against the forces of adversity, which are our constant adversary in this world.

With an abstract problem such as the Will presents, it is often simpler to use a concrete illustration. To make plain to you what I mean by the three stages of the Will's development, I shall again slip into water symbolism and speak of the Two Rivers. (Although they seem different in themselves, they are not really two rivers, but two different attitudes to one stream of Experience, which is the River of Life. Thus our experience of Reality will always change as we will change our attitude towards it.)

The first river represents the first stage of the Will, in its blind instinctive and unconscious state of unredeemed 'Old Adam.' Like any river, it has two banks, which are 'left' and 'right,' but these may be called by any of the pairs of opposites, such as inner and outer, past and future, worse and better, or yours and mine. All I want to imply is that the direction of the traveller is across the bridges from one side to the other, with

e desire and intention of leaving one bank safely behind, while
is enabled to acquire and fix more of the benefits of the other.
his volitional trend is not 'wrong,' but it is partial, in the sense
at it splits life into two, throwing part on one side, unwanted,
it eagerly grasps the other. It is 'reasonable,' but only on an
ppetitive level of 'gusto' and 'disgust.' It is fairly satisfactory
long as it is successful, but success for one involves failure for
many others, and success can only be partial and temporary.
s end is inevitably Death, and the other side of the river is
ways paradoxically ahead, in spite of our strenuous efforts to
ave it behind.

The second stage of the Will is therefore *willingness*; willing-
ss to fail, fall, lose and suffer; willingness to die. Willingness,
fact, to cross the river, and to experience the other, shadow,
de which has been so strenuously rejected. Willingness to go
ll circle round the clock, down one side and up the other.
Villingness, in more mathematical terms, to experience the
lationship of planes which are at right angles to one another.
Villingness — to be converted.

And then the third stage of the Will, and our discovery of—or
it by?—the other river. It seems a different stream of life
ecause our attitude to it has changed. There is now no avoidance,
defence, no aggression and no escape. Bridges are not for
ne-way traffic but for communication between one side and the
her. 'Goods' are not for hoarding, but for circulation in right
lationship with need. Life is not for having and doing, but for
eing and becoming.

The direction of the stream is onward, straight ahead, not off
right-angles all the time; but it is onwards on a new dimension,
mysterious and inspired adventure, which is the fulfilment of
ne Will. The essence of this way of life is that it is founded and
rtilized in the creative relation. It is the flashing stream, the
Middle Way, the Great Perpendicular Path, the Way, the Truth
nd the Life. But I do not want to make it sound anything special
itself, for it is not. It is ordinary life, given us for our experi-
nce. What is special about it is only our attitude towards it.

But this is the stream to which I have referred in our experi-
nce of conversion. This is the stream in which we become gradu-
lly more and more immersed, until we are cleansed and purged.
his is the stream in and from which we may one day be born
gain, beyond all fear of death. This is the stream in which the
otential statement that I AM becomes the actual, in that I WILL
. . NOW. This is the stream where Heaven and Earth are met in
ne creative relation, which is incandescent Life. This is the

stream in which a patient must have bathed often and deep before she could say, 'I used to despise ordinary everyday things, but I have learnt to love them.'

VIII. Conclusion

We do not enter the Kingdom, or experience change of heart, or become healed of our sickness, by means of an effort of the Will. In fact, the change that befalls us is a mysterious one, beyond our comprehension. It is 'given,' frequently through despair, when all seemed lost and we had given up even hope. And so, if we can patiently receive all that is given, the healing is given too, in the end. But it is not the reward of skill, virtue, comprehension, cleverness, or any continued effort either on the part of the doctor or the patient, the teacher or the pupil, the priest or the person. Like life itself, or the person himself, and like the situation in which he finds himself, this healing grace is *given*, exactly in that measure in which we are willing to give ourselves to life and to one another, as and when each one may personally choose.

The ethics of goodwill are good meeting, or 'mating' with one another. This means being willing to enter into, and to be entered by, the other. This is what all self-giving and self-noughting means: it is a giving *into* another but certainly not merely a '*giving in*,' or passivity or self-surrender, to the other. The freedom of the Will, the responsibility of choice and the integrity of personality, must never be surrendered. We are not cyphers or sheep, but men and women made in the image of God. Even if our freedom may in the end be given back to Him who first gave it to us, it must be given freely and willingly without threat or bribery, so that it still remains our own responsibility, an act expressive of our own free choice.

'God so loved the world . . . He gave His only begotten Son . . . who did not abhor the Virgin's womb.' Thus even in our lives also we may willingly serve the purpose of our incarnation by giving ourselves willingly into all experience, past, present and future, into every other whom we may meet, as into each part of ourselves, and into every commonplace daily act and situation. The task of psychotherapy seems to me to be just this: that we should also learn not to abhor our lot or situation, but that we should be willing to enter into our ground, to work in it and spend our lives in making the best of it, without evasion or complaint.

HASTINGS RASHDALL

By the Rev. D. L. Scott, M.A.

THERE is no need to explain why a paper on Hastings Rashdall should form a part of this Conference which marks he Jubilee of our Union. Not only was he one of its most disnguished founders and for many years a leader in the cause of heological liberalism within the Church of England, but in a eculiar sense he represents an epitome of English Modernism. he fact that I myself owe much to his writings and feel perhaps ore in sympathy with his teaching than with that of any other heologian must be my sole excuse for venturing to accept the esponsibility and privilege which this paper entails.

To say that Rashdall epitomizes the Modernist movement in he Church of England is, of course, too broad a generalization to e in any sense strictly correct. Above all else, Modernism is not static thing and its outlook is by no means confined to any one articular aspect. But it has characteristic tendencies, and of these ashdall may be regarded as typical. Perhaps one might even say hat he is typical of English religion as a whole, for in great easure our national religious temperament is moralist, rationalist hd individualist; it is practical rather than pietistic; it is susicious alike of too much outward show and of the claims of ystical experience. Rashdall undoubtedly was all of these. His ith was based unflinchingly upon human reason, because he elieved that in this, more than in any other faculty which we ossess, we are akin to God. He was 'a moralist to the core,'[1] ombining a severely practical morality with idealist beliefs; and is, together with his reverence for human reason, led him to ace the strongest emphasis upon individual worth and responsility. An attitude of distrust towards mysticism followed as the atural consequence.

By many at the present day, all these beliefs will be held gainst him. Human reason is at a discount, though its full and roper exercise is obviously a crying need. The phrase 'mere orality' is often used, although the steep moral decline is aditted on all hands to be deplorable. Actually Rashdall was no mere' moralist in any narrow sense, for he insisted that truth and eauty must have their place with goodness in the moral ideal. is dislike of mysticism may seem a more definite limitation, but e experience of the moralist is not always so diverse from that

[1] *Life of Hastings Rashdall*, by P. E. Matheson, p. 242.

of the mystic as both generally suppose it to be. In any case I think there is cause to be grateful that Rashdall could affirm so unhesitatingly that no mystical assurance is necessary for firm belief in God's existence and love.

I do not propose that this paper should be in any sense biographical; nor shall I say anything about Rashdall as an historian, though some have thought that it was in this direction that his gifts especially lay. What I shall attempt to do is to sketch in outline his theology, and to a lesser extent his moral philosophy, in order to present it as — what it appears to me to be — an attractive and convincing *apologia* for English Modernism.

At the basis of his theology lay, as I said just now, his belief in the pre-eminence of reason. He is reported to have said that if he had not believed Christianity to be rational, he could not have been a Christian; and he would have agreed wholeheartedly with the following words of Hort, whose name the Bishop of Birmingham, in his Gifford Lectures,[2] couples with that of Rashdall, these being in his opinion the greatest associated with the Modernist movement in English theology:

> 'There can be no surer sign,' Hort wrote, 'of decrepitude and decay in faith than a prevalent nervousness about naming and commending reason, an unwillingness to allude to its existence except under wrappings of language which suggest that it is but a necessary evil . . . The faitn of ordinary people would be far more clear and sure if they had been freely instructed in the responsibilities of reason. Our present cowardice moreover is of recent growth.'[3]

With this last sentence in particular Rashdall would have concurred. Since his faith in reason as the vital link between man and Deity was so unswerving, he felt much in sympathy with Aquinas and the mediaeval Schoolmen who regarded reason with an equally high esteem. He realized of course that their speculations frequently bore no relation to history or experience; therefore they could afford but little help towards a modern understanding of the Incarnation. But it was otherwise with the doctrine of the Trinity. In their exposition of this he found a confident affirmation that God is one Mind and not three; that the three Persons of the Trinity are not 'distinct centres of consciousness,' but 'eternally distinct activities of One Divine Mind.'[4]

Rashdall saw clearly that the tritheism of popular orthodoxy was a main stumbling-block against the intellectual acceptance of Christianity, and at the same time liable to cause confusion among the simple. On the other hand, a bare unitarianism would abandon

[2] *Science and Religion*, p. xxiii.
[3] *The Way, The Truth, The Life*, p. 176.
[4] *Ideas and Ideals*, p. 175.

whole heritage of Christian thought and feeling. Hence he ever tired of maintaining that the doctrine of the Trinity, interpreted as he believed the Schoolmen to have interpreted it, voided both horns of the dilemma. It preserved a strict monotheism yet recognized within the Godhead the presence of eternal distinctions. In the last sermon that he preached before the University of Cambridge, he declared:

> 'It is absolutely necessary that the monotheism of the Church's Creed should be unmistakably proclaimed from the housetops . . . Let it be understood beyond the possibility of doubt that God . . . is one Consciousness, one Thinker, one Will—one Mind who is eternally Power, Wisdom, and Love.'[5]

This was in 1921. Thirty years earlier, in 1889, Rashdall had preached his first sermon at Cambridge, and its subject had been the Incarnation. Under the title 'Limitations of Knowledge in Christ,' it had argued that more serious consideration should be given to St. Paul's doctrine of *Kenosis*—that is, in Rashdall's words, 'when the Eternal Word of God was united with a human soul, some at least of the divine attributes—though not lost—ceased to be manifested in the man Christ Jesus.'[6] Amongst these Rashdall includes omniscience besides omnipresence and omnipotence. Thus he anticipated Bishop Gore's celebrated exposition of the same doctrine in *Lux Mundi* and some of his later writings. It may be difficult for us to-day, who doubtless accept the limitation of Christ's knowledge without question, to realize how novel and startling it could be sixty years ago. But Liddon's Bampton Lectures in which our Lord's complete omniscience is asserted had appeared less than a quarter of a century earlier, and the outcry against Colenso had been aroused not only by his criticism of the Pentateuch as such, but even more because it brought our Lord's infallibility into question.

The sermon goes on to plead

> 'that we should in all our teaching put the simpler presentations—the moral, the spiritual, the personal aspects of Christ's divinity—foremost. Let us show people how Christ is a real revelation of God to *us*, and how He may be so to others. Then let us endeavour to demonstrate . . . that the head-truths of the Catholic Faith supply a natural basis, a reasonable formulation of the heart-truths of the Christian consciousness.'[7]

Throughout his life Rashdall contended for a view of Christ's person that should do full justice to His true and entire humanity; and it was a paper on this subject, read at the Modern Churchmen's Conference of 1921, which provoked a storm of controversy which the setting up of the Archbishop's Commission on Doc-

[5] *Principles and Precepts*, p. 44f.
[6] *Doctrine and Development*, p. 36.
[7] *Doctrine and Development*, p. 55f.

trine a year or two later was partly due. It need hardly be said that Rashdall entertained no doubts respecting the complementary truth of Christ's divinity, but he saw that the right question to ask was, How can a human Christ be also divine? rather than, How can a divine Christ be also human? 'Jesus,' he said in the paper just referred to, 'was in the fullest sense a man, as much so as any other human being . . . He had not merely a human body, but a human soul, intellect, will.'[8] Then he went on to show in what sense so unreserved an admission could be compatible with belief in our Lord's divinity:

> 'If,' he said, 'we believe that every human soul reveals, reproduces, incarnates God *to some extent* . . . then it becomes possible to believe that in One Man the self revelation of God has been signal, supreme, unique. That we are justified in thinking of God as like Christ, that the character and teaching of Christ contains the fullest disclosure both of the character of God Himself and of His will for man—that is (so far as so momentous a truth can be summed up in a few words) the true meaning for us of the doctrine of Christ's divinity.'[9]

It is not for its originality that this view of the Incarnation is so remarkable. It is remarkable because it was expressed in the clearest and most unequivocal fashion by one who was at once a dignitary of the Church and a competent scholar whose knowledge of history, philosophy and theology rendered him fully prepared to maintain the essential orthodoxy of his teaching.[10]

The same thing is true to a large extent of his beliefs regarding the Atonement. There, too, clarity of thought and expression combine with minute scholarship to present a theory that is both intelligible and practical. Like his views on the Trinity and the Incarnation, Rashdall's doctrine of the Atonement developed through the greater part of his life without any radical change

[8] *Jesus, Human and Divine*, p. 13.

[9] *Ibid*, p. 20f. Cp. the following extract from his address at the first M.C. Conference held in 1914: 'If God dwells to some extent in all men, in the prophets and saints more than in other men, then it is possible that in One Man he may have dwelt supremely, uniquely. And such I believe was the nature of the indwelling of God in Christ' (quoted in *Life*, p. 151).

[10] The outcry which this famous paper raised is significant. By 1921 the Anglo-Catholics were reaching a fresh height of ascendency and presumably felt strong enough for aggressive action. It was at this time that a trumped up charge of heresy was brought against Dr. Major, and Bp. Gore showed a surprising readiness to believe the newspaper reports that Rashdall had denied the divinity of Christ. It seems quite possible, therefore, that had Rashdall's confidence in the legitimacy of his interpretation been less assured, or his ability to justify it less certain, the modern church man might have found his freedom seriously compromised.

king place.[11] The ideas to which his Bampton Lectures give the ost weighty exposition of modern, or for that matter of any other nes, are to be found in outline in a sermon preached in 1892, titled 'The Abelardian Doctrine of the Atonement.' It centres ound a saying of Abelard that 'the purpose and cause of the carnation was that Christ might illuminate the world by His sdom and excite it to love of Himself.'[12] This, Rashdall tells , was solemnly condemned by a Pope and a Council of the urch!

The Bampton Lectures are a search for 'a theory of the Atonement which thoroughly appeals to reason and to conscience,'[13] and is in the writings of Abelard that such a theory is most plainly und. Essentially it is simply this — that God's love is so revealed in the death of Christ that it calls forth in response our ve for Him. This, as Rashdall shows, is the one belief in the onement that Christians have always held in common, whatever liefs and theories about it some of them and at different periods y have held besides.

The inadequacy of any view of the Atonement which is 'subtive' is frequently alleged. How, it is asked, can the death of rist demonstrate God's love and so arouse our love in answer His unless by that death something was objectively achieved? shdall, in reply to this, imagines our Lord as saying:

> 'To show my love for you I will allow myself to be put to death by those who have threatened to do so unless I abandon my work of preaching what I believe to be the truth of God, of preparing the way for His Kingdom and for your admission thereto.
>
> 'His death,' Rashdall continues, 'has been more to Christendom than other martyr deaths just because He was so much more than other martyrs, because His life was so much more than other lives, because His Messianic calling was a unique calling; because in fact of all that has led Christendom to see in that life the fullest revelation or incarnation of God. There is nothing in the fact that the necessity for the death did not arise from any objective demand for expiation which can diminish the gratitude and the love which, such a death, taken in connection with such a life, was calculated to awaken towards the Sufferer. And if the character which is revealed by that Sufferer be the character of God Himself, then the love that is awakened towards Christ will also be love of the Father whom in a supreme and unique way, Christ reveals. And that love will express itself in repentance and regeneration of life.'[14]

His critics, however, were not satisfied. There was more in Atonement, they said, than he would allow, though, as

[11] Rashdall's first published sermon on the Trinity was preached in 1894 closely resembles that referred to above. (*Doctrine and Development*, 1ff.)

[12] *Doctrine and Development*, p. 138.

[13] *Idea of the Atonement in Christian Theology*, p. 360.

[14] *Ibid*, p. 442f.

Rashdall complained, precisely in what the 'more' consisted they always seemed unable to indicate.[15] But the Modernist verdict is expressed in glowing terms by the late Rev. Hubert Handley. 'Your Bamptons,' he wrote, 'will stand and grow to be a beacon for years to come to thousands of perplexed and wandering minds who want to be Christian.'[16]

They show, in fact, the perfect fusion of three elements in Rashdall's character which we have already noted, the rationalist, the moralist and the individualist. He could not be content with any idea of the Atonement which appealed only to the emotions and failed to satisfy the intellect. Nor was any rationalization acceptable to him unless it was approved by the moral consciousness. He insisted that a right view of the Atonement must show the work of Christ to be real in its effects and no merely legal fiction. In this respect he was more truly 'objective' than some of his detractors. And further, he insisted that these effects must operate upon the *individual*, for Rashdall had no sympathy with theories which stressed the solidarity of the human race and One who is 'the universal of humanity' as its representative. Such theories, he realized, must belittle if they do not destroy the value of the individual and his claim to the apprehension of reality; and similarly, if God's dealings with man appear to be such that the moral consciousness cannot approve them, the basis of morality and our very belief in God are alike imperilled. Very wisely he saw that, on the other hand, any sound doctrine of the Atonement must take full account of the teaching of Jesus Himself. His teaching on forgiveness is perfectly explicit — 'If ye forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly Father will also forgive you'[17] — and its clearest illustration is given in the parable of the Prodigal Son. In advocating the Abelardian or exemplarist doctrine, Rashdall could maintain that it was wholly in accordance with what Christ Himself had taught. 'It represents,' he said, 'Christ's life and death, the Revelation of God, as the strongest influence which there is in the world for bringing about that repentance and amendment upon which, as He Himself taught, acceptance with God really depends.'[18]

It is often held against Modernism that an immanentist view of the Incarnation creates a falsely optimistic conception of man, whilst an exemplarist doctrine of the Atonement similarly underestimates the seriousness of the problem of evil. Rashdall suffi-

[15] Cp. *Life*, p. 193; and *Jesus, Human and Divine*, p. 45.
[16] *Life*, p. 192.
[17] *Matt.* vi, 14.
[18] *Ideas and Ideals*, p. 162.

ently demonstrates that neither of these charges need ever be ue. To attempt to maintain either of them in his own case would rtainly be ludicrous. Few things are more apparent in his ritings than the earnestness with which that problem was con-onted and even how heavily it weighed upon him. Thus in his *heory of Good and Evil* he lays down as a basic postulate of orality what he calls 'the negation of optimism, the assertion at not everything in the Universe is very good, and that the istinction between good and evil belongs to the real nature of ings, and not merely to appearance.'[19] In the same work, 'I ould wish,' he says, 'the Universe were better than it is, and if od be the God who is revealed to us by our moral consciousness, e wishes that too.'[20] Some indeed have thought that Rashdall's eodicy, the direct outcome of his keen appreciation of sin and ffering, is so extreme that the very essentials of theism are ompromised by it. They have thought this because he saw no eans of approaching a rational explanation of all the evil there in the world if God's power be literally infinite and unlimited. ealizing that evil may be to some extent the condition upon hich the development of goodness depends, he realized also how uch of it seems unnecessary both in quantity and degree. Hence e ventured to conclude the presence of certain 'necessities' *ithin* the Being of God which render the Universe only the best hat is possible and prevent it from being as good as God Himself ould wish it to be.

There is, however, nothing in such a view that is incompatible ith Theism in the fullest sense. Rashdall believed these 'neces-ties' to be internal to the nature of God, and not, as his critics ave sometimes carelessly supposed, that they were due to some

[19] *Theory of Good and Evil,* vol. II, p. 244.

[20] *Ibid*, p. 345. Cp. also p. 236: 'If we were to confine ourselves to empirical idence alone, I confess that I should see very little to lead us to the con-usion that the world was even good "on the whole," or that it had any od end or object in the future . . . It is only the evidence of the moral nsciousness, taken in connection with the idealistic or theistic argument a whole, that forces us to believe that the world must have an end, that at end is good, and that the good is in principle the same good of which, the moral judgments of the developed moral nature, we have a doubtless adequate but not fundamentally misleading revelation. On this supposition hatever evil exists in the world must be supposed to exist because it is a cessary means to the greatest good that the nature of things make possible.' 'In a letter preserved in his *Life*, p. 168, Rashdall also wrote: "If we ve to admit that God finds it impossible to avoid some evil in this life, it ems difficult to say positively that there must be absolutely none in the next age of existence, or even that finally there may not be some failures or very nperfect successes."'

self-existent and intractable matter over which God could not establish more than a partial control.[21]

Nor, as he himself pointed out, is there anything in such a view that is really novel or startling; Bishop Butler, for example, had said, 'Perhaps there may be impossibilities in the nature of things, which we are unacquainted with.'[22] What Rashdall did in this instance, as in others which we have already noticed, was to state plainly what others merely hinted at in more ambiguous language. And nowhere does he express himself more plainly than in the following passage:

> 'Everybody admits that God cannot change the past; few think it any derogation from His Omnipotence to say that He cannot make the sum of two and two to be other than four... There are necessities to which even God must submit. But they are not imposed upon Him from without; they are parts of His own essential nature. The limitation by which God cannot attain His ends without causing some evil is a limitation of exactly the same nature... If we supposed the world to contain no evil at all, still there would be in it a definite amount of good. Twice such a world would be twice as good... And so on *ad infinitum*, no matter how much good you suppose God to have created. The only sense which we can intelligibly give to the idea of a divine Omnipotence is this—that God possesses all the power there is, that He can do all things that are in their own nature possible... Popular unbelief rests mainly upon the existence of evil. We should cut at its roots by teaching frankly that this is the best of all possible universes, though not the best of all imaginable Universes... And in many ways such a belief is far more stimulating than a belief in God who can do all things by any means and who consequently does not need our help. In our view we are engaged not in a sham warfare with an evil which is really good, but in a real warfare with a real evil, a struggle in which we have the ultimate power of the Universe on our side, but a real struggle in which we are called upon to be literally fellow workers with God.'[23]

Here, surely, we see nothing of that shallow light-heartedness which is supposed to characterize the liberal theologian and render him self-condemned. What we do see once again is Rashdall's moralism blending into one with his rationalism. This is always brought to bear upon moral problems, while the moral issue of any problem never escapes the notice of his moralism.

A further example of this may be seen in his handling of the question of Eschatology and the insight which he brought to bear upon it. It was in 1913 that Rashdall delivered in America a

[21] Rashdall was invited to deliver the Gifford Lectures for 1923-4, but his failing health obliged him to decline. Had he been able to do so they might well have afforded us a developed exposition of his more strictly metaphysical thought which scarcely finds systematic treatment in his actual writings.

[22] *Analogy*, pt. I, ii. Cp. Hooker's statement, 'The being of God is a kind of law to his working.' (*Ecclesiastical Polity*, Bk. I, chap. 2, quoted in *Theory of Good and Evil*, II, p. 346.

[23] *Philosophy and Religion*, pp. 82-86.

ries of lectures subsequently published as *Conscience and Christ*. he second of these, entitled 'Ethics and Eschatology,' is a con- bution to the subject of greater value than has perhaps been lequately recognized. At that time, it must be remembered, chweitzer's famous book had just been translated into English id was strangely welcomed in certain quarters as giving the death ow to liberal theology. 'Some theologians,' wrote Rashdall,

> 'are so obsessed with this eschatological notion that they can see nothing else in the teaching of Jesus, and make Christianity consist in the following of a teacher who taught nothing of importance except an Eschatology which after all was not true.'[24]

ich an obsession was, in his view, wholly unreasonable, though admitted, what is surely true, that an exact solution of the roblem is unlikely ever to be attained.[25] And further — though fusing to accept as genuine utterances of our Lord some of the ore extreme apocalyptic sayings, and pointing out their incom- atibility with others much more evidently authentic — Rashdall as prepared to admit that to a certain extent Jesus may have lared in the current eschatological expectations of his day. But dmission to the kingdom of God, he points out, 'depends upon ghteousness and nothing else.'[26] If this be granted — that the ndition of entry into the kingdom is a moral one — the time and anner of its coming as Jesus conceived them do not materially fect the truth of His Gospel. Its moral teaching is no mere *terimsethick*.

> 'It deals,' says Rashdall, 'almost entirely with general principles. The imperative need for repentance, the supreme importance of pure motive, the swallowing up of all the commandments in the command to love God and our neighbour—these are its main ideas. There is no reason why commands like these should not be equally valuable for a society which believes itself destined to endure till the sun waxes cold, and for a society which believes that some world transforming catastrophe is close at hand. There is no *a priori* reason for treating the Ethics of Jesus as useless to a modern society because He entertained certain eschatological expectations.'[27]

the lectures which follow he proceeds to justify in greater etail the truth of this contention.

Conscience and Christ is a fine study of Christ's teaching and shows clearly the keen moral insight and the acute reasoning ower of its author. But Rashdall was not a rationalist *and* a oralist; for him the moral and the rational consciousness were ne and indivisible. Whatever aspect of his teaching we consider

[24] *Life*, p. 146.
[25] *Life*, p. 219.
[26] *Conscience and Christ*, p. 57.
[27] *Ibid*, p. 62.

— upon the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Atonement, the Problem of Evil, or that of Eschatology — this unity is constantly evident. It was this unity which prevented his belief in reason from becoming faith in an abstraction; the facts of both inward and outward experience being taken fully into account, while the whole of his moral philosophy was directed towards the attainment of rational ends. Here, I believe, lies the real strength of his position — its complete integration makes it so essentially a working, practical faith.

Perhaps the clearest instance of this integration is to be seen in what Rashdall called his 'Ideal Utilitarianism' — a theory of ethics which regards an action as right or wrong according to the end that it promotes, but understanding that end to be ideal and not materialistic. The name which he gave to this theory well suggests that complete integration in his mind between what we might call the pure and the practical reason.

The critics of 'Ideal Utilitarianism' have again not always been careful or well informed. They have supposed that Rashdall merely advocated a variant of the view that pleasure in one form or another should be the ultimate purpose and justification of conduct. In fact the whole point of calling his theory 'ideal' was to guard against such misunderstanding.

No moralist ever recognized more clearly than Rashdall the reality of moral obligation. But as a rationalist he could not be content with an idea of duty which was altogether unanalysable. He was bound to seek further what it is in which the rightness of an action consists. 'The right action,' he replies, 'is always that which will produce the greatest amount of good upon the whole . . . Actions are right or wrong according as they tend to produce for all mankind an ideal end or good, which includes, but is not limited to, pleasure.'[28] To this extent only was he a hedonist, that he believed pleasure to be *one* element present in all good.

It would be too much of a digression to consider Rashdall's ethical theory beyond the purpose of this illustration. But as

[28] *Theory of Good and Evil*, vol. I, p. 184. Cp. p. 153f.: 'The very idea of an "end" implies the existence of beings with tendencies, desires, or impulses for which some kind of satisfaction can be found in that end. This satisfaction is not the same thing as pleasure, but there can be no satisfaction without some degree (however low) of pleasure. "The good" is an intellectual category, but it is a category which would be meaningless in a purely knowing consciousness . . . The fallacy of Hedonism lies in the attempt to estimate the value of the feeling element in abstraction from the other elements of consciousness. Knowing, feeling, willing, are for us at least, the three inseparable elements of consciousness. It is upon consciousness taken as a whole that we pronouce our ultimate judgments of value.'

eveloped by him it reveals much more than his identification of eason and morality. It shows, too, how firm was his belief in the mplete reality of the individual consciousness. This indeed lay t the very basis of all his thinking, for, as he fully realized, 'the ata of consciousness are the only ground we have for believing nything at all.'[29] Upon this belief with its implications of per- nal responsibility were founded his theory of ethics; his belief h God as the Mind 'which is the source of whatever is true in our wn moral judgments,'[30] and so validates our awareness of objec- ve moral values; and lastly, his belief in personal immortality. brief glance at this may stand as our final example of Rashdall's elief appropriately enough; for it too is typical of the three ele- ents which are so closely interwoven in his character—the rational- t, the moralist and the individualist. Rashdall believed firmly in a ersonal life after death and had no sympathy with those who in is opinion tended 'to resolve Immortality into absorption into the bsolute (which to him meant nothing) or even an "immortality in ne memory of survivors."'[31] He believed it to be utterly neces- ary if a rational explanation of human life is to be found. Only o could the present unequal distribution of good and evil be ade compatible with 'the willing of such a world by a Being hose character the moral consciousness at its highest presents as ove.'[32] This line of thought is forcefully presented in a lecture hich he delivered in 1919 at King's College, London, entitled The Moral Argument for Immortality.'[33] It shews how profound conviction belief in immortality was for him, and though founded pon a rational basis, it was far from remaining a purely intel- ctual theory. Moreover, rationalist though he was, he did not gnore the limitations of human reason. Thus, after considering ne problem of time and eternity and the difficulties which that roblem raises for the believer in personal immortality, he con- ludes:

> 'My own way of dealing with the antinomy about time is far too simple to please philosophers. It is simply to recognize that here we come to the limits of human thought. Doubtless there must be a way of "transcending" the antinomy. Doubtless God knows what it is . . . but we do not know how this transcendence is effected.'[34]

Such frankness reveals him as a true philosopher, and indeed

[29] *Ibid*, II, p. 203.
[30] *Ibid*, II, p. 212.
[31] *Life*, p. 167.
[32] *Theory of Good and Evil*, vol. II, p. 216.
[33] *King's College Lectures on Immortality*, pp. 78-121. (Reprinted in *God nd Man.*)
[34] *King's College Lectures*, p. 114.

Rashdall may fairly be called the philosophical theologian *par excellence*. If it be further conceded that a theology incapable of philosophical presentation is as futile as a philosophy which cannot also be called a theology, then no one person supplies a more compelling argument than does Rashdall for the necessity of a Christian Modernism. It has always been a matter of some surprise to me that his widely varied teaching has not made a far more general appeal. We hear continually of the need for 'definite teaching,' and Rashdall is so admirably definite, free from any suspicion of vagueness and generalization, yet at the same time so entirely free from irritating dogmatism. Scholasticism, too, attracts many adherents to-day, and Rashdall might well be called a modern Schoolman. But his scholasticism has the merits of the older system without its demerits, for its rationalism is essentially empirical and even in one sense utilitarian.[35]

But the primary purpose of this paper is, I take it, far less ambitious than to commend a general return of interest to Rashdall's thought and teaching, however excellent that would be. It is rather that we ourselves may draw mutual encouragement from following in outline the beliefs of one to whom, surely, all modern churchmen must feel themselves drawn by strong sympathy. In doing so, however, we must not forget the greater community to which we belong, the Church as a whole, nor our desire to see such principles as those for which Rashdall stood more fully realized within it. 'May the increase of co-operation and sympathy between those who think and feel alike in such a society as this only increase and strengthen the bond which connects us with our brethren, in humble service of the same Lord and the same Church!' These again are Rashdall's words, and it is appropriate to recall them on this occasion which marks the Jubilee of our Union, for they were spoken at its first annual meeting.[36] They remind us that Rashdall was certainly not less a Churchman than a Modernist. His fundamental belief in the individual was one that should bind men together rather than isolate them; and the idea of a Christian society was to him 'an essential and imperishable element in Christian theology and Christian ethics.'[37] Though no Erastian, he believed firmly in the union between Church and

[35] 'With many differences, of course, he might have stood for a great Schoolman or Father of the Church, with, naturally, a far wider outlook. I do not think that in our time any ecclesiastic, taken all round, stood intellectually quite on a level with him. The pity is, full use was never made of him by his generation.' Article on Dean Rashdall in the *Modern Churchman*, October, 1927. (Quoted in *Life*, p. 252.)

[36] October 6th, 1899. See *Christus in Ecclesia*, sermon xxiv.

[37] *Christus in Ecclesia*, p. 26.

tate as the best means of maintaining, or at least of upholding s an ideal, the spiritual character of the State and the national haracter of the Church.[38] In furtherance of this end he was eager o promote a closer measure of understanding between the Church f England and the Nonconformist Churches, believing that occa- ional acts of intercommunion would assist considerably such nderstanding.

It is, then, alike as a great Churchman and as a great liberal heologian that we pay homage to the memory of Hastings Rashdall. We honour him as a great leader of the past whose xample encourages us to go forward still. 'He brought to the ervice of his age,' says a tablet to his memory in New College, 'a are passion for Virtue, Knowledge, and Truth.' We can best onour him by seeking from his example the encouragement to ender a like service to our own.

[38] *Ibid*, p. 312. Rashdall believed that the Church, including, of course, the aity, should be allowed a large measure of freedom in the management of its ffairs. But in a letter to *The Times* of February 27th, 1919, he indicated with eference to the proposed Enabling Act what he considered its limits ought o be. 'The Assembly,' he wrote, 'should not be empowered to deal with *all* matters relating to the Church." Certain main features of the present elations between Church and State should be expressly reserved, such as the resent appointment to Bishoprics and Cathedral dignities, and the jurisdiction f the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, these being the two chief ecurities for the maintenance of comprehensiveness and liberty of thought n the Church of England. Parliamentary control should be a real control. am quite sure that the necessity of laying the measures passed by he Church Assembly upon the table of both Houses of Parliament or forty days would prove a wholly illusory check upon the designs of re- ctionaries and obscurantists. Parliament should, I think, insist that these neasures should not go through without a positive vote—*i.e.* an address to he Crown from both Houses, or at least that the period should not be forty lays but at least six months.' (*Life*, p. 188). To the objection that Parliament vas no longer composed of even nominal members of the Church of England, ie replied: 'The true question for the Church is not, "Does our submission o this measure of State interference constitute an infringement of an abstract *priori* ideal of autonomy or self-government; does it correspond with the raditional principles and practices which have been handed down to us from rimitive times?"; but rather, "Does it or does it not conduce to the end or which the Church exists?" "Will the Church do its work more or less fficiently, by submitting to these restrictions?" And if that test be applied, he answer cannot, to my mind, be very doubtful.' (*Christus in Ecclesia*, p. 310.) The existence of a lay court of final appeal,' he continues, 'secures a pro- ressive toleration of differences in practice and opinion which could hardly ave been secured in any other way. The Church of England would inevitably, t is not too much to say, have committed suicide as a comprehensive national Church but for the interposition of that fatherly tribunal.' (*Ibid*, p. 311.)

BURNETT HILLMAN STREETER

By the Reverend J. S. Bezzant, B.D., M.A., Canon-Residentiary and Chancellor of Liverpool Cathedral.

BURNETT Hillman Streeter was born in November, 1875, the first child and only son in a family of four. His father, John Streeter, was married at the beginning of that year by Archbishop Tait in the parish church of Addington. The family home was a few miles away, at Sanderstead, then a village. John Streeter was a solicitor, in comfortable circumstances, practising in Croydon where he set up his home. Burnett's maternal grandfather, named Walker, came from Yorkshire but had acquired a farm of several thousand acres at Addington, an enterprising man who did much for agriculture in the county by introducing new methods and up-to-date machinery, and it was his youngest daughter who married John Streeter. By her own youngest daughter she was described as the most kindly and generous person she had ever known, but not at all clever and lacking a sense of humour. John Streeter also built a house at Farleigh, some five miles from Croydon, to which the family migrated for half the year; he was known as a good lawyer, who kept the County Courts in fits of laughter, but he did not like his profession and retired at about the age of fifty, maintaining his two large houses and losing money. There was always a resident governess and the daughters were not allowed to go to school. Burnett might not have gone had not an aunt one day taken him forcibly to a small preparatory School in Croydon High-street, where he remained until the headmaster requested his removal because he knew all that the staff could teach him. It was then arranged to send him to Uppingham and all was ready, even to his pockets being sewn up, when the strong-willed aunt urged that he should enter for a scholarship at King's College School, which he did and was awarded it. His father gave him the choice between going to Uppingham or taking the scholarship. The lad, impressed by frequent but groundless family talk of impending impoverishment, chose, against his own wish, to take the scholarship.

Both parents were affectionate, alike to each other and to their children with whose future they did not appear to be much concerned, and withal a little irresponsible. The mother was much attached to the Church and when young rode over to Addington in all weathers to play the organ. She always hoped her son would be ordained; but in Croydon she did no church work nor was such activity permitted to the daughters because father feared, in their opinion unnecessarily, that they would want to marry the curates.

urnett early revealed a seriousness and a sense of concern for s family. He was never strong yet never ill, except for the in-gestion which was a life-long inconvenience and sometimes a rious affliction. While still young he appeared to his sisters as other and father combined.

Streeter went up to Queen's College, Oxford, with a classical holarship in 1893. An exact contemporary, his nearest neigh-our in college who sat at the same table in hall and saw a great al of him, says he was then the same Streeter as he remained, gestures, in speech and in the rather shy friendliness that was characteristic. Tall and thin, with a suggestion of stooping d with abnormally long, narrow feet which gave him a distinc-ve gait, his friend noticed little change in him when they met ain after many years, except the short, pointed, rather sandy ard which he acquired as a young man and which was early ged with grey. None was more sympathetic and loyal to college stoms and he never condemned the vigour and pleasantries of dergraduate life. Most athletic sports were out of the question r him, but he took up rowing and by grit and determination got to the college boat, at some cost to health. Though he in no way od out as a leader among young men, he influenced others by iet discussion and friendly toleration of differing opinions. His terest was then in ethical, political and social matters; not obvi-sly in religion but in man's relations with other men. Then, as ter, during a walk with him, one felt that the countryside ap-aled to him rather as the setting for conversation than for its vn interests. His friend of undergraduate days learned with sur-ise of his reading for the Theological School. Streeter, then as ways, had many friends but very few intimates : he made a point knowing as many sorts of men as he could. He never posed, s genuineness inspired confidence and he was a model in sticking his job, having the strength of will to keep to strict hours of ork. Often, in the middle of long after-dinner talks, he would ok at his watch and say, ' I must go now : work to do,' and leave. one suggested the pursuit of sidelines in study he would ask, Do you think it will pay?' or comment, ' I don't think that will ay.' This rather quaint habit amused others, though they did not ink him one whose eye was to the main chance. He thought mply that to aim at the best possible result in examinations was duty, one for which scholarships had been awarded. He never preached' and was plainly honest in speech and action and, ove all, was unvaringly friendly.

In due course Streeter gained three First Classes (in Mods., reats and Theology); he was a Liddon student, was awarded

the Hall-Houghton Senior Greek Testament Prize and the Denyer and Johnson Scholarship. He was elected Fellow and Dean of Pembroke College in 1899 and made Deacon the same year. From 1903 he undertook the theological lecturing at Queen's. Two years later he became a Fellow of his own college and left Pembroke. The affection he retained for that society, of which he much later became an Honorary Fellow, was typical of the loyalty he invariably felt towards any institution with which he had been connected, and some of his best stories were of Pembroke personalities of those days. In a city of great loyalties Streeter's devotion to Queen's and his interest in what undergraduates were thinking and in their welfare, were outstanding. More than once, at later dates, he would not become a candidate for professorships, for which he had the obvious qualifications, because election would have involved leaving Queen's and, in his judgment, have made it less easy to make and maintain his contacts with the younger members of the University.

Streeter's interest in all subjects relevant to New Testament Criticism began while he was reading for the Honour School of Theology, when he substituted it as one of his subjects instead of Church History which, at that time, he found dull. He became absorbed in careful scholarly work on the Gospels which was to win him a distinguished place among experts wherever the subject is studied. It was the publication of *Oxford Studies in the Synoptic Problem*, in 1911, which revealed his powers in dealing with the complicated issues involved in the literary relations of the first three Gospels: his contributions to that volume made the words 'Synoptic Problem' inseparable from his name for all serious English-reading theological students. The editor of this volume, Professor Sanday, himself of European reputation, in his Introduction referred to the 'remarkable excellence' of the essay entitled 'The Literary Evolution of the Gospels,' and continued:

> 'I do not remember to have seen, within anything like the same compass, a picture at once so complete, so sound and (to my mind) so thoroughly scientific, of the whole course of development in the Apostolic and sub-Apostolic age in its bearing upon literary composition in general and the composition of the Gospels in particular. It is a real evolution, and an evolution conceived as growth, in which each stage springs naturally, spontaneously and inevitably out of the last. I shall in future always refer to this essay when I desire either to refresh or to correct the picture present in my own mind.'

In this essay Streeter showed that the document Q (which, though no longer existing except as preserved in the Gospels and although its contents and extent could not be determined with precision, was demonstrated by critical investigation to have existed when

e Gospels were being written) together with the Gospel of Mark d those of Matthew and Luke, form three distinct stages in the olution of the Gospel writings. It is interesting to note, in view the much later theories of Form-criticism, that at this early date reeter wrote of these three stages :

> ' Each meets the probable apologetic and practical needs of a different period and presupposes a different background.'

nd more significantly :

> 'Q is an unordered collection of sayings or incidents, selected because they had vividly impressed the mind of the narrator or had an ethical or apologetic interest for the early community. Mark is a collection of vignettes — scenes from the life of the Master. The oft-recurring use of *euthus* produces an illusory impression that the scenes are all closely connected in time and place, but this is a mere habit of style. The traces of a development which have been noticed in our Lord's Messianic teaching, or in the degree of hostility of the Pharisees, show that the author has some knowledge of the correct order of events, but far too much has been made of this. In the last resort Mark is a series of roughly arranged sketches or reminiscences, exactly as Papias describes it.'

reeter also contributed to the volume an Appendix on ' Synoptic iticism and the Eschatological Problem,' in which it is shewn careful comparison that

> ' Three clearly marked stages in the development of the Eschatological Teaching ascribed to our Lord are found respectively in Q, Mark, and Matthew.'

e admitted that his sketch was far from exhaustive,

> ' but it suffices to show clearly that in the series Q, Mark, Matthew, there is a steady development in the direction of emphasizing, making more definite, and even creating, sayings of our Lord of the catastrophic Apocalyptic type, and of thrusting more and more into the background the sayings of a contrary tenor.'

nd he went on to argue that we have no right to assume that the ocess had not already begun even before Q crystallized the dition into writing, though he was fully aware that the argument uld not be pushed to the length of entirely eliminating the ocalyptic element from the authentic teaching of Jesus. He lt that his later studies confirmed this position and it remained s settled conviction.

A subject of interest and importance arises in this period. When reeter returned to his own college in 1905, William Temple, ough in age six years his junior, was already a Fellow of Queen's d did not take Holy Orders until the end of 1908. He had seri- s hesitations on intellectual grounds and so had the Bishop of xford (Paget) who, with the greatest regret and sympathy, felt iable to ordain him. The Dean of Lichfield, in his biography Temple, says that it was from Streeter, with whom at this time

'he was in closer spiritual contact than with any other member of the University,' that 'Temple acquired most of his views on New Testament criticism'; and that in the judgment of a colleague of both of them (R. H. Hodgkin, retired Provost of Queen's) it was Streeter who 'led Temple to take a "reasonable view" of the declaration required from ordinands.' They always remained on friendly and affectionate terms; but when Temple's life-track took him away from Oxford and as he ascended the hierarchical ladder, their personal contacts became much less frequent. At the time of the initiation of the 'Life and Liberty' movement, which led to the Enabling Act and its consequences, Streeter was critical; he 'held that the movement was beginning at the wrong end and was emphasizing the importance of the Church's body to the neglect of its soul.' He thought the greater need was to attend to the spiritual and intellectual condition of the clergy and laity. Nor did his opinion change in later years. Though he recognized that the Church Assembly had passed useful measures introducing needful practical reforms, he also saw that these were unable to increase the effective membership of the Church or its influence in the life of the people. He felt that the good results were more than counterbalanced by an ever-increasing organization which absorbed both labour and money that could have been more usefully employed, and out of all proportion to any real advantages to the interests of religion. He used to say that Temple was always at his best when in Oxford and that elsewhere he was too sensitive to the distinction (which Streeter knew could not be ignored) between what he could say as William Temple and what as the Archbishop of York.

The Synoptic Problem was the subject of Streeter's continual study, though combined with other interests, until the publication of his greatest work, *The Four Gospels*, in 1924. This is a full-dress treatment of the sources, authorship, dates and manuscript traditions of the Gospels, containing several original contributions to the study of these matters. Perhaps the most original and important was the identification of the then fairly new Koridethi MS. Θ with the text of the Gospels in use at Caesarea about A.D. 230. The effect of this is to broaden the basis of early evidence towards the recovery of an authentic text of the New Testament. The theory of a draft of St. Luke earlier than the existing third Gospel, named by Streeter 'Proto-Luke,' maintained that the author had already combined Q with the matter peculiar to his Gospel, except the Infancy narrative, before he knew of Mark, extracts from which he later inserted into his existing outline. This proposition, which Streeter claimed to be a scientific hypothesis, has been on the whole

urably received, though some scholars have rejected it and rs have not felt that it admits of so high a degree of verification s author claimed for it. The consequence of its acceptance at the matter peculiar to the third Gospel (from chapter 3 ards), though, like Mark, later in date than Q, is independent Mark and is a source of approximately equal historical value the second Gospel; where the two are parallel it is sometimes erior, sometimes inferior, to Mark. Streeter also argued that thew used a source, M, peculiar to himself, which was strongly aistic in tone. Possibly Streeter over-estimated the advance e by this 'Four Document Hypothesis'; for scholars had long posed that Matthew and Luke had other sources, some written, e oral, besides Q and Mark, of which Matthew's would seem e of less historical value than Luke's in that they too frequently too plainly reflect the later Jewish-Christian controversy. eter himself emphasized that his theory

> does not enable us to make a "tidy" scheme showing us exactly which sayings or incidents belong to M, which to L, and which to Q. If Matthew and Luke used four sources, every one of which to a certain extent overlapped with every other, the problem of disentangling them, beyond a certain point, is one which no amount of ingenuity can solve.'

ther contribution of this book was to show, by a minute textual cism, that a theory which had long troubled Synoptic studies d be finally abandoned: the agreements of Matthew and Luke nst Mark no longer afford ground for supposing that they l an Ur-Marcus, or earlier edition of Mark than ours.

The Four Gospels is, as Dr. Major once observed, a work aining pools in which lambs may drink but also depths in which hants must swim. It is in every way a standard work, not ly soon to be superseded, the more so because it sums up the lts of a long period of concentration upon its subject-matter. e its publication, interest has shifted to the much more specue and precarious task of trying to reconstruct the pre-literary ory, forms and origins of the contents of the Gospels.

Throughout his life Streeter was keenly interested in the rela of Religion to Science, and his most widely read book, *lity*, he described as a new correlation of the two. It states the otion in which his acute and sensitive mind found rest after y years of search. With some diffidence he gives an outline of gious autobiography:

> 'I came up to Oxford . . . fully determined to follow my father in the profession of the Law. But about the end of my second year I realized quite suddenly that the religious beliefs in which I had been brought up rested on a very slender intellectual foundation; and I awoke one day to find myself an agnostic. After a year or so of thought and reading, and

discussion with older friends, I reached, through the gateway of T. H. Green's philosophy, what at the time seemed to me an adequate intellectual basis of religion — largely taken over, in a not too well-digested form, from the earlier writings of Illingworth and Gore. The conviction was then borne in upon me that it was my duty to give my life to the task of further working out, and passing on to others, the truth which I had seen; and I decided to seek ordination. After taking my Degree I read Theology, and there opened up a possibility, which had not previously occurred to me, that my work might be in Oxford; but it was not till some little time after I had been elected to a Fellowship that I realized how very far from being water-tight was the position which I had reached. The restraining advice of a senior friend kept me from relinquishing my Orders; but I think I should ultimately have taken this step but for the reinvigorating inspiration of the Summer Conferences of the Student Christian Movement, which I began to attend in 1905. Here I gained a renewed confidence that in Religion man can attain to a genuine apprehension of Reality, of that "Beyond which is also Within," in a way and of a kind which any intellectual theory of the Universe must account for or confess itself bankrupt.

'I started again on my quest with a new courage, but with no weakening of my old conviction that religion in its mystical, emotional or practical expression was, for me at any rate, of little value if divorced from intellectual integrity. I endeavoured to work on in the spirit of the philosopher who, in Samuel Butler's famous phrase, "should have given up all, even Christ Himself, for Christ's sake."

'It has been my peculiar good fortune to have come into a personal contact, which admitted of long and repeated discussion of large problems, with an exceptional number of fellow-seekers after truth — philosophers, scientists, and others whose interest was mainly in art, literature or practical life, as well as theologians of many Christian denominations and students or adherents of the great religions of the East. Looking back over my life, I feel that I have learnt more in this way than from the books which I have read. I owe a special debt to those friends who were associated with me in the series of "group-books" — *Foundations*, *Concerning Prayer, Immortality* and *The Spirit* . . .

'Instinctively anyone brought up in the Christian tradition . . . frames his question in the form, Is Christianity true? But merely to state the question thus precludes a satisfactory answer; for the very form of the question implies that Religion is itself the problem, whereas the truth of Religion is a matter worth enquiring about only if, and in so far as, it offers a solution of the problems that are posed by life — of which the problem of evil is the chief. . . .

'By those who first heard it the Christian message was called "Gospel," that is, "good news." It was so named because to them it did seem to give an answer both to the theoretical and to the practical questions. Life posed the riddle; Religion had found an answer. Life has not ceased to pose its riddle; but who to-day has an answer which the majority seems to have the authentic ring? Those who are without Religion admit they have no answer. The Christian theologian stands on the defensive. Having once begun by asking the wrong question, he finds himself "defending the faith"; in effect he has got himself in the position of being anxious to save Religion, instead of expecting Religion to save him.'

The fundamental idea in this book is one for which its auth

ned to do no more than set it forth in outline. Science con-
es Reality mainly in terms of quantity, whereas quality or value
e special province of Art and Religion. Scientific knowledge
Representation of Reality comparable to a diagram : Religion
Representation comparable to a picture. Both are necessary
comprehensive knowledge. While Religion is akin to Art in
it is concerned with quality, it resembles Science in its claim
present truth. But to test the truth of any religion it is neces-
to find the inner meaning of its myths, rites and creeds before
ing at intellectual theological constructions. Nevertheless,
gion will degenerate into superstition unless it checks concep-
s derived from myths, rites and creeds in the light of scientific
philosophical knowledge. If in Art there is no conflict between
hanism and meaning, why should there be any such in Nature?
chapter on Immortality in this volume is the best, in a few
es, I have ever read, and it has a very rare beauty. Another
section is on ' The Christ,' from which I quote :

> ' The life and character of Christ are an embodiment in concrete experience of an ideal principle — the principle of Creative Love. It follows that the thinker who wishes to frame a conception of the Universe must regard the occurrence in history of such a life as a phenomenon of unique importance. The life of Christ is a fact; no theory, therefore, of the Universe can be intellectually watertight which is inadequate to explain this fact. And when a principle has been realized in concrete experience, we must ask how far it is representative of an element in Ultimate Reality. The fact of Christ, the actual emergence upon the stage of history of this transcendent personality, is an empirical phenomenon which challenges explanation. For every effect we must assume a cause adequate to produce it. If the personality of Christ is the effect, is it not reasonable to infer, in that Infinite Creative Life which we must assume as cause, a character in which Love is an essential element? . . . More than that — the moral quality and purpose in the Infinite are not only that element in It which is most important for us to know; they are also (if they exist at all) intrinsically the most important thing about It, they must constitute what Greek thinkers called Its *ousia*, or Its "essence," *i.e.* that which makes It to be what It is.'

For Streeter, as for St. Paul, Jesus was the portrait, in human
is, of the invisible God, and he did not feel great need to go
ond that position. He saw little religious or theological value
peculation about the *mode* of the Incarnation, since this could
be matter of knowledge and was not a proper object of faith.
ordingly he made no contribution to the theology of the Incar-
on or to the doctrine of the Trinity. Though William Temple
t much further in philosophical analysis and elaboration, there
close resemblance in their basic attitude to the data of these
rines and to what must necessarily be inferred from those data;
from the standpoint of psychology and epistemology,

Streeter's is perhaps less open to the criticism that it is rather a able and eloquent exposition of a system of personal conviction than reasoning designed to convince those who do not start wit sharing their religious faith. Streeter would not have assumed, a Temple sometimes gives the impression of assuming, that worshi implies the real existence of its object and that this belief is exemp from philosophical criticism. The book is full of wise saying revealing deep sympathy with human nature and understanding o life combined with anxious and long reflection upon their problems *Reality*, if an ambitious title, is a good one as indicating its qualit throughout. I agree with Mr. Hardwick's judgment that this is th sort of Modernism, entirely free of cant, which might rejuvenat English religion, if it could get a hearing.

Streeter's next book was *The Primitive Church*, a study of th earliest Church Order and a fresh survey of the relevant survivin literature. He points out that for four hundred years theologian of different Churches, however great their reverence for histori fact, have at least hoped that their researches would vindicat Apostolic authority for the type of Church Order to which the were themselves attached. Each has been able to make out a cas for his own view, but unable to demolish other views. Streete urged, and argued with great ingenuity, a simple explanation there was a development in Church Order comparable with that i theological reflection and, in the New Testament, both culminat ing in the writings of the Elder John. This judgment, which re quired no forced exegesis to support preconceived doctrine, h considered to have the great advantage of being fully consonan with other recognized facts. Throughout the second century ther was acute controversy between the Churches of Rome and Asi about the day on which Easter should be observed. The coin cidences in the Gospels of Matthew and Luke are accounted fo by their common dependence upon Mark and Q: their startlin divergences, in matters which must have been considered o supreme importance, are only explicable if there existed a hig degree of local independence in the sub-Apostolic age. A stud of the older versions and patristic citations of the Gospels an Acts affords further evidence of local diversity long after genera standardization had begun. Liturgies show the same phenomeno and so does the history of the formation of the New Testamen Canon. That 'the history of Catholic Christianity during the fi five centuries is the history of the progressive standardization of diversity which had its origin in the Apostolic Age' is a judgmen not affected by differences of opinion on some of the proposition maintained by Streeter; and that different systems of Churc

overnment existed at the end of the first century explains why piscopalian, Presbyterian and the Independent can each discover the prototype of his own system. There is 'one result from which there is no escape. In the Primitive Church there was no single system of Church Order laid down by the Apostles.'

Anglo-Catholic critics endeavoured to discredit this book by peated statements that it was 'largely speculative' and 'conctural.' These adjectives must needs apply to *all* attempts to etch the first hundred years of Christianity. Streeter's book difs from many others, not in containing more conjectural material, t in making clear which conclusions follow from empirically tablished presuppositions supported by real evidence and which not. This characteristic of the volume was indicated by Prossor J. M. Creed in the *Journal of Theological Studies*:

> 'Where the evidence is obscure, Canon Streeter does not shrink from conjecture, yet never without making it clear to his readers where conclusions based on evidence ends and conjecture begins.'

Canon Streeter was invited by the Heads of Houses at Oxford be the Bampton Lecturer for 1932, though he was not one of e candidates. He had a very long-standing interest in the Far ast, having been on lecture tours in India and Ceylon and in ina and Japan. To gather material about Buddhism in its living m he undertook another visit to the Far East, though then in or health. The result was another illuminating if less profound lume, *The Buddha and The Christ*, in which the comparison dicated in the title was employed to illustrate and confirm certain the positions maintained in *Reality*. Appointed Warburtonian cturer of Lincoln's Inn for 1933-35, he issued his lectures under e title *The God Who Speaks*. In this book the influence of his sociation with the Oxford Group is apparent, though only here d there and in a very slight degree. Ideas from earlier books pear again in a fresh and vivid form; the central portion of this lume traces the development of the characteristically 'proetic' insight in the Old and New Testaments. A much earlier all book, which had a large sale, was the study, jointly with J. Appasamy, of the mysticism and practical teaching of the dian Sadhu Sundar Singh.

The proposed restoration of the chained library in Hereford thedral provided an instance of Streeter's astonishing versatility d of the speed with which he could work at an entirely new subt. In order that mistakes in the renovation should be avoided, 'got up' the subject of ancient library fittings; thus aided, the tcome was a most remarkable series of discoveries of parts of old Hereford bookcases, or presses, and their fittings, which

had been put to various uses in other parts of the cathedral. The restoration was thus made far more complete than had been expected. He followed up his studies with enthusiasm, investigating all the large libraries in this country which were once chained, and several smaller ones; and in less than two years had produced the handsome volume, replete with photographs, drawings and plans, entitled *The Chained Library*. It contains much new and much more not otherwise accessible information. By chance, when in Colombo, I came across the following tribute by Sir Frank Douglas MacKinnon, Lord Justice of Appeal:

> 'At Hereford my last new experience was to spend a long time in the Cathedral Library . . . I knew the book of Canon Streeter, afterwards Provost of Queen's, and what he had accomplished in the way of restoration. But on previous visits I had only a fleeting look at the library. Its rescue and rehabilitation was a wonderful feat.'

In addition to these books of his own authorship there are the five volumes of Essays by various writers which Streeter edited, all involving group discussions, sometimes prolonged, and to all of which he contributed. The first of them, *Foundations* (1912) aroused much controversy and brought him a measure of notoriety. Not long before, J. M. Thompson's book on Miracles had aroused some stir and the Bishop of Winchester (Talbot), whose license Thompson held, cancelled it. Gore, as became his habit, wanted the Bishops to take public action. Gore, Talbot and Winnington-Ingram, each for a different reason, were believed by Streeter, as Dr. Prestige truly says, to be in the public mind the three outstanding Bishops. Though he admired them for their personal qualities, Streeter also thought, and often said throughout his life, that their influence was disastrous at a time when conditions for the transition to a more liberal theology in the Church of England were more favourable than they have since become. Later in life he wondered whether she had not left her theological house-cleaning until too late. Each of these Bishops 'made no secret of their conviction that the Christian religion stood or fell with the acceptance of the physical Resurrection of our Lord, or of their resolve to prevent anyone who thought otherwise from entering the ministry.' Streeter, like Rashdall, thought that no practical action in defence of Thompson could succeed, but there is no doubt that he deliberately trailed his own coat in his *Foundations* essay. He accepted the historical evidence for the Empty Tomb as sufficient, but attached no significance to it, saying there were possible natural explanations though no particular one was probable. Emphasizing the difficulties involved in the traditional view of a literal physical resurrection, he also set aside the 'subjective vision' theory of the Appearances of the risen Christ. He did not

deny the possibility of miracle, but would fain make a minimal appeal to it or none at all. So he suggested that the Appearances resulted from an external stimulus on the minds of the disciples, the living Christ being able, acting in the spiritual world, to convey to them the reality of his continuing life and his presence with them. Gore contemplated withdrawing Streeter's licence, but on reflection and the advice of friends decided not to do so. The Bishop of St. Albans, to whom Streeter was an examining chaplain, did not dismiss him but allowed him quietly to resign. Early in 1915 the Bishop of Hereford (Percival), pursuing a deliberate policy, added Streeter to the group of liberals, Bannister, Lilley and Rashdall, who already held residentiary canonries in his cathedral. This led to the public 'excommunication' of the Bishop of Hereford by the Bishop of Zanzibar who had no vestige of legal right in the matter. There was henceforward to be, he declared in an impressive, legal-looking document of which he sent a copy to Streeter, 'no Communion in Sacred Things between Ourselves and the Right Reverend John, Lord Bishop of Hereford, nor between Ourselves and any priest within his jurisdiction who shall make known his approval of the false doctrines now officially authorized within the Diocese of Hereford.' The faithful of the Zanzibar diocese were 'charged to duly observe this our Declaration and Sentence,' which no doubt they did, possibly with some assistance from geography and the war. The *Foundations* essay is also noteworthy as an early eulogy of Schweitzer in this country and for the space given to showing the religious value and advantages of the recognition of Apocalyptic Eschatology in the Gospels; but, as the learned and conservative Dr. Armitage Robinson pointed out, Schweitzer neglected principles of criticism while Streeter's investigations in the Synoptic Problem enabled him to avoid Schweitzer's mistakes. He said the essay 'deserves at every point the most careful consideration.'

Streeter's essay in *Adventure* (1927) on 'Moral Adventure' ran to eighty pages and won from that discerning and severe critic Dr. John Oman the tribute that 'the chief thing to be said is that it is full of the wisdom of experience and understanding . . . most brilliantly, perhaps too brilliantly, written . . . the advice given is so wise, gracious and helpful that criticism seems rather a desecration.' And of Streeter's second essay of forty-six pages in the same volume on 'Finality in Religion' Dr. Oman wrote that criticism 'is largely discounted by the fact that I know nothing in any language which deals with it better.'

I can but note that in *Concerning Prayer* (1916) Streeter wrote on 'The Nature of Worship' and 'The Psychology of Public

Worship'; in *Immortality* (1917) on 'The Resurrection of the Dead' and 'The Life of the World to Come'; and in *The Spirit* (1919) on 'Christ the Constructive Revolutionary.' Of these three books the first was reprinted four times and the third five times. All had a considerable influence.

On the reunion of Christian Churches Streeter felt strongly and maintained a clear position. Divisions arose because in different ways Christians had lost contact with the mind of Christ, and conformity with that mind was the only ultimate basis for reunion. It was therefore wrong to regard *rapprochement* between Anglican and non-Episcopalian Churches from the point of view of what the Roman and Orthodox Churches would think of it: the proper question is 'What does Christ think about it?' He did not want reunion with Rome unless and until the absolute claims of the Papacy and much else were modified. The one thing that might conceivably move Rome would be the spectacle of a federation of united Churches more efficient because freer than herself. Given the necessary goodwill, he did not think it should pass the wit of man to devise a system of Church government — episcopal, but with democratic improvements — which should do full justice to the rights of the local congregation and the liberty of prophesying within the limits of a ministerial priesthood; but Presbyterians and Nonconformists ought never to accept episcopacy unless it were constructively implied that it did not entail what he called, without wishing to give offence, the Roman magisterial conception of priesthood and the magical conception of sacraments. He was fully aware that rather than agree to any such solution, some in the Church of England would go to Rome. He would let them go. The most serious difficulty was with the larger number who, if pressed, would confess the ministerial view of priesthood, but who were persuaded that episcopacy was of the *esse* of the Church. He thought these were *subconsciously* influenced partly by ideas which in the last resort could only be justified by the magisterial view of priesthood and a magical conception of sacraments which they themselves rejected, and partly by a feeling that somehow the whole principle of authority in religion is bound up with episcopacy. Unless they were prepared to cross-examine their principles again and to be ready to act on what they really believed, corporate reunion was impossible. But federation, or 'a League of Churches,' was more than a possibility: it was a pressing necessity if institutional Christianity was not to profess itself morally bankrupt. If a 'League of Churches' was impossible there was no hope of a League of Nations — or United Nations, as we should now say.

Streeter was also deeply concerned about the supply and quality of ordination candidates. More than once he publicly stated his view that, in young men, keenness to serve and ability or promise of ability to serve intelligently were more important qualifications than dogmatic orthodoxy. Rigid dogmatic tests would keep out the able and the honest: they could not exclude the stupid and the dishonest from whom the Church had far more to fear. Provided a young man of ability and keenness was of good moral character and was not seeking ordination from plainly wrong motives, Streeter regarded the probing by other men into a candidate's personal religious life and 'vocation' and 'humility' as the absurdity and offence which it is. He also had clear ideas, related to the then prevailing circumstances, about the best and suitable courses of training; but they would appear impossibly idealistic in these later days when it is estimated that less than one-third of the candidates accepted by C.A.C.T.M. selection boards have obtained or are capable of obtaining the Higher School Certificate.

Streeter was a stimulating teacher, though with whatever subject a tutorial discussion began it was certain soon to turn to the one then uppermost in his mind. In his work of authorship he never sat, pen in hand, before blank paper; 'get *something* written' was his first rule. He would scribble notes at odd times on scraps of paper; later he would dictate to a typist who would leave wide margins and large space between the lines of text; the result he would then almost obliterate with his spidery and hardly legible writing, from which a typed copy would be made. This process would be repeated, often several times, before the fair copy was ready. Even so, his books were largely rewritten in galley-proof, and even his page-proofs must have given his printers headaches. He thought it all, including the expense, well worth while. His absorbing interest in living issues, his constant desire to be understood and helpful, his almost uncanny power of distinguishing the important from the secondary or trivial, and his lightness and lucidity of style, made all he wrote a profitable pleasure to read. For one who wrote so much he read surprisingly little — a fact which sometimes exposed him to the criticism of putting forth as new what was already known to other scholars, but in fact it was not only new to him but also the outcome of his own insight and thought.

It cannot be claimed that Streeter was a successful preacher. His sermons depended for the impression they made, at least upon those who did not know him well, almost entirely upon their content. He could not but be thoughtful and interesting, but what

he had to say lost heavily by his delivery of it. His voice was neither clear nor strong and often suggested that it was an effort for him to speak at all. In a large building he was inaudible to very many in a congregation. Sermons and addresses for particular occasions he would prepare with great care, and then their matter was as excellent as his books; but as a rule, and unless he intended to print a sermon, he did not spend much time in preparation of it. I myself heard him preach in Hereford cathedral from the galley-proofs of a forthcoming book, with frequent pauses and much fumbling and rustling of the long, awkward sheets of paper as he tried to find the required sections.

He was always a favourite with the young, and had many friendships among undergraduates as with persons of both sexes and of all ages. He could both stimulate and respond to youthful enthusiasms because he had never lost his own, a fact which enabled him entirely to overcome the inhibitions of an instinctive shyness. It was entirely natural to him to watch and investigate the Buchman Group movement from almost its first activities in Oxford.

From my knowledge of Streeter and my frequent walks with him I can at least understand his final surrender to the Groupist appeal. After the completion of his book on *The Chained Library* his never robust health weakened and he suffered much from lassitude and depression. He told me several times that he felt his New Testament work was done; he could not rouse himself to cope with the growing literature of 'Form-criticism' and he did not read German easily. What he did know of the newer fashion led him to the opinion that it was too much compounded of speculative presuppositions and unverifiable guesswork to have much relevance for empirical historical criticism. He was also at the time keenly sensitive to and apprehensive about events and tendencies in political international affairs, and convinced that they must lead to destructive war which would gravely set back any civilization which might survive it. The large numbers of young people and of men with public influence who, here and abroad, were being attracted to 'the Groups,' moved him to observe their activities with increasing sympathy; and when, in 1934, he openly identified himself with them, I am sure that all these factors contributed to his decision. It was, as he said, due not to a wish to be 'changed' and certainly less because of any help it afforded him in his personal life than because the Groups seemed to him a power making for the kind of goodwill among men, for the lack of which so much admirable social and international scenery failed of its effect. He said:

'This movement appeared to be able to change bad people into good,

> and to make good people better on a far larger scale than any body of people with whose activities I was familiar. It was also giving new heart and courage and a new sense of direction to some men of the best type who were losing heart and courage.'

But it would be wrong to deny that he gained renewed zest for life from his membership in this movement. 'The Groups' mediated to him a type of religious experience different from that which hitherto had been his, gave him new opportunities of influence among people young and old, and a greater measure of domestic contentment than had been his lot.

Streeter was a much travelled man. He twice visited China and Japan; he had lectured in India and paid several visits to America. His Prebendary's stall at Hereford was the only ecclesiastical preferment which came his way; but his insight into life's true values would in any event have saved him from a moment's soreness on that account, and in fact he was well aware that high ecclesiastical preferment would have involved a way of life for which he was as little fitted by temperament as he was by taste. He was glad to be a member of the Archbishops' Doctrinal Commission and occasionally served on similar committees; but at the usual debates of ecclesiastical assemblies he could hardly have kept awake. He once observed, on the elevation of the head of a college to the episcopal bench, that the only personal advantage of the new office was that he would have more opportunities of walking last in processions — adding (with that curious sudden intaking of breath which even close friends never knew whether or not it was a faint laugh) 'that is, if he happens to like that sort of thing.' His election by his colleagues as Provost of Queen's in 1933 was the tribute which probably gave him more pleasure than any other single event in his life. Other honours came unsought. In addition to his Fellowship of the British Academy he held Honorary Doctorates in the Universities of Edinburgh, Durham and Manchester; but he could not be induced to take in the ordinary way the degree of Doctor of Divinity in his own University, in which he was Reader in Christian Origins and, for a short time subsequently, Ireland Professor of Exegesis.

Returning to Oxford from a holiday which appeared to have completed a slow recovery from long and incapacitating ill-health, Streeter and his wife met swift death when an aeroplane of a Swiss air line crashed into a mountain in thick fog a few miles from Basle on September 10th, 1937. They are buried in a hillside cemetery outside the city, a lovely spot overlooking the French and German frontiers, and were laid to rest with the words of our service for The Burial of the Dead with the omission, as Streeter would have wished, of the supplication that God will be pleased

shortly to accomplish the number of His elect. In the ensuing Michaelmas term the church of St. Mary the Virgin was crowded for a memorial service at which William Temple, then Archbishop of York, gave the address.

The writer enjoyed Streeter's intimate friendship for nearly eighteen years and prefers to summarize his fundamental characteristics in words in which others expressed their appreciation. These were written by some members of his own senior common room, men not given to flattery:

> 'Streeter had at least a touch of greatness which was felt by all who knew him . . . it sprang not so much from intellect, though he was a finished scholar, as from character. Beyond the subtleties and intricacies of his reasoning and behind the shy and slightly awkward manner of his conversation lay a simplicity of soul not possessed except by the pure in heart. In it lay the secret of his perpetual freshness and ability to understand the thoughts and emotions of men and women forty years his junior, of his conquest over often indifferent health, of his sure insight into the ultimate values of things. It made him a sympathetic and charitable judge of mankind, a doer of kindnesses without advertisement, and the confessor of many troubled and doubting souls. Goodness came to him in a measure naturally; and the unity of his many works is to be found in his eagerness to do whatever lay to hand, without thought of comfort or consequence, if good might come of it.'

I would add that he never outwardly expressed anger; though meanness in any form, vindictiveness, and the tampering with righteousness in the supposed interests of other causes always stirred him deeply, his comments upon such incidents were couched in humorous vein and witty phrase, but he would work hard and long to counter them. He was the most sapient of advisers, the most loyal of friends.

Modern wars make so many deep breaches in the continuity of life that those who die before the outbreak of war seem, to those who survive, to belong to a past generation and to a world of vanished things. To-day theology and ecclesiastical life are coloured by far too much sheer dogmatism defended by paradox; by the curious mentality which seems to think religious truth is to be found by explaining the New Testament in terms of the Old with the aid of an elaborate and fantastic typology which suggests the influence of the crossword puzzle upon theology; and by the attempt to combine extreme historical scepticism with dogmatic orthodoxy — surely the most futile effort theology has ever made. But if and when these irrationalisms die the death they are preparing for themselves and men recover faith, not in abstract rationalism but in a broadly based reasonableness as the essential ground of any worthy religious faith, Streeter may yet come to be recognized as among the prophets.

CHRISTIAN MODERNISM AND PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY

By the Rev. W. Richardson, M.A., Assistant Chaplain, Oundle School

EVANGELISM and philosophical theology both aim at bringing God into the world and directing the world to God. Evangelism assumes that God exists and that the world can and should be dependent on Him by faith and prayer, and should seek His presence. Philosophical theology tries to show that that assumption is at least reasonable and that the universe as constituted necessitates its truth. Our inquiries will therefore centre primarily round the nature of the world, God, and the main Christian doctrines relating to them.

The trend of philosophy since Descartes has been to divide experience into two types between which there is no passage—sense-experience with which the empirical sciences would be especially concerned, and mental activity dealing with concepts or universals with which mathematics and so-called *a priori* metaphysics deal. If one started from the former, as Hume did, and tried to derive all other experience from it alone, then without unjustifiable and inconsistent assumptions there is no passage to the many other activities of the mind and spirit with which we are familiar; in particular one cannot arrive at the concepts of religion, and one is left agnostic with regard to reality, as Kant professed to be. If one started from the latter alone, like Bradley, then sense-experience in its turn appears to be illusory and unreal and the natural sciences of merely ephemeral significance.

This unsatisfactory situation should have been sufficient to indicate that something was wrong. It seems clear that the empiricists were both making unjustifiable negative assumptions about our experience and also claiming for themselves the help of certain principles of explanation at which on their own assumptions and by their methods they could not arrive. In spite of themselves they were compelled to acknowledge and use categories whose existence they denied, for instance, causation in one form or another. On the other hand it was patently absurd that the whole field of natural science should be relegated to illusion, since at least a large part of man's life has to be lived in its range and all mental activities are of necessity mediated through a physical brain and body.

Modern philosophy had to overcome this *impasse*. For philosophical theology it was vastly important; for if there is no passage from sense-experience to a knowledge of reality, there can be no knowledge of God, and religion must be either ethics or superstition or both; while, if the whole field of sense-experience is illusion, then there is no point in bothering about this life's activities; sin and suffering are likewise illusions. It is necessary then to go back behind Descartes in order to cross the great gulf, and it may be remembered that Plato had tried to solve this very problem by the Theory of Ideas or Forms. According to one exposition of the theory, the whole of reality is a graded or hierarchical system, something like a genealogical tree, descending from the Idea of the Good, which is the supreme idea, right down to the very lowest forms of physical existence such as hair and dirt. Objects, whether physical or conceptual, at various levels 'participate' in various combinations and degrees in these ideas, which thus constitute the existence of these objects. The whole of reality is thus a closely-knit system linked with the Idea of the Good from which all other ideas are derived. Moreover, the Idea of the Good has an energizing influence which permeates the whole system, for it is by a kind of desire for the degree of good in the higher levels of ideas, and ultimately for the supreme good at the top, that the whole universe is moved and exists. The Good is that 'which every soul pursues, and for the sake of this it does everything, divining that it is something important but perplexed and unable to grasp adequately what it is.' (Plato, *Republic*, 505 d.)

It has been said by R. G. Collingwood to be a sign that a philosopher's system is breaking down when he introduces God into it. Whitehead, like Plato, is one of the great philosophers who, on the contrary, find in God the necessary ultimate ground and explanation of all that is, and it is in Plato expanded and reinterpreted in the light of later scientific and philosophical discovery that he finds the closest analogy to his 'philosophy of organism.' He says:

> 'If we had to render Plato's general point of view with the least changes made necessary by the intervening two thousand years of human experience in social organization, in aesthetic attainment, in science, and in religion, we should have to set about the construction of a philosophy of organism. In such a philosophy the actualities constituting the process of the world are conceived as exemplifying the ingression (or "participation") of other things which constitute the potentialities of definiteness for any actual existence. The things which are temporal arise by participation in the things which are eternal. The two sets are mediated by a thing which combines the actuality of what is temporal with the timelessness of what is potential. This final entity is the divine element in the world by which the barren inefficient disjunction of abstract potentialities obtain

primordially the efficient conjunction of ideal realization.' (*Process and Reality*, p. 54).

He further says with regard to thought-forms and terminology:

> 'The appeal to Plato . . . has been an appeal to the facts against the modes of expression prevalent in the last few centuries. These recent modes of expression are partly the outcome of a mixture of theology and philosophy, and are partly due to the Newtonian physics, no longer accepted as a fundamental statement . . . Both for Plato and Aristotle the process of the actual world has been conceived as a real incoming of forms into real potentiality, issuing into that real togetherness which is an actual thing.' (*P. and R.*, 133-4.)

Whitehead states as it were the ground-plan of the philosophy of organism thus:

> 'God is primordially one, namely, He is the primordial unity of relevance of the many potential forms: in the process He acquires a consequent multiplicity, which the primordial character absorbs into its own unity. The World is primordially many, namely, the many actual occasions with their physical finitude; in the process it acquires a consequent unity, which is a novel occasion and is absorbed into the multiplicity of the primordial character. Thus God is to be conceived as one and as many in the converse sense in which the World is to be conceived as many and as one. The theme of Cosmology, which is the basis of all religions, is the story of the dynamic effort of the World passing into everlasting unity, and of the static majesty of God's vision, accomplishing its purpose of completion by absorption of the World's multipliciy of effort.' (*P. and R.*, 494.)

For this philosophy there is in the world neither inert matter nor empty space.

> 'Every reality is there for feeling: it promotes feeling; and it is felt. Also there is nothing which belongs merely to the privacy of feeling of one individual actuality. All origination is private. But what has been thus originated, publicly pervades the world.' (*P. and R.*, 439.)

All entities in the world have the characteristic of functioning as objects, and so they both provide the initial data for the growth or 'concrescence' of other actual entities in which they intervene, and also, by this universal relationship with each other, the bricks and mortar of a stable universe.

> 'The satisfaction of each actual entity (*i.e.* "the actual entity as a definite, determinate, settled fact, stubborn with unavoidable consequences" at the completion of its concrescence) is an element in the givenness of the universe: it limits boundless abstract possibility into the particular real potentiality from which each novel concrescence originates.' (*P. and R.*, 311.)

Each subject in the world, or, as Whitehead prefers to call it, each subject-superject (for in the subject there is process from one state to another), is a combination of initial data provided by the actual world at the beginning of the concrescence, subjective aim, and objective datum, the ideal target, as it were, or proposition,

at which the subject aims in its effort at self-realization and satisfaction. On obtaining that objective datum in its process of concrescence, it attains as superject its satisfaction or the decision which constitutes it determinate, settled fact. It then dies as concrescence and obtains the immortality of being an objective datum in the universe, a datum intervening in other concrescences. An actual entity in concrescence 'prehends' other objects and is thus related to them. 'Prehension' is a unique operation which in its positive form is also called 'feeling,' and feelings constitute the very core of things. 'An actual entity feels as it does feel in order to be the actual entity which it is. In this way an actual entity satisfies Spinoza's notion of substance: it is *causa sui*.' (*P. and R.*, 313.)

Can the process of concrescence be further described? Whitehead tries to follow it through successive phases from the initial data:

> 'Each new phase . . . means the retreat of mere propositional unity before the growing grasp of real unity of feeling. Each successive propositional phase is a lure to the creation of feelings which promote its realization. Each temporal entity, in one sense originates from its mental pole, analogously to God Himself. It derives from God its basic conceptual aim, relevant to its actual world, yet with indeterminations awaiting its own decisions. This subjective aim, in its successive modifications, remains the unifying factor governing the successive phases of interplay between physical and conceptual feelings. These decisions are impossible for the nascent creature antecedently to the novelties in the phases of its concrescence.' (*P. and R.*, 317.)

The basic conceptual aim of God, in virtue of which He is the Creator of the entity, is also the principle of order and ingression among entities and objects in the world. To be an entity is

> '"to be a determinant in the becoming of actualities." Accordingly the differentiated relevance of eternal objects to each instance of the creative process requires their conceptual realization in the primordial nature of God . . . the general relationships of eternal objects to each other, relationships of diversity and of pattern, are then relationships in God's conceptual realization.' (*P. and R.*, 363.)

The beginning of this creative process of our world, according to modern science, took place at a definite point in time, and so the Christian doctrine of Creation receives confirmation.

> 'There was an epoch about 10^9 or 10^{10} years ago on the further side of which the cosmos, if it existed at all, existed in some form totally unlike anything known to us: so that it represents the ultimate limit of science. We may perhaps without impropriety refer to it as the Creation. It supplies a concordant background to the view of the world which is suggested by the geological evidence, that every organism ever existent on the earth has had a beginning in time.' (Sir Edmund Whittaker, *Space and Spirit*, p. 118.)

Perhaps we can now sum up our picture of the world and the creative process in Whitehead's words as follows:

'Nothing floats into the world from nowhere. Everything in the actual world is referable to some actual entity. It is either transmitted from an actual entity in the past, or belongs to the subjective aim of the actual entity to whose concrescence it belongs . . . the initial stage of its aim is an endowment which the subject inherits from the inevitable ordering of things, conceptually realized in the nature of God. The immediacy of the concrescent subject is constituted by its living aim at its own self-constitution. Thus the initial stage of the aim is rooted in the nature of God, and its completion depends on the self-causation of the subject-superject . . . In this sense God is the principle of concretion; namely, He is the actual entity from which each temporal concrescence receives that initial aim from which its self-causation starts. That aim determines the initial gradations of relevance of eternal objects for conceptual feeling; and constitutes the autonomous subject in its primary phase of feelings with its initial conceptual valuations, and with its initial physical purposes . . . The subject, thus constituted, is the autonomous master of its own concrescence into subject-superject. It passes from a subjective aim in concrescence into a superject with objective immortality . . . According to this explanation, self-determination is always imaginative in its origin. The deterministic efficient causation is the inflow of the actual world in its own proper character of its own feelings, with their own intensive strength, felt and re-enacted by the novel concrescent subject. But this re-enaction has a mere character of conformation to pattern. The subjective valuation is the work of novel conceptual feeling; and in proportion to its importance . . . this autonomous conceptual element modifies the subjective forms throughout the whole range of feeling in that concrescence and thereby guides the integrations . . . Each creative act is the universe incarnating itself as one, and there is nothing above it by way of final condition.' (*P. and R.*, 345-7.)

Modern scientific investigations of causality and of the transmission of physical influence, therefore, support

'the view that in the physical domain there is a continual succession of intrusions or new creations. The universe is very far from being a mere mathematical consequence of the disposition of the particles at the Creation, and is a much more interesting and eventful place than any determinist imagines. Over the field within which rational science is possible, there must be regularity, for on this we depend for a connexion between the past, the present, and the future; but the regularity is not universal and exhaustive, for the world is being enriched unceasingly by the accession of new elements. It has been surmised that some relation, unknown to us as yet, may exist between the intrusions and the regularities. C. S. Peirce, the American mathematician and philosopher, believed that the laws of nature have resulted from an evolutionary process, the fixing of inveterate habits, so to speak, in the world of inanimate matter. But however this may be, the way in which the two features of regularity and novelty are endured simultaneously, and in both the physical and the psychical spheres, compels our wonder and exaltation.' (Sir E. Whittaker, *Space and Spirit*, pp. 126-7.)

The philosophy of organism holds that the origin and constitution of all things in the universe, animate or inanimate, conscious

or unconscious, is fundamentally the same, though the animate and conscious are high grade and more complex 'conscrescences.' There is in principle no duality of things material and mental or spiritual. All are alike constituted by the same mode of concrescence by prehensions or 'feelings.' How well this agrees with the latest evidence of modern science in its investigations of atomic energy can be seen if we translate some of our terms into those used by the President in last year's Presidential Address. The fundamental 'creativity' of the universe may perhaps be translated 'energy,' and the 'concrescence' into various types of object the 'congealment' of this energy in varying modes and degrees under the direction and desire of the ordered concepts of God. That 'congealment' is not a series of isolated events but is a phenomenon effected by and affecting the organic whole of the universe which in its successive or progressive phases of congealment creates individual entities, each constituting itself by its prehending or feeling or grasp of others throughout the whole universe, and these become the basis and conditions for future phases. As a crude and over-simplified illustration we might take the various phases of the cooling of the earth's crust by which successive salient, individual geographical and geological features are created which are the basic conditions of the next phase. In the mental and spiritual sphere character and society are built up or 'congeal' in much the same way out of their successive phases of experience and environment.

We must now ask, what is the nature of the God who is the Ground of this World and Process? Sir Edmund Whittaker points out that since the *same* mathematical laws are valid throughout the whole cosmos, which science has proved to be consistent and interrelated, we can be reasonably certain that only a *single* mind was responsible for the whole creation and that polytheism is excluded. Moreover, since we know that the universe as operated under the present laws of nature must have come into existence at a definite date in the past, called Creation, and that there will be a time when life will cease to be physically possible, it is impossible to believe that God is limited and conditioned by the limits and conditions of this world. 'If we have in any way arrived at the conviction that God exists, modern cosmology points to the further conclusion that He must be, in one aspect at least, extramundane.' (*Space and Spirit*, pp. 130-1.) But he cannot be Aristotle's unmoved mover, for 'the philosophy of organism finds a hierarchy of categories of feeling' (*P. and R.*, 233) linking the whole universe throughout with God, and 'the completion of God's nature into a fulness of physical feeling is derived from the

objectification of the world in God. He shares with every new creation its actual world; and the concrescent creature is objectified in God as a novel element in God's objectification of that actual world.' (*P. and R.*, 488.) He is also far more than the moralist of the Hebrew prophets or the omnipotent ruler of much Christian thought. Whitehead's sensitive description of his own view of the divine cannot be bettered:

> 'It dwells upon the tender elements in the world, which slowly and in quietness operate by love; and it finds purpose in the present immediacy of a kingdom not of this world. Love neither rules, nor is it unmoved; also it is a little oblivious as to morals. It does not look to the future; for it finds its own reward in the immediate present.' (*P. and R.*, 485.)

The complete nature of God is

> 'His judgment on the world. He saves the world as it passes into the immediacy of His own life. It is the judgment of a tenderness which loses nothing that can be saved. It is also the judgment of a wisdom which uses what in the temporal world is mere wreckage. He is the poet of the world, with tender patience leading it by His vision of truth, beauty and goodness.' (*P. and R.*, 490.)

In the light of what the philosophy of organism tells us about the world and God, what would be the attitude of philosophical theology to the specific doctrines of Christianity derived from the incidents of Christ's life and often embodied in the Creeds? As Dr. F. R. Tennant says, science, philosophy and theology all arose out of the mythology in which men first tried to explain the world; religion in particular 'could find expression only in metaphorical language of this kind, as no other mode of interpreting the mysterious, or the Beyond, was possible.' (*Phil. Theol.*, II, 227.) Collingwood further maintains that the use of metaphor is inevitable in all religion, however advanced, and that the metaphor is taken literally. If in religion we talked of upsetting someone's apple-cart, it would immediately and inevitably be understood as a literal cart full of apples. 'Religion is a hybrid of the literal and the spiritual, of superstition and truth. Far more than art, it conveys to man real knowledge of himself and the world . . . But religion is not the highest form of truth, even though the truth which it reveals is substantially the highest and final truth. Its message is formally imperfect, tainted by the dislacement of assertion from the truth to the symbol, so that religion can never say what it means.' (*Speculum Mentis*, p. 145.) In religion metaphor mistakes itself for literal fact, and so religion mistakes what it says for what it means.' Philosophical theology is concerned with the meaning and its value.

Now Whitehead maintains that 'in the real world it is more important that a proposition be interesting than that it be true.

The importance of truth is that it adds to interest' (*P. and R.*, 366); from false propositions creative advance can be made. Propositions are a 'lure for feeling,' and when a Christian meditates on the sayings in the Gospels 'he is not judging "true or false"; he is eliciting their value as elements in feeling. In fact he may ground his judgment of truth upon his realization of value.' (*P. and R.*, 261.)

Since in the organic philosophy ''tis *feeling* makes the world go round,' the historicity of the Gospel accounts, on which Christian doctrines are based, is not so important as their efficacy as lures for feelings which will lead to the subject's satisfaction and immortality in God's completed nature and to the harmony of the various societies which constitute the universe. In the unlikely event of criticism's disproving the historicity of all the Christian story, religion will still go on and philosophical theology will still have place and purpose in refining its metaphors and symbols and in rendering explicit their implicit meaning. It will have no interest in any elements which do not serve to further the full satisfaction of man and the world in God's full and perfect actuality.

Let us consider some of the main Christian doctrines. The cosmological problem of evil is the fundamental situation with which the most majestic doctrines are designed to deal. Whitehead finds its origin in a frustration or maladjustment of creative effort in the universe.

> 'A new actuality may appear in the wrong society, amid which its claims to efficacy act mainly as inhibitions. Then a weary task is set for creative function, by an epoch of new creations to remove the inhibitions. Insistence on birth at the wrong season is the trick of evil. In other words, the novel fact may throw back, inhibit, and delay. But the advance, when it does arrive, will be richer in content, more fully conditioned, and more stable. For in its objective efficacy an actual entity can only inhibit by reason of its alternative positive contribution. A chain of facts is like a barrier reef. On one side there is wreckage, and beyond it harbourage and safety. The categories governing the determination of things are the reasons why there should be evil; and are also the reasons why, in the advance of the world, particular evil facts are finally transcended.' (*P. and R.*, 315.)

Now the primary corrective of such maladjustment in the creative process is the subject's 'prehension' of God's primordial nature, its realization, valuation or grasp of God's conceptual nature seeking actuality in the creative process, which results in a 'lure for feeling' in the subject and in desire and effort to actualize the values of God's primordial nature. Through it would come all the operations of grace. But in Christian doctrine the supreme battle with evil was fought at the Crucifixion and is continually fought

through its extension, the Atonement. By the challenging shock of the Crucifixion new influences were released to combat the evil influences engrained in society. Strong new contrasts were set up, and it is by contrast that there is advance into consciousness (*P. and R.*, 226) and novelty (*P. and R.*, 32) in the creative process. Those influences still operate in those who through the Christian religion are brought to realize the significance of the Crucifixion. The past is effective in the present and into the future. As Whitehead says of causation, there is 'a sense of influx of influence from . . . presences in the past, localized and yet evading local definition, such influence modifying, enhancing, inhibiting, diverting the stream of feeling which we are receiving, unifying, enjoying, and transmitting.' (*P. and R.*, 251.)

That other great doctrine, the Incarnation, intensifies the shock of the contrast of the Crucifixion. The whole creative process is the first act in the incarnation of God, for in it His conceptual nature finds full satisfaction and self-realization and actuality in giving satisfaction and self-realization in perfected actuality to the many actualities of the world. It would seem, then, that in the conditions of this our cosmic epoch the incarnation of God in a unique manner with regard to His conceptual nature in the individual Person Jesus Christ, with limitations necessitated by the mediation of the human body, would be a natural culmination of the creative process. As Pringle-Pattison says, 'Whatever else it may mean, it means at least this — that in the conditions of the highest human life we have access, as nowhere else, to the inmost nature of the Divine.' (*The Idea of God in Recent Philosophy*, p. 157.) In conjunction with the Crucifixion it does mean more. Have we not here 'a new actuality appearing in a wrong society,' before its time, with the resulting outrage and shock of the Crucifixion? On the one side wreckage, beyond it harbourage and safety, as in the creative advance of the world the significance of the Incarnation-Crucifixion is assimilated and issues in 'lure for feeling' and desire to find full realization in the God who through the Incarnation experienced the full poignancy of individual human life.

The final action of the creative process

> 'is the love of God for the world. It is the particular providence for particular occasions. What is done in the world is transformed into a reality in heaven, and the reality in heaven passes back into the world. By reason of this reciprocal relation, the love in the world passes into the love in heaven, and floods back again into the world. In this sense God is the great companion—the fellow-sufferer who understands.' (*P. and R.*, 497.)

And so we return to the note of Evangelism with which we began. Mervyn Stockwood in his book *Whom They Pierced* says:

> 'We hear much of atomic energy, but there is a divine energy capable of greater things, and it is this energy which lays hold of us and saturates us in prayer.' (p. 67.)

If the atomic energy and the energy of the spirit in prayer are both modes of the same divine spiritual source of energy, then to 'throw open the windows of the soul to let in the mighty influence of God's divine energy' is to find strength and purpose in co-operating harmoniously with the energy of God's love creatively surging out into the world.

THE CHARTER OF CHRISTIAN MODERNISM

> 'The Spirit of truth . . . shall guide you into all truth.'
> —*St. John* xvi, 13.

WE may claim these great words from the Fourth Gospel as the Charter of Christian Modernism. The Church of Christ is by its very nature a learning as well as a teaching Church: both *Ecclesia discens* and *Ecclesia docens*. Its task in every age is to bring together in a new synthesis inherited tradition and newly acquired knowledge. That task is specially urgent to-day, for modern research in History and Natural Science (including Psychology) has not only brought to light fresh evidence, but has also developed improved methods of criticism. Years ago that great Roman Catholic thinker, the late Baron von Hügel, used to maintain that in order to touch the educated Western European world of to-day Catholicism must assimilate the intellectual temper of the cultivated non-Roman world which is, he said, 'in part unconsciously, often slowly, yet everywhere surely, getting permeated and won by critical tendencies and methods.'

In this sharpening of the instruments of the mind we can surely recognize the hand of God. In Him we live and move and have our being. 'Reverence God in *thyself*,' said Benjamin Whichcote (Aphorism 798), 'for God is *more* in the *Mind* of Man, than in any part of this world besides . . .' Our power of thought is from Him and of Him, and it is part of His purpose to work

* Sermon preached in Somerville College Chapel to the Modern Churchmen's Conference on July 26th, 1948, by the Right Rev. J. W. Hunkin, D.D., M.C., Bishop of Truro.

through our active thinking. We claim no infallibility for ourselves or for anyone else, but it is our duty to think things out and to get as near the truth as we can.

Reverently we seek the help and inspiration of the Divine Spirit, Who is closer to us than we can imagine—infinitely close. And relying continually on that divine assistance we endeavour to prove all things and to hold fast that which is good. Fact must come before theory. We must first discover and face the facts. 'We can never get comfort by hiding any fact,' F. D. Maurice wrote to his wife.[1] 'God's revelation will explain all facts if we will allow it to do so.' Some years previously, in another letter, Maurice wrote:

> 'The steadfastness of Balaam in refusing to turn aside when the creature on which he rode refused to go forward, is precisely the steadfastness of . . . false prophets. They do not believe that facts are angels of the Lord, saying "Thus far shalt thou go and no farther"; they merely kick and beat and rave, determined to do what they cannot do, always mistaking adherence to their own maxims for obedience to the divine will.'[2]

Here Maurice's attitude is precisely that of T. H. Huxley,[3] who wrote to Charles Kingsley:

> 'Science seems to me to teach in the highest and strongest manner the great truth which is embodied in the Christian conception of entire surrender to the will of God. Sit down before fact as a little child, be prepared to give up every preconceived notion, follow humbly wherever and to whatever abysses nature leads, or you shall learn nothing. I have only begun to learn content and peace of mind since I have resolved at all risks to do this.'

In the sixties of the last century Dr. Döllinger's claim for scientific freedom for the historian's work was rejected by the Church of Rome, but it is a claim that neither Church nor State can afford to refuse. And the assured results of sound historical and biblical scholarship are to be accepted, not grudgingly but frankly and gratefully.

New Testament scholarship, for instance, points to the conclusion that the stories about our Lord which were circulating in various groups of the primitive Christian community in the period 29 A.D. to 70 A.D. owed a certain amount both in form and content to the groups themselves. These stories were edited and strung together into more or less continuous narratives by the writers of the New Testament Gospels. Some of the original stories have probably been embroidered by piety, some may be *ben trovato* rather than literally historical, others — for example, some of the

[1] *Life*, II, 259 (22 March, 1855).

[2] *Life*, I, 441 (Spring, 1847).

[3] *Life*, I, 219 (23 September, 1860).

birth narratives, notoriously difficult to fit into one another — may be regarded as Christian Midrash rather than authentic history. And so on. But, studied all together, like pictures round a picture gallery, they give us a living portrait of that wonderful Person whom we, like the Roman centurion who saw Him die, call υἱὸς θεοῦ, *Son of God* (*Mk.* xv, 39); and, we add, κύριος, *divine Lord*, triumphant over death.

Here is a supreme revelation of God which must be interpreted in terms of the concrete life of the present. Dogmas are authorized formulations built up on the spiritual facts of religion; authorized, that is, by the authorities of the Church at a particular epoch. All dogmas are dated, and should therefore be reviewed from time to time in the light of increasing knowledge and improving critical technique. The developed speculative Christology authoritative in the fifth century is now no longer adequate; and a number of other examples could be given.

The fundamentals of the Creed stand firm. We believe in God, All-Sovereign Creator: in Jesus Christ, His Son (*in Filium ejus Iesum Christum*): in the Holy Spirit (*in Spiritum Sanctum*): in the holy Church (*sanctam ecclesiasm*), in the forgiveness of sins and in Eternal Life — the prime articles of the earliest Roman creed and of every other since. But the form and idiom of all the creeds published in the authorized documents of the Church are dated, and the dates are ancient and not modern dates. The expressions used are not familiar in present-day language. We are bound, therefore, to claim reasonable liberty of interpretation, and reasonable liberty not merely for some but for all.

In *The Faith of a Moralist* the late Dr. A. E. Taylor justly criticized Bishop Gore's attempt to allow a symbolical interpretation of some articles in the Creed, *e.g.* the Ascension, while rigidly insisting on a literal interpretation of others, *e.g.* the Virgin Birth.

> 'What I dispute,' Dr. Taylor writes,[4] 'is the right of any man or body of men to claim once and for all to limit the right to recognize the presence of the symbolic element to the case of certain specified articles, and to exclude from active participation in the devotional life of the Christian community those who do not make the same precise restriction.'

And further, it is necessary to claim not only reasonable liberty of interpretation but also reasonable liberty of disagreement. No great society, and above all no society which aims eventually at including all mankind, can expect to secure uniformity of opinion on all points. A considerable width of divergence on minor matters is not undesirable, and indeed it is quite inevitable.

Moreover, the Christian Modernist no longer attaches so much

[4] II, 142 (*cf.* 113).

nportance to summaries or slogans. He believes, with Alfred oisy, that the problems of theology have to be resolved by drawg inspiration much more from the Spirit of Jesus than from His rmal declarations.

On the other hand, liberty to think straight is vital. Of recent ears we have been frequently warned of possible attacks from utside upon the spiritual freedom of the Church, but there may e danger to real spiritual liberty from within as well as from ithout. And if honest thinking involves risk, the risk is by no eans so great as that which arises from slipshod thinking or from ought suppressed. The Roman Church really reformed would ally the great people of France into the unity which is so urgently eeded in that country. What a difference a real reformation of e Eastern Church would have made in Russia at the beginning f the present century! A story is told of Joseph Stalin that after e had risen to power someone asked his mother if she were not roud of her son. 'Well,' the old lady answered, 'if he had only ontinued his original studies he might have been a bishop.' But the Russian Church might have found it hard to retain their oung theological student, why should Rome have lost Loisy and yrrell? That gallant Roman Catholic, Miss Petre, remained toutly loyal to them both. Why did not the influence of first-rate inkers like Lord Acton and Baron von Hügel have more weight, nd why should the work of that very eminent and very devout nd single-hearted Professor of Mathematics, Le Roy (*Dogme et ritique*, 1907), have been placed on the Index?

'Our epoch,' said Trotsky in his book on Stalin, 'is above all n epoch of lies': and if that is an exaggeration, there is none the ss a very urgent need to raise the standard of personal integrity n thought and practice. 'Consecrate them by the truth' is one of he petitions in the Lord's high priestly prayer found in the next hapter of this Gospel (*Jn.* xvii, 17). 'The end of the Truth,' says Bishop Westcott, commenting on these words, 'is not wisdom, hich is partial, but holiness, which is universal.'

Holiness, of course, is never merely theoretical. It is intensely ractical. 'People must believe more strongly in a few truths hich we all acknowledge,' Benjamin Jowett wrote to a friend 22 April, 1879), 'and they must apply them more vigorously to ractical life.' This indeed was the main point of a most able and hristian address delivered to a large gathering of the Lambeth ishops by Sir Stafford Cripps at an Industrial Christian Fellowhip breakfast last week.

This is the very moment to take stock of the position of hristian Modernism. It has a tradition and an inheritance of

which it is justly proud. The thin red line can be traced right back to the beginning. St. Stephen, if not the first, was one of the first of Christian Modernists. The line always has been thin, and red is hardly the right word for its colour. The Cambridge Platonists were far from red: they were a heavenly blue. And coming down to our own day, we have Hastings Rashdall and B. H. Streeter—and I am particularly glad to see that our programme includes accounts of them—A. L. Lilley, F. C. Burkitt, J. M. Creed and a number of other teachers and leaders whom this evening we most thankfully remember.

The Gospel of Christ is a living Gospel. It is not a dead tree. It is a growing tree and sheds its dead leaves in accordance with the natural rhythm of life. From time to time it needs a little pruning. Pruning is a skilled operation. It may easily be too drastic, and only a well-sharpened instrument should be used.

Mr. Valiant-for-truth is one of the most attractive characters in the Second Part of *Pilgrim's Progress*. When Mr. Great-heart first came upon him it was just at the place where Little-faith formerly was robbed, and he stood with his sword drawn and his face all bloody. Three men had attacked him.

> 'These three, to wit, Wild-head, Inconsiderate, and Pragmatic, drew upon me, and I also drew upon them. So we fell to it, one against three, for the space of above three hours. They have left upon me, as you see, some of the marks of their valour, and have also carried away with them some of mine.'
>
> Then said Great-heart: 'Thou hast worthily behaved thyself. Let me see thy sword.' So he showed it him. When he had taken it in his hand, and looked thereon awhile, he said, 'Ha! it is a right Jerusalem blade.'
>
> Valiant: 'It is so. Let a man have one of these blades, with a hand to wield it and skill to use it, and he may venture upon an angel with it.'

Let the Christian Modernist take care to provide himself with a right Jerusalem blade. Who knows but he may have to venture upon an angel with it? An angel, perhaps; but with a fellow-Christian controversy is to be avoided as far as possible. We must be patient with the speculations of others, for we too have our own, though we do not always recognize them as such. 'Speaking the truth in love—that is how we may best grow up into Him in all things, which is the head, even Christ.' (*Ephes.* iv, 15.)

Benjamin Jowett used to say that 'to meddle in theology required an exceptionally happy nature.' It may be so. At all events, 'forbearing one another in love,' we should endeavour 'to keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace.' (*Ephes.* iv, 2, 3.) Now, if ever, is the time to close the ranks of the Church, and to stand shoulder to shoulder against the advancing forces of secularism and materialism.

In this service on the first evening of our Conference we deliberately and earnestly seek to put ourselves under the guidance of the Spirit of Truth, both individually and corporately. Each of us tries to lift up heart and mind to God and prays for deliverance from prejudice and partial affection. So he prepares to apply his mind for all he is worth. But we are here not only as individuals. We are here to pray and think together. The Church is in a sense the home of the Spirit. In the fellowship of the Spirit the powers of mind and spirit are enhanced, and we help one another both consciously and subconsciously. An individual, for example, will often find a certain argument leading him to a certain conclusion; and yet he will hesitate, for he is haunted by a doubt whether he may not after all have overlooked some vital factor. We help one another not to overlook vital factors.

. . . . . .

'The Spirit of truth shall guide you into *all the truth*' — *all* the truth. What a far-stretching country lies before us! And for human beings in the present state of their development to travel hopefully is a better thing than to arrive.

VIA VERITAS VITA*

I am the Way, the Truth and the Life. — *St. John* xiv, 6.

THE Way first; that may give us cause to think, for often we have felt that our need is to search out the Truth in order that we may know the Way. We feel with Thomas — 'Lord, we know not whither thou goest, and how can we know the way? But did not our Lord say, 'He that doeth the will shall know of the teaching'? The philosophy of the *Pilgrim's Progress* is so true to life. We must find the Way, and walk in it, that we may know the Truth. Truth to be learnt in the Interpreter's House, the Palace Beautiful — even in Doubting Castle and Vanity Fair — that we may reach the Delectable Mountains to view the landscape o'er, and find our rest in the land of Beulah before we cross the River.

The Christian Way is the Way of service, and, it may be, of suffering. In our present distresses and nameless anxieties, when we are each called to bear some special burden, of which perhaps we rarely speak, but which is never far from our thoughts, there

* Sermon preached in Somerville College Chapel to the Modern Churchmen's Conference on July 36th, 1948, by the Ven. W. M. Browne, M.A., Archdeacon of Rochester.

is a way that has proved again and again a true path of life, when it almost seemed as if all ways were closed, and we could see no road before us. That is the Way of service: 'Bear ye one another's burden and so fulfil the law of Christ.'

The story of Simon the Cyrenian is a true example. It was a dread moment when the Centurion's hand fell upon his shoulder and he was compelled to bear the Cross for a prisoner who had fallen under its weight. Why should this have happened to him of all men? It was so unfair, so undeserved. It was such a shameful thing. Would he ever forget it? But as he followed on the way he forgot himself, and thought of Him in whose steps he trod until he laid down the burden. One thing we may be sure of—Christ thanked him, if not with words, yet with a look. For that service Simon is remembered in the Gospel story. His shame became his glory. 'Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of these my brethren, ye have done it unto Me.' Christ is more than the Pioneer who has blazed the trail; He is with us on the way, the Great-heart of our pilgrimage.

I am the Way. Yes, but the way must have direction, and a goal. It is a way to lead us into all truth. Is it enough to say with Matthew Arnold,

> 'Henceforth man
> Must labour — must resign
> His all too human creeds and scan
> Simply the Way Divine.'?

In quoting those lines Dr. Figgis added with prophetic truth, 'In the last generation men were unable to take Jesus as Lord, and they were sad. Now they are choosing other masters and are glad.'

Does this mistake lie in thinking that we could separate Christ as the Way and Christ as the Truth? The truth of revelation is not to be found in discovery only. Can we be content with the quest and believe that God has withheld the finding? All finding, it is true, will lead to a new quest. To that St. Paul bears witness: 'Not as if I had already attained, or were already perfect. But I follow after. I press towards the mark for the prize of the high calling of God.' But notice also how the Apostle speaks of being apprehended of Christ and found in Him.

Dr. Hort's comment on the words of our text is significant:

> 'The truth which they combine to set forth is not one of those lesser truths. Its evidence is to be found in the light that it brings far more than in any light that it receives.'

'Humanism' claims to enlighten the universe by man-made theories. The Christian faith claims to enlighten mankind by God-given truths. Such faith depends not upon a multiplicity of

ogmas stated by authority, but upon the principles of life as nown in the portrait of our Lord in the Gospel pages, in His ords, and in all that we dare claim to be according to the mind f Christ. Bishop Lightfoot endorsed such a view in these words : Things that edify others do not edify me. I feed upon four or ve great ideas.' Meaning, thereby, ideas inspired by the Gospels. I cannot pretend,' he wrote, 'to be indifferent about the veracity f the records which profess to reveal Him whom I believe to be ot only the very Truth, but the very Life.' Words which I am ure would be endorsed by Dr. Rashdall, whom we have honoured n our memories at this Conference.

As to the rival claims of Humanism and Christian Theism, let ie quote these words of Lord Balfour—at some length :

> 'The religion of humanity seems specially fitted to meet the tastes of that comparatively small and prosperous class who are unwilling to leave the dry bones of agnosticism wholly unclothed with any living tissue of religious emotion, and who at the same time are fortunate enough to persuade themselves that they are contributing or may contribute, by their individual effort to the attainment of some great ideal for mankind. But what has it to say to the more obscure multitude who are absorbed and well-nigh overwhelmed with the constant struggle with daily needs and narrow cares; who have little leisure or inclination to consider the precise rôle they are called upon to play in the great drama of humanity, and who might in any case be puzzled to discover its interest or importance? Can it assure them there is no human being so insignificant as not to be of infinite worth in the eyes of Him who created the Heavens? or so feeble that his actions may have consequences of infinite moment long after this material system shall have crumbled into nothingness? Does it (the religion of Humanity) offer consolation to those who are in grief; hope to those who are bereaved; forgiveness to the sinful; rest to those who are weary and heavy laden? If not, then whatever its merits it is no rival to Christianity. It cannot penetrate or unify the inmost life of ordinary humanity. There is no nourishment for ordinary souls; no comfort for ordinary human sorrow; no help for ordinary human weakness.'

I do not think we can fail to notice the passionate feeling of ose words from one such as Lord Balfour, who was usually ought of as a teacher of 'Philosophic Doubt.' Our claim for the aster as the Truth is that He can and does 'penetrate and unify ie inmost life of ordinary humanity.' The truth by which man can ve must be as simple as His call 'Come unto Me'; though such truth is full of mystery, and such a call beckons us on to Eternity.

'I am the Way, the Truth and the Life.'

What of the Life? Bishop Creighton, writing to a friend, says is : 'Life can only be explained by a life. And I see in Jesus at life of which all other life is but a partial reflection.' In Him ie 'Word was made flesh.' In Him the Love of God was made carnate. And what was perfectly true—and only perfectly

true—of Him is partially true of others—of the prophets, priests, saints and reformers who strove to make some Word of God incarnate; some parable of Christ real for others. Such as made no claim to make new things known, but were able to make known things new. Those who lived their creed, and died in a faith they had made their own.

But this is true also of our friends, for whom we thank God and take courage because in their lives we found the way to follow; felt some truth made vital; God's love made manifest. If we are to follow the Way, find the Truth, and live the Life, some word of Christ must not only be believed, it must find expression in our lives.

Is that possible? We know it is, because we have seen it in others. Not of ourselves, for we are tempted and fail; our prayers are so faltering; our faith so dim; our service of others so imperfect. Yet it is possible by His Grace, His Power, and His Spirit. In Him is life; and the message of those from whom we learn most is that they dwell in Him and He in them. The life is more than the truth; the deed more than the word; the influence more than the example. May their way be our way; their truth our truth; their life our life, by that personal influence that counts for more than argument.

The Christian Faith, if it is to survive the grim realities of our times, must be more than a seeking; it must be a finding. Nay, more than a finding: it must mean 'a being found of Him who is for time and eternity the Way, the Truth and the Life.'

> The dear Lord's best interpreters are humble human souls.
> The Gospel of a life like theirs is more than books or scrolls.
> From schemes and creeds the light goes out; the saintly fact survives,
> The Blessed Master, who can doubt, revealed in Holy Lives.